DAMASCUS - The anticipated meeting between the Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) will be held in Paris "soon" to finalize integration talks, a senior Syrian foreign ministry official confirmed to Rudaw. Describing ties with Washington as a “partnership,” the official highlighted regional stability as the main shared goal and Syria’s role as a bulwark against “the return of Iranian militias.”
In an exclusive interview with Rudaw, Qutaiba Idlbi, director of American affairs at Syria's foreign ministry, stated on Wednesday that the new Syrian leadership supports administrative decentralization but rejects the idea of “an army within an army and a state within a state.”
Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and the SDF chief Mazloum Abdi signed an agreement on March 10 to integrate all civil and military institutions in northeast Syria (Rojava) - including the SDF - under the authority of the Syrian state.
Idlbi confirmed that a high-level meeting between the SDF and the Syrian government “will be held soon in Paris” to “complete the negotiations on the implementation of the [Abdi-Sharaa] agreement.”
The meeting - reportedly to include Abdi, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, and representatives from the United States and France - was previously delayed due to "purely technical reasons," he said.
Referencing the Iran-aligned Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) as negative models, Idlbi stressed the need for full integration of the SDF into the national army.
Syria is “better off utilizing the SDF's expertise by deploying its fighters and commanders across all army institutions, rather than keeping them as a separate division,” he added.
On the future of the Kurdish-led Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) administering Rojava, Idlbi stated the interim Syrian government aims for a “smooth” integration, keeping local institutions and personnel intact under the national umbrella.
What will change is “the framework that is used by the institutions on a daily basis,” but the institutions “with their people and methods of management, will remain,” he clarified.
On July 13, violent clashes broke out in the Druze-majority Suwayda province between Druze fighters and Bedouin tribes, initially sparked by mutual kidnappings and escalating with the involvement of state-affiliated forces. According to the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), at least 1,300 people were killed.
Earlier, in March, violence also erupted in Syria’s Alawite-majority coastal regions after ousted president Bashar al-Assad's loyalists attacked Damascus-aligned security forces. SOHR reported around 1,700 deaths - mostly Alawite civilians - with many casualties linked to government or pro-government forces.
Idlbi blamed these incidents on Assad affiliates, acknowledging the “natural state of fear” among Kurdish communities as a result of the violence, but urged addressing them through a political resolution while cautioning against external involvement.
He also accused Israel of stoking the conflict in Suwayda and seeking to “create this internal clash between Syrians.”
On Syria’s broader relationship with Israel, Idlbi noted that despite a history of hostility - including over 700 attacks on Syrian military sites since the fall of Assad - the interim government is open to resolving issues through a political framework. He dismissed reports suggesting that Washington has issued specific "demands" for Damascus to normalize relations with Tel Aviv.
Idlbi characterized the relationship with the US as a “partnership” grounded in "common interests," with regional stability as the primary shared objective. He emphasized Syria’s new role as "the main barrier that prevents the return of Iranian militias and [the Iran-aligned Lebanese] Hezbollah [Movement] to the region."
Below is the full transcript of the interview with Qutaiba Idlbi.
Rudaw: Mr Idlbi, thank you for joining us. Let me start by asking how we can evaluate the current relations between the Syrian government and the American administration? Can we describe them as being at its all time best?
Qutaiba Idlbi: Of course, thank you very much for having me today. The Syrian-American relationship today is still at its best. Since the liberation of Syria and the fall of the [Bashar] al-Assad regime, there has been a major change in Syrian foreign policy. The focus of this change has been to transition from the political blackmail that the Assad regime practiced for more than fifty years in its relations with world countries to building a relationship based primarily on partnerships. We do not look at our relations with countries today and think about what these relations will be like in a month or two. Instead, we try to build these relationships on solid foundations for decades to come. We look, think, and plan for what this relationship will be like in ten, twenty, or thirty years because this is what will truly establish strong partnerships that will positively reflect on Syria and the United States, on the Syrian people and the American people. Perhaps many American officials have asked me about this, and I tell them, we are trying to build a steel bridge between Damascus and Washington that connects the two countries and the two peoples. We are practically at the beginning of this building process, and it is in a state of continuous development. What will unfold will certainly be better than what it is today.
Can we describe them as good relations? The United States also has demands from the Syrian government, including asking Damascus to join the Abraham Accords. Is the Syrian government ready for that?
There are no demands from the American government to the Syrian government within the framework of this relationship. The partnership between Syria and the United States actually involves common matters that the two countries need to work on. Putting anything within the framework of "demands" is, in fact, perhaps closer to a media term. There are no demands. There are common interests that Syria and the United States are working on, foremost among them being regional stability. Today, after the withdrawal of Iranian militias, Syria is the main barrier that prevents the return of Iranian militias and [the Iran-aligned Lebanese] Hezbollah [Movement] to the region, and prevents the instability and sabotage that usually come with them. This is a fundamental matter and, of course, a priority for the United States in the region, and it is a priority for us as well. As the [Syrian] Foreign Minister [Asaad al-Shaibani] and the interim President [Ahmed al-Sharaa] have mentioned in several meetings, we want to be a bridge of connection in the region, and we do not want Syria to be a source of threat to anyone in the region. Of course, how we manage our relationship in the region depends on both parties, not just on Syria, whether it is in partnership relations or de-escalation relations. We are open to the entire world, and we are also open to the countries and powers of the region, because we believe that building any partnership requires two parties.
There were talks about meetings between Syrian government officials and Israeli officials under American sponsorship. Did these meetings take place?
Israel, of course, has been a key player in Syria since the liberation. From day one, as we saw, Israel has carried out more than 700 attacks on Syrian military sites, and we also saw many messages that could be described as hostile to the Syrian people in general and to the Syrian government in particular. Of course, the last thing Israel did was its aggressions and bombing of the defense ministry building in Damascus and the shelling of security forces at the interior ministry in Suwayda province two weeks ago. So, within this framework, there is a major problem with Israel today regarding its hostile actions and policies towards Syria. We fundamentally believe that there are always two paths to resolving any problem: either the path of war or the political path. We believe that the Syrian people have gone through at least 14 years of war, and I think we have had enough of the years of war and we should spare the Syrian people from more war and confrontations, and therefore we are certainly open to resolving all these problems through the political framework. Within this path, of course, there have been meetings in an attempt to de-escalate and stop the Israeli aggressions on the one hand so that there is stability in the region - because the loser from the instability in Syria is not only Syrians but the entire region - and on the other hand, so that they [Israelis] let Syrians solve their problems by themselves and do not interfere in Syria's internal problems.
Regarding the US Congress, last week, it did not vote to lift all sanctions - and here I specifically mean the Caesar Act - imposed on Syria. They laid out conditions and stages for lifting these sanctions. Did you see that coming?
What happened at the beginning of last week was not a full on vote. What happened was that a bill was submitted to the financial committee in the House of Representatives, the United States Congress, and this bill was passed. It is still a bill that has been passed by the committee, and it must be submitted to the armed forces committee in the House of Representatives, and then it is submitted to the full House, and then it must go to the Senate. So, there is no complete move by the Congress. There was a clear movement by the financial committee in the House of Representatives, and behind this movement, it is also clear that Israeli and pro-Israeli pressure groups were fully active in pushing this project over the past weeks. So, what we are seeing, in fact, through this resolution is a fundamental expression of the nature of the Israeli efforts in this matter in Washington and their push within this resolution. I believe that the American people have not yet spoken their word on this law, as I mentioned, because it is still in its early stages.
Did we expect it you ask? In fact, we did not expect the extent of the Israeli planning and efforts in this regard, especially as it was evident in what Israel did primarily in southern Syria and also in Washington through its instruments. But as I mentioned, this does not necessarily express the direction of the American people, and I think we should also wait for the final word on this matter, which is from President [Donald] Trump, who made it clear what the American policy towards Syria is during the investment conference in Riyadh. So, I think as long as President Trump has not come out and changed this policy, but on the contrary, we see a full confirmation from the American administration of the policy that President Trump set at the Riyadh conference, I think the path is clear, and I think the word of the American people is clear in this regard.
Is there a link between the US not lifting the sanctions and the events that took place in Suwayda?
The process of lifting the sanctions, in fact, we saw from President Trump a full lifting of all executive orders and all sanctions that were [previously] passed by executive and presidential decisions, and that happened last month. In fact, lifting the rest of the sanctions requires a legal and political process, and it naturally takes a lot of time. For example, lifting the designation of Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism, which was done in 1979, requires at least six months from the time the president issues an indication to Congress that there is a change in policy towards Syria. So this naturally takes its time. The Caesar Act will also naturally take its time for deliberations and consultations within the Republican Party and also with the Democratic Party, so it will also naturally take some time. And these two laws are, in fact, the only obstacle today to the full lifting of sanctions. So, I think there is a natural path to lifting the sanctions. What happened in Suwayda, the unfortunate events, and what happened in connection to them - form the media misleading to the exploitation of these events for political purposes, especially by the Israeli side - I think it may have had an effect on slowing down the process of lifting the sanctions, but I do not think it will affect the path completely.
If we move to the internal Syrian affairs, specifically what happened in Suwayda and what happened before that in the coastal regions, was the Syrian government unable to deal with these two files? And is there a danger, or as they say, fears of those events being repeated in the Kurdish regions?
Regarding dealing with the files, let's start with what happened in the coastal regions, or let's start with the file of liberation in general. Of course, after the liberation, the state of stability that we saw was the result of the government's efforts primarily, but it was also the result of what can be called a collective commitment from all Syrians that this is the path that preserves all of Syria. This collective commitment is naturally critical because it does not depend on the ability of the government or the state, especially since the state is nascent, it does not depend on the ability of the government or the state to preserve it. Collective commitment means, in fact, that every person and every group must be committed to implementing this path so that the path remains on its correct course. The problem that happened on the coast, in fact, was that this path was breached. At least from the point of view of a large part of the Syrian people and a large part of society, when a group affiliated with the Assad regime set up ambushes and attacked security men and killed a large number of them, and this matter was framed as an attempted coup and a change of power, at least as these groups promoted it. This, in fact, was a signal to the entire society that there was a breach of this societal commitment and that there was an attempt to turn back the clock. It resulted in a large reaction that I do not think any government could have controlled. I think the Syrian government made great efforts, as we saw in the first days of these events, and it pushed a lot of forces and individuals who came to the coast to fight these remnants and they committed violations. It actually pushed many of these forces out of these areas, and there were even losses from the ministries of defense and interior and from these fighters as a result of pushing them out of those areas. And if we also look at the frameworks of any country after civil wars, about 90 percent of countries that emerge from civil wars return to a state of civil war immediately within months due to permanent breaches of this societal commitment. I think so far, if we compare the situation in Syria today with the situation in these cases, we are in a much better situation than the majority of cases of emerging from civil war, and this, as I mentioned, is not only due to the efforts of the government, but it is due to the cohesion and solidarity of the Syrian people today.
With regards to what happened in Suwayda, what happened was similar in nature to what happened on the coast. There is a group that emerged linked to the Assad regime, which has been in Suwayda since the liberation of Syria, and did not abide by any agreements. It is still continuing, whether through Captagon networks and drug trafficking or the theft networks that the regime established even in 2023 when Suwayda came out in demonstrations against the Assad regime. The networks that are currently in Suwayda are the same ones that Louay al-Ali and Ali Mamlouk and other intelligence chiefs established to tamper with Suwayda. These networks are still present today in Suwayda. The problem is that since the liberation and until now, these networks - similar to what happened in the coastal region - are trying, after the cloak of the Assad regime has fallen from them, to entrench themselves in a sectarian cloak, and they committed breaches, as we saw, as a result of clashes with the Bedouins that led to the bloody events we witnessed.
The question today, in fact, is: can the state with its current resources, with its current size, with its current age, really be a stopping barrier and stop any bloody events of this matter? In fact, this is what the Syrian government did; it tried to stop things before they deteriorated, and the messages were clear even to community leaders in Suwayda from day one that let's work together so that these events do not escalate and get out of control, and so that, God forbid, what happened in the events on the coast is not repeated, and so that the wrong signals are not sent to society. These messages were clear from day one, and there was great cooperation from community leaders in Suwayda with [the Druze spiritual leaders] Sheikh [Hammoud] al-Hinnawi and Sheikh [Youssef] al-Jarbou and many leaders of the [armed] factions in Suwayda, not only [Laith] al-Balous but even Sulaiman Abdel Baqi and others.
What happened, in fact, was that a party, especially affiliated with [Druze spiritual leader] Sheikh [Hikmat] al-Hajari, was not satisfied with the state of support that occurred in the province around the state's option to end this military situation, so it called on the Israeli side. Of course, in the first hours of the Israeli intervention, there were no Syrian army forces or defense ministry forces inside the city of Suwayda. In fact, the government withdrew the defense ministry forces and deployed security immediately to avoid any unnecessary confrontations or any violations; because in the event of the army entering civilian sites in any case, there is always a possibility of any indirect clash or any violation. So, the state or the government took the initiative, fundamentally, from day one to withdraw the army forces and deploy the internal security forces.
In fact, was that the forces and factions affiliated with Hajari, whether he agreed to that or not, called on the Israeli side, and we saw the Israeli side's attacks not only on the internal security forces in the city of Suwayda, but on the deployment of the internal security forces, in fact, around the province, which left Suwayda open and vulnerable to attacks from everyone, not only from the [spontaneous mobilization] ‘faza'at’ whether from Bedouin forces or tribes, but we even saw a real activity of [Islamic State] ISIS groups that flocked in from the [Syrian desert] Badiya. If you look at the map of Suwayda province, 70 percent of its borders are with the Badiya, and they are administrative borders, in fact, that are impossible to control without a large military and security presence. This military and security presence that was protecting the province was hit by the Israeli enemy, and thus it deprived the government of the ability to protect the province effectively, and I think this is what the Israeli side was seeking from day one; it did not seek to protect the Druze, it was actually seeking to create this state of internal clash between Syrians, and what happened, happened.
Of course, we move today to the situation of the Kurdish community, as you mentioned, is there a state of fear? I think there is a natural state of fear for sure. For a regular person who does not know or does not follow the details of these matters day by day will surely say: "Look at what happened to the Alawites, look at what happened to the Druze, it is natural for me to be afraid." What I am saying in this situation is that this fear is natural, but the government was and still is, as I mentioned at the beginning, extending its hand to everyone, saying: let's solve our problems through political solutions, and do not involve external parties in any conflict. And this is the path that we are reiterating today to everyone: Let's sit at the negotiating table and work to reach a political solution. I understand the fears as you mentioned, but even I, as a Kurd, say: there is a unique Kurdish experience today in Syria. Kurds are not new to Syria, Kurds have been in Syria for hundreds of years, if not more than a thousand years, and they have an excellent experience. We in Syria today, ever since the establishment of the Syrian Republic, have had three heads of state, presidents and prime ministers, who were Kurds. The presence of Kurds in Syria is not new, and their experience within the [Syrian] society is not new, so let's learn from this experience and let's sit down and really prioritize the interests of the Kurdish people and the interests of the Kurdish communities instead of personal interests.
Delving deeper into the [Kurdish] dossier, there was a March 10 agreement between the Syrian presidency [represented by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa] and [Mazloum Abdi] the commander of the SDF. The agreement comprised eight items, and it was expected that there would be a meeting in Paris between the Syrian government and a delegation from the SDF with French and American presence. Why was this meeting postponed?
The Paris meeting was postponed for a purely technical reason; initially it was arranged at the last minute. In fact, the invitations for the meeting were sent only a few days before its date and it was prepared for somewhat unilaterally by the mediators in the midst of the events in Suwayda. So, the postponement, in fact, happened primarily because it overlapped with the events in Suwayda, and the focus of the Syrian government and the Syrian leadership was primarily on a ceasefire and de-escalating the crisis for fear that fighting would resume again, and on the other hand, there was not enough time, in fact, to prepare for the meeting. As was announced, the meeting will be held soon in Paris between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian government to complete the negotiations on the implementation of the [Abdi-Sharaa] agreement.
Has a specific date been set for this meeting?
A specific date has been set preliminarily and will be announced soon.
Can we announce it now?
You will hear about it soon.
Regarding the Kurdish issue, the Kurds agreed among themselves and held a conference in Qamishli, and they had demands and called for decentralization. Does the Syrian government reject all forms of decentralization?
Certainly not. First of all, there are two things: first, in the meeting that took place in Qamishli, I think there was a gathering of many Kurdish parties and groups. Of course, there is always a question that is asked: do these Kurdish parties and groups represent the entire Kurdish community? I think this is a matter that the Kurds themselves must answer. As a Syrian Kurd, I do not, in fact, see in many of the existing Kurdish groups and parties any representation for me, and there are many like me, especially when you look at the communities of Kurds whom some Kurdish hardliners call ‘Arabized Kurds.’ If you look at the communities of Kurds in Hama, Latakia, Aleppo, and Damascus, which represent the majority of Kurds in Syria, you do not find any representation for them in these parties, and you do not find any communication with them.
Regardless of this matter, after this meeting took place [in Qamishli], of course, there was a lot of talk about decentralization. The Syrian state's or the Syrian government's dealing today with governance, especially local governance, is based a lot on the principle of decentralization, especially administrative decentralization. So, I do not believe that there is, in fact, a discussion or points of disagreement about the issue of administrative decentralization. The problem of centralization in Syria was not a legal problem, but a political problem. The Assad regime did not want to apply any form of decentralization that is in fact mentioned in the Syrian law, and it wanted, of course, as a totalitarian dictatorial regime, to hold all the strings in its hand.
We say today: we are not the Assad regime, and we are not the Baath Arab Socialist Party, and we are not Arab nationalists, because when we start from the standpoint of the Syrian government, we do not start from an Arab nationalist standpoint, but we start from a Syrian national standpoint that brings all Syrians together. So the problems that the Assad regime created because of its political nature and because of its political perspective must also be solved through politics. We do not need to solve them by creating new legal frameworks that we do not need in the first place. For example, within Syrian law, Law 107 for local administration gives extensive authority for administrative decentralization.
In fact, today, as a Kurdish person, how do I see my representation within the Syrian state? And how do I see the representation of my culture within the Syrian state? If I can go or send my children to school and they can learn the Kurdish language alongside the Arabic language, I see that as a representation of me and my culture. If I can open a Kurdish cultural center, I also see that as a representation of me. If I am, for example, in a Kurdish village, and I see the use of the Kurdish language within this village, this also has representation for me. If I can go to an official institution to get my official papers and my Arabic is weak, but there is a person who speaks Kurdish and can help me issue these papers, like what most developed countries do, this is also a representation for me.
So, these are, in fact, the demands that matter to the normal Kurdish person in their place, not those who try, as you mentioned, to get personal, factional, or political gains at the expense of the cause of the ordinary Kurd. Within this context, the Syrian government says: this is originally our starting point in dealing with the Kurdish issue, and not only with the Kurdish issue, but with the issue of all Syrians; that they must see their representation and culture within their local communities, this is a very natural matter and should not even be a starting point for negotiation.
If we talk about the Syrian Democratic Forces, in many interviews, the leaders of the Syrian Democratic Forces told us that they would be part of the defense system in Syria or the interior ministry, and they also talked about integrating approximately 100,000 fighters into the defense ministry, but they also have conditions, which is to join with their current formation into the defense ministry. What is the American opinion on this?
I think what matters first is the opinion of Syrians on this matter before the American opinion. But I tell you that the Syrian government and the American government agree on a fundamental matter, which is that there cannot be an army within an army and a state within a state. We have seen this experience before; we saw it in Lebanon with Hezbollah, and we saw it in Iraq with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) militias, and we saw it in other places. An army within an army cannot create a sound, healthy, and stable state, and this will always reflect in more strife and instability for the entire state. What we are putting forward clearly is that there is room for everyone in the state in all its joints. And as is the existing experience today in the Syrian army, which started from an alliance of different factions that liberated Syria and then a number of factions joined it, this alliance of these factions that created this army and included other factions did not itself create a bloc within the army, even though it was the one which established this existing era today. So, just as we worked on this basis from the beginning, we also say that groups cannot be established within the army. So the challenge today is how can we benefit from the expertise that exists with the Syrian Democratic Forces, but at the same time create a sound situation on which armies are built. And I think this sound situation is built, in fact, through the full integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces into the Syrian army. What does that mean? I'm sorry, let me finish my thought. What does that mean? Today, General Mazloum Abdi says that the Syrian Democratic Forces have a lot of expertise that they accumulated during the last era, and I agree with him on that. What we are saying today is: let's benefit from this expertise in all institutions of the Syrian army. Why do we want to limit this expertise to one division? For the state to benefit from this expertise, it must be fully deployed within the divisions according to specialties. So, on the one hand, the Syrian state can then fully benefit from the expertise that the Syrian Democratic Forces have built and from the expertise of the Kurdish fighters, and on the other hand, I avoid, God forbid, after a period of time, having an army within an army and a state within a state like other countries that used this model and we saw how they failed or entered a state of instability from which they will not be able to get out.
There is an experience on the ground in the Kurdistan Region, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces are part of the Iraqi defense system, but they are not integrated into the Iraqi defense ministry, they are affiliated with a separate ministry in the Kurdistan Region. Can't we apply that model in Syria?
We are generally open to learning from the experiences of others, whether they succeeded or failed, and this is a very important matter. But in the end, the Syrian experience and the Syrian component have very different natures and characteristics from the natures of other experiences, whether in the nature of the Syrian components, or in their culture, or in their relationship with each other historically and during the recent period. Therefore, we start primarily from understanding the experiences of others and where they succeeded and where they failed, but we need to build on our experience as it is. As I mentioned, we as Syrians, especially during the past eight months, have had a somewhat successful experience, it has its flaws and needs some reform, but we have a successful experience in this regard. How, in fact, do we integrate the state of factionalism into a military institution? As I mentioned, it is not complete and not at its peak, it needs a lot of development and work, but we have an experience in the state of transitioning from the state of factionalism to the state of thinking on the country level, the national state, and thinking about the homeland. And with this, we want to protect Syria from returning to a state of division, fragmentation, and factionalism, but also, as I mentioned, to benefit from all the expertise that all Syrians have built, whether they were in civil society organizations and the state of expatriation or in the state of factionalism and military groups in northern and eastern Syria.
There is a self-administration in north and east Syria, [the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES)] . It has its security and service institutions. Does the Syrian government want to end the self-administration and maintain administrative decentralization with its conditions and with few authorities?
Administrative decentralization means, as I mentioned, that the parties manage themselves regarding their daily interests and people's lives, this is administrative decentralization. As for the continuation of the self-administration, we say that government or institutional work is linked to people first, and is not linked to models. A state cannot have several models for institutions; there must be one model for institutions, while the people who transfer their experience can be in these institutions. So, in fact, the state of integrating the self-administration means that we use the people who are in water management; they can remain to manage water in that area. The people who are in civil registry management and others can remain in the same framework under the umbrella of the Syrian state.
So, in fact, the state of transition is, in fact, a very smooth state, no one is talking about firing employees, this did not even happen in Damascus for it to happen in the areas of northern and eastern Syria. What will change, in fact, is only the framework that is used by the institutions on a daily basis, but the institutions with their people, their areas, and their way of management will remain the same. In the end, providing services to people, in general, and especially when we talk about administrative decentralization, remains the same, in fact, whether you wear a green or blue uniform, the service is the same one you provide to people.
So, what are the disagreements between the Kurds and the Syrian government?
As a Kurd, I do not believe there is a disagreement between the Kurds and the Syrian government. I think perhaps there is not a complete meeting of views yet between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian government. What is being talked about now and what we hope to achieve is how we can accelerate and set a practical plan to implement the March agreement that took place between General Mazloum Abdi and [interim] President Ahmed al-Sharaa. So today, I think for different circumstances and for the absence of mechanisms for building trust, there were no diligent efforts to try to implement the agreement completely. What we hope for today first is that there will be positive efforts to build trust regarding the implementation of the agreement, so that there is no room for misunderstanding, and so that there is no factor of instability whether in the areas of northeast Syria [Rojava] or elsewhere.
This is what we hope to achieve, and then there will be a practical and realistic plan with a clear timeline for implementing the agreement, so that we can turn any page of disagreements, and so that all of Syria, including north and east Syria, can move towards more investment, developing infrastructure, and creating job opportunities. And this is, in fact, what Syrians want in the end, whether they are Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, or other components.
