In practice, this was indeed what Turkey was doing – by facilitating and even financing independent oil and gas exports from Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey and the rest of the world, Ankara for the first time offered South Kurdistani (Basuri) Kurds a way out of Iraq. As relations between Ankara and Baghdad (as well as between Erbil and Maliki’s Baghdad) soured, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)-led partnership with Turkey only strengthened.
In June of 2014, Turkish government spokesman Huseyin Celik expressed how Ankara’s perspective towards Erbil had evolved when he stated that "The Kurds of Iraq can decide for themselves the name and type of the entity they are living in... the Kurds, like any other nation, will have the right to decide their fate." Similar and previously unimaginable statements came from other Justice and Development Party (AKP) leaders at the time, indicating that Ankara had reconciled itself to Kurdish independence in Basur.
At the same time, the Iraqi army’s retreat in the face of Islamic State (ISIS) attacks left almost all disputed territories in Iraq in Kurdish hands. Although ISIS captured some of these territories from the Kurds in August 2014, Peshmerga forces later pushed the jihadis back out. This removed a major hurdle from the prospect of Kurdistan’s secession from Iraq – the reluctance to leave majority Kurdish-inhabited areas behind.
With an outlet through Turkey and all their lands in hand, Iraqi Kurds increasingly felt ready to finally cease being Iraqi. Given all the massacres of previous decades along with the new government in Baghdad’s refusal to share power, they also seemed to deserve the right to independence – America’s “One Iraq” policy be damned.
Recent developments in Turkey now stymie the whole Basuri independence bid, however. Ankara’s hostility towards Syrian Kurdistan and events in the town of Kobane around December of 2014 cost the AKP many of its Kurdish voters. President Erdogan fully realized this in the June 2015 election when his government lost its majority and the pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy Party (HDP) – led by the charismatic young Kurdish lawyer Selahattin Demirtas -- garnered some 13% of the vote. Mr. Erdogan’s response was to abandon the peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, resume the war and take a hard turn to the Right in an attempt to attract more Turkish nationalist votes.
As evidenced by the repeat election of November 2015, Mr. Erdogan’s electoral gambit worked brilliantly.
As a result, the government in Turkey today – along with the constitutional reforms needed to secure Mr. Erdogan’s increasingly dictatorial powers for the next decade or more – depends more than ever on support from conservative, right-wing Turkish nationalist voters. Although AKP leaders and Turkish diplomats may still think they can accept Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence – and privately may even say as much to KDP leaders in Erbil – a crucial segment of their voters still cannot.
If Basur were to declare independence, the vociferous reaction in the Turkish street might therefore force the hand of Ankara against such a project. If such a declaration of independence occurred unilaterally, Erbil would then find itself embargoed and squeezed between unfriendly Ankara, Tehran, Damascus and Baghdad. Under such circumstances, even a new Trump-led Washington – assuming it decided to upend decades of American policy rejecting an independent Kurdish state – would be hard pressed to help Basur out of its box. Even resupply flights to Erbil would need to fly through the air space of Turkey, Syria, Iran or Iraq.
This would not necessarily doom the whole prospect of Basuri independence. Over a hundred thousand trained, motivated and well-armed Peshmerga and the threat of joining hands with Kurds in other parts of Kurdistan could well protect Basur from any invasion by neighboring states. International recognition of the new state would likely not be too long in coming, and the embargoes of neighbors would be lifted. In the interim, however, the people of Basur would need to get a lot better at growing their own food, suffering even lower standards of living and going without government salaries – much like those in Rojava have been doing for some time.
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
