The tensions between Baghdad and Erbil are continuously increasing. Both sides have failed to reach an agreement on a range of disputed issues that are of mutual paramount importance. The tensions have reached a point where the issue of a referendum in the Kurdistan Region is again back on the table. Nevertheless, it is uncertain to what extent a referendum can assist the Kurdistan Region enhance its position. At a meeting with the president of the Kurdistan Region, Massoud Barzani, all Kurdish political parties agreed on a referendum that could allow the Kurdish people to choose whether they prefer federalism, confederation or independence.
I argue that, for three reasons, holding the referendum is not a good idea.
First, is the problem of disputed territories: Throughout the history of Kurdish struggle against successive regimes in Baghdad, the issue of disputed territories was proven to be the main point of disagreement. In March 1974, the Iraqi government imposed a draft autonomy agreement and gave Mustafa Barzani two weeks to respond. Barzani rejected the agreement, which would have left the disputed territories, including Kirkuk, under Iraqi government control. He resumed fighting against the regime. Since the removal of the Baath regime, the Kurdish leadership has consistently warned Baghdad that the unity of Iraq depends on a full implementation of Article 140 of the constitution, which sets a legal framework on solving the issue of disputed territories. A referendum on the future of the Kurdistan Region, excluding the disputed territories, would not only further complicate the implementation of Article 140, it will also, to some extent, delegitimize the Kurdistan Regional Government’s call of reclaiming the disputed territories.
Second, the effectiveness of the referendum: The referendum will have limited, if any, impact on the political developments of the Kurdistan Region and the disputes between Baghdad and Erbil. The results of the referendum are very predictable. It is almost a certainty that the vast majority of Kurdish people will vote for independence, as was the case in a 2005 referendum, in which an overwhelming 98 percent majority voted in favor of independence and permanent secession from Iraq. There is no doubt that the dream of every single Kurd is to see an independent Kurdish state. In an ideal world where rights are given, there would have been an independent Kurdistan. But unfortunately, world politics has not created an ideal world.
The idea that the referendum results will provide Kurds with leverage in dealing with Baghdad might not work, and it actually might backfire and lead to further escalation. It is unclear how the results of the referendum can help the Kurdish cause. There are several unanswered questions that seriously question the necessity of such a referendum. Assuming that the Kurdish people vote in favor of independence, how can the Kurdish leadership cope with that result? How would the international community, great powers in particular, receive such a unilateral decision by the Kurdistan Region? Considering the existence of a sizable Kurdish community in the neighboring countries, particularly Turkey and Iran, how would they react to such a referendum? To what extent might the referendum endanger the integral economic and political contribution of Turkey and Iran in the development of the Kurdistan Region? Is the Kurdish leadership ready to declare independence while excluding the disputed territories? Other than an emotional triumph and the revival of nationalism, the referendum will not result in any tangible positive developments.
Third, financial burdens: Currently the Kurdistan Region is facing a financial crisis. Baghdad refuses to fully make the rightful payments to the Kurdistan Regional Government. As a result, the KRG is facing harsh difficulties in paying the salaries of its employees on time. The financial crisis is also having an adverse impact on the investment projects and economic movements in the region, and it is unclear how long the financial crisis facing the KRG will last. Holding the referendum will require a great deal of financial resources. Therefore, the cost of the establishment of the Kurdistan election commission, which is yet to be established, and the cost of the referendum per se will put another financial burden on the KRG.
* Niyaz Barzani, MA in International Politics from the University of Texas. He is based in Erbil.
Comments
Rudaw moderates all comments submitted on our website. We welcome comments which are relevant to the article and encourage further discussion about the issues that matter to you. We also welcome constructive criticism about Rudaw.
To be approved for publication, however, your comments must meet our community guidelines.
We will not tolerate the following: profanity, threats, personal attacks, vulgarity, abuse (such as sexism, racism, homophobia or xenophobia), or commercial or personal promotion.
Comments that do not meet our guidelines will be rejected. Comments are not edited – they are either approved or rejected.
Post a comment