The Islamic State (ISIS) could not have made such steady gains – as the recent capture of Ramadi in Anbar province – without grassroots support. What that makes clear is that the Sunni tribes remain key to defeating ISIS, not only today but also in future when successors may emerge.
It is becoming increasingly evident that Iraq can only survive if it effectively has three armies: the Kurdish Peshmerga, a new official Sunni battalion and a Shiite force.
The ISIS advance in Iraq was about exploiting fractures in the Iraqi state. It is no different in Syria, where the militants took control of the historic city of Palmyra just days after seizing Ramadi.
But as with victories in Iraq, the ISIS gains in Syria are as much down to the weakness of the Syrian state and opposition forces as the sheer strength and capability of the militant group.
Meanwhile, the US “train and equip” program in Syria is slow and unclear. Even those forces are designed to confront ISIS and not the real reason why ISIS exists today: the Bashar al-Assad regime.
Until a strategy is devised to effectively tackle both Assad and ISIS in Syria -- as well as the ethnic and sectarian fractures in Iraq -- the war against ISIS will merely be fought by reaction to events rather than with a real, long-term strategy.
It is a year since the first ISIS whirlwind in which the group captured a third of the country, and Baghdad is once again within their sights. Iraqis aref earing the worst.
As ISIS racks up victories, US President Barack Obama’s belief that “I don’t think we’re losing” or that Ramadi was merely a “tactical setback” are delusionary assessments. Obama was spot-on with his statement that, “If the Iraqis themselves are not willing or capable to arrive at the political accommodations necessary to govern, if they are not willing to fight for the security of their country, we cannot do that for them.”
Iraqis have been quicker to point the finger at the US than their guns at ISIS, and that’s the fundamental issue.
The US spent trillions of dollars and thousands of lives to afford Iraqi politicians an opportunity to rebuild the state and bridge the elusive national divide in the post-Saddam Hussein era. But years of sectarian policies have only strengthened this divide.
Prior to ISIS attacks in 2014, Iraq had on paper one of the largest security forces in the Middle East, with the US providing significant advanced weaponry and training programs. Now in 2015, the theme is once again the need to build up and train Iraqi security forces and provide weaponry.
This may make little difference if the core issues are once again not addressed: the army suffers from low morale, sectarian mistrust and animosity dots the landscape; state forces are not sufficiently inclusive of vital Sunni and Kurdish ranks.
As the forces wilted away in Ramadi, the baton was once again passed to the much more effective Shiite militia forces to take over the fight.
Today it is ISIS, and during the heyday of the Sunni insurgency it was al-Qaeda. These militants succeed by exploiting the glaring gaps in the ethno-sectarian fabric of Iraq.
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
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