As the United States struggles to mobilize a coalition of allies behind potential military action against the Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS) in Syria, the policies of Turkey Iraq and Syria remain captive to the IS and the 49 Turkish hostages it holds.
Turkey might well be the key to the US effort to confront IS, and it is in a very tough spot.
In June, IS raided the Turkish consulate in the northern Iraq city of Mosul and captured 49 Turkish citizens, including the consul-general, staff members and their families. Ankara has imposed a media blackout against reporting on the crisis, claiming that news stories in Turkey could provoke the IS militants and put the hostages’ lives in danger.
While the world is uniting behind the US-led effort to counter the IS threat, Turkey has been reluctant to join the international call for military action against the extremists. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared his opposition to US airstrikes on Iraq and would not allow the United States to use the Incirlik airbase in the southern city of Adana as a launching point.
The hostage situation will continue to complicate the western effort to counter the IS threat because the Syrian-Turkish border has been critical for the militants. The presence of a large Syrian refugee community in Turkey makes it easier for IS militants to move freely in Turkey’s towns and cities.
Consequently, IS has used Turkey as a major route for militants to travel to and from Syria (and indirectly, Iraq.) IS seeks to reopen its main artery for foreign fighters and is pushing to recapture the area in northwest Syria that borders Turkey. The Turkish border also serves as the group’s main gateway for smuggling oil and weapons.
In the early stages of the Syrian conflict, Turkey maintained an open door policy for Syrian refugees. Turkey now hosts 1.2 million Syrians, many of them in big cities, and it lacks the institutions to monitor them.
Turkey also has become an organizational hub for the Syrian opposition and has turned a blind eye to weapons transfers to Al-Qaeda linked groups from its territory. Further complicating the matter has been the thousands of foreign fighters from countries around the region and the world, including the United States and Europe, who have entered Syria via Turkey. Wounded IS militants have received treatments in hospitals in border towns.
There are now reports of well-established networks of radical Islamist factions that have been fighting in Syria, including IS, who also have a presence within Turkey’s borders. In June, the Shiite Allahu Akbar Mosque and the Muhammediye Mosque in Istanbul's Esenyurt district were set on fire by groups affiliated with IS.
In July, an IS-affiliated group held an open-air mass rally calling for jihad in Istanbul, raising questions about the intelligence failures, lack of institutional capacity and the political will to address the domestic threat these radical groups pose to Turkey.
The rapid advance of IS in Iraq and the growing threat the group poses to Turkey’s own national security seem to have changed Turkey’s calculation.
Ankara initially resisted western calls to crack down on weapons transfers to insurgents; to stop jihadists from entering Syria; and to monitor its southern border. Now, however, Turkey finally seems to be on the same page with the west.
Ankara recently stepped up intelligence sharing and tightened security cooperation with its western allies. In collaboration with the European Union, Turkey is now conducting tighter screening of passengers on flights into Turkey and recently beefed up border patrols on the frontier with Syria. Only three of the 13 border crossings between Syria and Turkey are open and foreign nationals are only allowed to pass through two of them.
Despite the Turkish government’s increased concern over the growing IS threat, Erdogan’s priority is still to secure the release of the 49 Turkish nationals.
Turkey will continue working closely with the west on intelligence sharing, airport measures and border controls. It will probably take part in the western effort to strengthen the moderate Syrian opposition through training and arms delivery. But it is unlikely to join any US-led coalition that involves American military action in Syria as long as the IS holds Turkish hostages.
Turkey might well press for US help to resolve the hostage situation. The United States' unarmed predator drones, based at the İncirlik air base in southern Turkey, have already conducted surveillance in Iraq and have allegedly pinpointed the whereabouts of the Turkish hostages.
Turkey might rethink its opposition to military action if the hostages are released. If the United States decides to act without Turkey and IS does not release Turkish nationals, however, the two allies might find themselves at odds in Syria, which will complicate US efforts to contain IS militants.
* Gonul Tol is Executive Director of the Center for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute.
