During a recent conference on contemporary security issues held in Croatia’s capital Zagreb, I asked an American expert from the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies if the United States were ready to support the creation of an independent Kurdish nation state on the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan, now that Iraq was in shambles and the Peshmerga had proven to be the only force capable and willing to fight ISIS, but also the only force with no objections to military cooperation with the US-led coalition. He promptly answered that Washington’s policy was to uphold the unity of Iraq and to transform it into a Bosnia and Herzegovina-style federation. This came as a surprise to many in the audience since there’s a wide consensus among political theoreticians and practitioners that the Dayton Agreement of 1995, which ended (froze?) the armed conflict in Bosnia, turned out to be a complete failure as a basis for state-building. The answer equally purported a marked discrepancy between the political and military reality of Iraq on one side and Washington’s objectives for this part of the world on the other.
Biden and Gelb obviously worked under the premise that Bosnia and Iraq were similar cases and that if the Dayton Agreement held Bosnia together, a matching peace deal would surely have the same effect on Iraq. 
However, the idea that BiH (short for Bosnia and Herzegovina) should serve as a model for the Iraqi federation isn’t new. In May 2006, Joe Biden – then ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee – and Leslie Gelb ‒ president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations – wrote an op-ed for The New York Times, titled “Unity through autonomy in Iraq”, in which they lauded the Dayton Accord for keeping the Balkan country whole by dividing it into ethnic federations, and proposed that Iraq’s unity should equally be maintained by decentralizing the country and giving each ethno-religious group room for running its own affairs. Biden and Gelb obviously worked under the premise that Bosnia and Iraq were similar cases and that if the Dayton Agreement held Bosnia together, a matching peace deal would surely have the same effect on Iraq. By doing so they disregarded two crucial facts: firstly, that Bosnia was (and remains until today) hopelessly dysfunctional and could hardly qualify as a role model for any multiethnic country in the world, and, secondly, that there were two diverging variables which indicated that Iraq would ultimately have a different outcome from Bosnia.
(The Bosnian flag)
Before scrutinizing the shortcomings of the Dayton Agreement and Bosnia’s constitution, let us consider the similarities shared by the two geographically distant countries. Historically, between the 16th and 20th centuries Bosnia and Iraq have been part of the Ottoman Empire, in the interwar period they were monarchies (BiH as part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), and in the second half of the 20th century they experienced authoritarian dictatorship and non-aligned versions of socialism (Titoism in Yugoslavia and Baathism in Iraq). Also, the borders of both countries were drawn by foreign powers – the Ottomans in the case of Bosnia (1867), and the British in the case of Iraq (1920). This means that the boundaries of Bosnia and Iraq are not the result of a popular struggle for self-determination and national independence, but rather the result of Ottoman (Bosnia) and British imperialism (Iraq). Furthermore, both countries have three main ethno-religious groups – Muslim Bosniaks, Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats in Bosnia, and Shia and Sunni Arabs and Kurds in Iraq. According to Samuel P. Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilizations, the gap between Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats is civilizational, whereas in Iraq the differences are sectarian (Shia-Sunni) and linguistic (Arab-Kurd).
Undoubtedly, Bosnia and Iraq are similar cases worthy of comparison. This, however, doesn’t mean that the federal model applied in one country could or should be duplicated in the other, especially if it turned out to be deeply flawed. The asymmetric (con)federalism of BiH is indeed deeply flawed, to say the least. To begin with, it comprises three constituent peoples, but only two territorial entities, which means that the Serbs were ascribed their own entity – the Republika Srpska, whereas Bosniaks and Croats, due to their shaky alliance during the Bosnian war, were huddled together in the second entity – the Federacija BiH. In other words, Bosnia is a federation within a federation. Because of its relative homogeneity – a result of ethnic cleansing between 1992 and 1995 – the RS (short for Republika Srpska) is divided into 64 municipalities with little competencies, which makes it a highly centralized entity. On the other hand, the Bosniak-Croat entity is divided into ten cantons (Croats use the term counties) with considerable autonomy, which means that this portion of BiH is generously decentralized. Five of these have a Bosniak and three a Croat majority. The two ethnically mixed cantons/counties are further decentralized in an attempt to avoid the domination of any group. To complicate things further, the multiethnic Brčko District is a special self-governing administrative unit which formally belongs to both entities, making it a condominium.
Undoubtedly, Bosnia and Iraq are similar cases worthy of comparison. This, however, doesn’t mean that the federal model applied in one country could or should be duplicated in the other, especially if it turned out to be deeply flawed.
One of the results of BiH’s complex territorial division is a staggering growth of bureaucracy. A country of roughly 50,000 km² and less than 4,000,000 inhabitants, Bosnia has 14 executive bodies – The Council of Ministers of BiH in Sarajevo, The Government of the Federation of BiH also in Sarajevo, The Government of RS in Banja Luka, ten cantonal/county governments and the Government of the Brčko District – altogether comprising 147 ministries. All of these are staffed according to strict ethnic quotas, which is detrimental to meritocracy and benefits ethnic nepotism. The legislative branch of government consists of 14 legislative bodies and currently employs in toto 646 elected delegates. The judiciary is particularly interesting since BiH has three constitutional courts – one on state level, and one for each entity. The central Constitutional Court of BiH, consists of nine judges. Out of these, four are selected by the lower house of the Parliament of the Federation of BiH, two by the National Assembly of RS and the remaining three are foreigners selected by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg!
The legislative and executive bodies require a consensus or at least a qualified majority for all important decisions, while the members of the tripartite Presidency of BiH have an indirect veto right (the veto takes effect if it’s confirmed by two thirds of delegates in the legislative body of the respective entity). Another veto actor is the High Representative, a sort of European proconsul for Bosnia, who – among other things – has the right to sack elected officials and install new ones to his liking. According to Croatian political scientist Mirjana Kasapović, a recognized expert on BiH, these constitutional arrangements have created “the most complex political system in Europe” (Kasapović, 2005: 156). But the system isn’t only complex, it’s also deeply unjust. For example, members of minorities (Jews, Roma etc.) are discriminated by not being able to run for the Presidency of BiH since the three posts are reserved for a Bosniak, a Croat and a Serb. Also, a loophole permits voters of larger ethno-religious groups to elect the representatives of smaller groups. This was the case between 2006 and 2014, when Željko Komšić was elected twice in a row as the Croat member of the Presidency, albeit with votes from the Bosniak electorate. Thus, for eight years the Croat seat in the Presidency was held by a usurper.
The omnipresent tensions between the three constituent peoples and their lack of consensus on the very foundations of the state they live in are perhaps most visible on the symbolic level. The wordless national anthem of BiH was decreed by the Spanish High Representative Carlos Westendorp in 1999, since elected officials repeatedly failed to agree on it. The HR (short for High Representative) also imposed the national flag, coat of arms and currency. The national flag of BiH is partially accepted only by the Bosniaks and during unofficial celebrations is often used in combination with Turkish, Saudi and Bosnian war-time flags, in an overt display of Muslim identity and fraternity with other Muslim countries. The national football team is supported exclusively by Bosnian Muslims, while Croats and Serbs cheer for the national teams of neighboring Croatia and Serbia. Public holidays are another source of discord. Independence Day is celebrated on March 1st in the Bosniak-Croat federation, while Bosnian Serbs consider it a day of mourning. Namely, on March 1st 1992 BiH held its independence referendum which was snubbed by an overwhelming majority of Serbs, and is therefore regarded by them as an act of war against the Serb people. This view was recently corroborated by Mladen Ivanić, the Serb chairman of the Presidency of BiH.
The national flag of BiH is partially accepted only by the Bosniaks,
The most bizarre example of diverging collective memories was the unveiling in June 2014 of a monument to Gavrilo Princip. Princip was a Serb nationalist who shot and killed the Austrian archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie in June 1914 in Sarajevo, thereby triggering the First World War. The monument was unveiled in the town of East (Serb) Sarajevo only a day before the World War I centennial. On the following day, the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra performed in the nearby capital Sarajevo to commemorate the murder of the Habsburg heir to the throne but also to send a message of peace and reconciliation in Europe. The concert was attended by the presidents of Austria, Croatia and Montenegro and by the Bosniak and Croat members of the BiH Presidency. However, it was boycotted by the Serb member of the Presidency and by officials from Serbia.
Without doubt, Bosnia remains a divided society and unstable state, consisting of three ethno-religious groups who are basically forced to live together by the international community. In 1992 Bosnian Serbs already opted for the separation of their territories and annexation to a rump Yugoslavia. Following a series of military defeats in the summer of 1995 (including the NATO bombardment of Serb positions), they agreed to remain within Bosnia, albeit under the condition of running their own ethnically cleansed republic. Initially, Croats sided with Bosnian Muslims, in the expectation that a future BiH federation would entail a Croat territorial entity. Although the Dayton Agreement dismissed such a possibility, Croat politicians in BiH are still struggling for the creation of a third entity, while privately many Bosnian Croats are hoping for a full union with the Republic of Croatia.
Bosnian Muslims are equally dissatisfied with the Dayton arrangements. Although, their hope is not more federalism but less. As the most numerous group (estimates suggest Bosniaks have surpassed the 50% threshold of the overall population of BiH) they are in favor of unitarisation, and plan on shifting the focus of the political system from constituent ethno-religious groups to citizens, i.e. from collectives to individuals. This is logical from a Bosniak perspective because the most numerous group, or core ethnie, tends to camouflage its own ethnic nationalism behind a veil of civic patriotism.
On the whole, Daytonian BiH is unfit to be a role model for multiethnic and multisectarian Iraq, or any other heterogeneous land for that matter. Rather, it should be regarded as a failed and, to a certain degree, foreign-imposed experiment on federalism and consociational democracy. Nevertheless, the Balkan country keeps its head above the water, which brings us to the question how come Bosnia survived its internal divisions, whereas Iraq – a similar case by many parameters – succumbed to them. The answer lies in two variables which distinguish the two cases:
Firstly, there’s the prospect of Bosnia joining the European Union. Although the country still hasn’t achieved candidate status, it’s nonetheless a potential candidate for EU membership, together with Kosovo. Bosnia is neighbored by Croatia, an EU member state since 2013, Montenegro and Serbia, two official candidate countries who started their accession negotiations in 2012 and 2014. In regional terms, Bosnia is part of the so-called “Western Balkans” and Brussels has been adamant for years about its intention to integrate the region in the Union. In fact, EU membership is used as the principal “carrot” in the “carrot and stick” approach of European institutions and officials toward Sarajevo. This has led many observers to the conclusion that the chance of Eurointegration is the main, if not the only reason why Bosnian political elites abide to a minimum of intergroup cooperation instead of resorting, once again, to violence.
(Ethnic and religious map of Iraq. Credit: globalsecurity.org)
Unlike Bosnia, there’s no likelihood of Iraq joining any politico-economic union. Theoretically, it could strive for inclusion in a revived United Arab Republic, but the failed state of Syria hardly qualifies as a desirable partner. The Gulf Cooperation Council is no option either since it consists of six Sunni monarchies, whereas Iraq is a Shia-dominated republic. The same reason rules out a reincarnated Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan. A union with the Shiite theocracy of Iran is equally out of the question since it would be completely unacceptable to Iraqi Sunnis. This leaves us with Turkey, a NATO member state and EU candidate country which is trying to project its influence across the territories of the former Ottoman Empire but isn’t striving for a union with non-Turkic nations. In short, the incentive of upholding the country’s unity as a prerequisite for joining a politico-economic union is given in the case of Bosnia, but nonexistent in the case of Iraq.
Secondly, Bosnia is an unofficial protectorate of the EU, or Mandatory Bosnia. Its factual head of state is the High Representative who latently wields dictatorial power. In the past, HRs have removed democratically elected members of the Presidency from their posts, changed the constitution on entity level, decreed laws and imposed national symbols. They are the authorized guardians of the Dayton Agreement, although some of them were less than excited about its provisions. In 2005, former HR Wolfgang Petritsch (an ethnic Slovene from Austria) called the Dayton accord a “straitjacket for BiH peoples and citizens”. Interestingly, since 2007 the post of HR was continuously held by Slavs from the former Habsburg Empire – the Slovak Miroslav Lajčak between 2007 and 2009, and Valentin Inzko, another Carinthian Slovene from Austria, since 2009. The commanders of EUFOR Althea, a military deployment in BiH whose role is to oversee the military implementation of the Dayton Agreement, have been Austrians since 2009. It’s impossible to overlook the obvious continuation of Europe’s policy since the Berlin Congress of 1878 to task Austria with administering Bosnia.
Iraq has no equivalent institution and is essentially left to govern itself to the best of its abilities.
Iraq has no equivalent institution and is essentially left to govern itself to the best of its abilities. The post of Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq, held by American diplomat Paul Bremer, was abolished in June 2004, and native Iraqis have been heads of state ever since. The fact that 20 years after the signing of the Dayton Agreement Bosnia is still supervised by a foreign custodian, whereas Iraq was left to its own devices one year after the US-led invasion, is yet another explaining factor why Bosnia has remained largely peaceful and territorially united, while Iraq broke down in civil war and finds itself on the verge of disintegration.
So far I’ve tried to demonstrate why imitating the Bosnian model in Iraq is neither desirable nor feasible. I’m left with proposing an alternative. The alternative is simply accepting the reality of Iraq being split into three pieces. It’s self-evident that ISIS will have to be defeated and replaced by a moderate Sunni Arab government in the areas allotted to this ethno-religious group. The nine Shia-majority governorates in the south of the country are the obvious span of the future Shia Arab state. The fate of the capital Baghdad will probably have to be decided on a referendum.
Finally, an independent Kurdistan will emerge from the Kurdish autonomous region in the north, with some obvious territorial corrections in favor of the Kurds.
The new states will be relatively homogenous in their ethno-religious composition and most probably organized as unitary republics with parliamentary or semi-presidential systems. Their constitutions will be drafted after intra-group (instead of inter-group) negotiations, which means that the main cleavage will most likely be the one between secularist and Islamist factions. If this process should lead to the establishment of two Islamic republics, so be it (Kurdistan will surely preserve its secularist outlook). It’s paramount that the new constitutions are considered domestic instead of foreign-imposed and that they reflect the wishes of the majority of the people in each country. Of course, the rights of various minorities will have to safeguarded as well, in order to diminish the possibility of future disturbances.
An independent Kurdistan will emerge from the Kurdish autonomous region in the north,
As the experienced US diplomat Peter Galbraith wrote in his 2006 book “The End of Iraq”: “No one should be under any illusions about the long term. The moment the international environment permits an independent Kurdistan, the Kurds will declare it… There will be no reason to mourn Iraq’s passing. Iraq has brought virtually nonstop misery to the 80 percent of its people who are not Sunni Arabs and could be held together only by force. Almost certainly, Kurdistan’s full independence is just a matter of time. As a moral matter, Iraq’s Kurds are no less entitled to independence than are Lithuanians, Croatians, or Palestinians”
Less than ten years later, the international environment is on the brink of permitting an independent Kurdistan. The brave struggle of Kurdish men and women against ISIS in Iraq (and in Syria), as well as the protection they’ve offered to threatened minorities such as the Assyrians and Yazidis, gained the Kurdish cause a great deal of sympathy across the globe. More and more state and non-state actors are realizing that the breakup of Iraq is inevitable and that the creation of a Kurdish nation state should be welcomed. Besides being a bulwark against Islamic extremism, Kurdistan is also an interesting destination for investors and the preferred provider of crude for many oil companies. This is why 29 countries have so far opened diplomatic missions in Erbil, and more are coming. Due to all the reasons pointed out in this article, the creators of US foreign policy would be well advised to give up on the idea of duplicating the dysfunctional Dayton Agreement in fragmented Iraq and instead embrace independent Kurdistan as their other great partner and ally besides Israel in the Middle East.
Janko Bekić holds a PhD in political science and is senior research assistant at the Institute for Development and International Relations in Zagreb, Croatia. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
