As mentioned in previous articles, the European Union (EU) has no specific policy regarding the greater Kurdish question, but deals with the question in the framework of the four countries greater Kurdistan is part of. Therefore, it is important to first know the EU’s view on Iran. The EU sees Iran as an influential and powerful country. Apart from that, given Iran’s large population, they see it as a good market for European companies. Iran is a country rich in natural resources such as natural gas and oil, which Europe needs. All this has led the EU to have a consistently stable and strong relationship with Iran, despite the criticism that Europe levels against the country when it comes to human rights and Iran’s nuclear program.
In 2017, two years after the 2015 nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), trade between Iran and the EU reached around 21 billion euros. This created an opportunity for further growth and gave Iran the chance of becoming one of the main business partners of Europe. However, the deal falling apart once again put Iran under severe sanctions, eventually pushing the EU-Iran relationship almost to zero.
The Kurdish question in Rojhelat (eastern Kurdistan, Iranian Kurdistan) in EU’s view
The EU, neither formally nor behind the curtains, has a policy regarding Rojhelat, nor has it made formal or informal relations with the Kurds in Rojhelat. There are three reasons for this. First, the reality is that the Kurdish question in Rojhelat in comparison to the three other parts of greater Kurdistan is not well-known to the outside world. This is one of the reasons that has led the EU to not have a specific view on the Kurdish question in Rojhelat. The second reason is related to the fact that, despite criticizing the human rights situation in Iran, the EU believes Iran has great geostrategic importance and is a main actor in maintaining stability in the Middle East. For that reason, the EU has not had nor will have any strategy towards changing the regime in Iran. The third reason is that Kurds in Rojhelat have not been able to form a united front and become a strong actor for the present and future of Iran, attracting international attention.
EU and the Kurdish question in Rojhelat, present and future
The Iranian regime’s violations against Kurds have been mentioned in some of the 15 decisions made by the European parliament over the past ten years on Iran. The European Union’s foreign policy office has also at times released statements of concern (such as after the death sentence given to Shayan Saidpour, aged 17, in 2020). However, all these have been discussed in the wider context of “human rights in Iran” and not in the context of the Kurdish question. The EU now, apart from diplomatic pressure and helping some Iranian activists, has no specific political action towards Iran. A popular opinion, which is also a source of hope for the Kurds, is that with increasing sanctions and punishments, and with further isolation of Iran, the Islamic regime is on the verge of collapse. However, the Kurds have not made any preparations for this scenario and the EU has no intention of changing the regime.
Kurds in Rojhelat need to be more forceful in expressing their rights and objectives. The Kurds in Rojhelat have a strong precedent in powerful lobbying in Europe, led by the late Dr. Abdulrahman Ghassemlou in the 1970s and 1980s, from which Kurds from the south also benefited. However, Kurds from Rojhelat were not successful in maintaining strong lobbying and using the Kurdish community in a more effective way to achieve their political goals. The Kurdish parties in Rojhelat not only have not established a united front, but they have not tightened their circles, establishing relationships with social democratic parties in Europe.
This is at a time where they have the opportunity to have a stronger presence in European capitals, especially in Brussels, which is the political capital of the EU. In order to attract European countries, it is important and necessary for the main parties in Rojhelat to come up with a united front when it comes to their foreign policy and widen their lobbying and activity circles. That is the only way Kurds in Rojhelat will be able to become part of the bigger picture as a strong actor in Iran, and attract the attention of European countries and the EU authority.
This is the fourth in a series of articles looking at EU policies and interests in relation to the Kurdish question in all four parts of Kurdistan.
Zana Kurda is an expert in EU-Kurdish affairs, holding a PhD from the Vrije Universiteit Brussels.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
Translated by Dilan Sirwan
In 2017, two years after the 2015 nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), trade between Iran and the EU reached around 21 billion euros. This created an opportunity for further growth and gave Iran the chance of becoming one of the main business partners of Europe. However, the deal falling apart once again put Iran under severe sanctions, eventually pushing the EU-Iran relationship almost to zero.
The Kurdish question in Rojhelat (eastern Kurdistan, Iranian Kurdistan) in EU’s view
The EU, neither formally nor behind the curtains, has a policy regarding Rojhelat, nor has it made formal or informal relations with the Kurds in Rojhelat. There are three reasons for this. First, the reality is that the Kurdish question in Rojhelat in comparison to the three other parts of greater Kurdistan is not well-known to the outside world. This is one of the reasons that has led the EU to not have a specific view on the Kurdish question in Rojhelat. The second reason is related to the fact that, despite criticizing the human rights situation in Iran, the EU believes Iran has great geostrategic importance and is a main actor in maintaining stability in the Middle East. For that reason, the EU has not had nor will have any strategy towards changing the regime in Iran. The third reason is that Kurds in Rojhelat have not been able to form a united front and become a strong actor for the present and future of Iran, attracting international attention.
EU and the Kurdish question in Rojhelat, present and future
The Iranian regime’s violations against Kurds have been mentioned in some of the 15 decisions made by the European parliament over the past ten years on Iran. The European Union’s foreign policy office has also at times released statements of concern (such as after the death sentence given to Shayan Saidpour, aged 17, in 2020). However, all these have been discussed in the wider context of “human rights in Iran” and not in the context of the Kurdish question. The EU now, apart from diplomatic pressure and helping some Iranian activists, has no specific political action towards Iran. A popular opinion, which is also a source of hope for the Kurds, is that with increasing sanctions and punishments, and with further isolation of Iran, the Islamic regime is on the verge of collapse. However, the Kurds have not made any preparations for this scenario and the EU has no intention of changing the regime.
Kurds in Rojhelat need to be more forceful in expressing their rights and objectives. The Kurds in Rojhelat have a strong precedent in powerful lobbying in Europe, led by the late Dr. Abdulrahman Ghassemlou in the 1970s and 1980s, from which Kurds from the south also benefited. However, Kurds from Rojhelat were not successful in maintaining strong lobbying and using the Kurdish community in a more effective way to achieve their political goals. The Kurdish parties in Rojhelat not only have not established a united front, but they have not tightened their circles, establishing relationships with social democratic parties in Europe.
This is at a time where they have the opportunity to have a stronger presence in European capitals, especially in Brussels, which is the political capital of the EU. In order to attract European countries, it is important and necessary for the main parties in Rojhelat to come up with a united front when it comes to their foreign policy and widen their lobbying and activity circles. That is the only way Kurds in Rojhelat will be able to become part of the bigger picture as a strong actor in Iran, and attract the attention of European countries and the EU authority.
This is the fourth in a series of articles looking at EU policies and interests in relation to the Kurdish question in all four parts of Kurdistan.
Zana Kurda is an expert in EU-Kurdish affairs, holding a PhD from the Vrije Universiteit Brussels.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
Translated by Dilan Sirwan
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