Speaking to Rudaw TV on July 28, the political insider discussed the motivations behind his support for Kurdish independence, the US withdrawal from northeast Syria, and his country’s lack of an “effective” policy toward the Kurds. A staunch conservative seen as a "hawk" in the foreign policy arena, Bolton served as Trump's national security advisor — a highly influential position close to the American president – from April 2018 to September 2019.
The interview builds on insights the former official revealed about Washington’s attitude toward the Kurds in his new memoir, a tell-all expose of events within Trump's inner circle. Inside closed-door meetings, joining the president on Air Force One, and listening in on phone calls with heads of state, Bolton's book recounts navigating a cutthroat world of influence-peddlers competing for the president's attention – one Bolton eagerly plays along in, confessing that he had aspirations of becoming Secretary of State.
Bolton also expressed his views on the US’ alignment with Iranian or Iran-backed forces in the fight against ISIS, saying it “unknowingly or at least inadvertently, was strengthening Iran's hand across the region,” which he notes continues to play out.
These interview questions have been edited in written format for brevity and clarity.
Rudaw: You are known as a friend to the Kurds, who like you very much. When did you first learn about the Kurdish issue?
Well, I think in general terms, years and years ago, probably in college, but certainly it came home to me most immediately after the first Gulf War in 1991 when, after the Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait and Saddam Hussein began a campaign of repression across Iraq. Tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees left their homes in Iraq and headed north and it was a huge potential humanitarian tragedy in the making. And so I actually accompanied then-Secretary of State Jim Baker on his inspection tour in southeastern Turkey. We went across the border into Iraq in fact, that day. But that was the beginning of the effort to help make sure that there was protection and assistance for the Kurdish displaced persons inside Iraq and those who came across the border. And from that point on, it was, the subject of what would happen to the Kurds was always very much on my mind.
The Kurdish issue was a very hot topic when part of George Bush's administration and also later when you became US ambassador at the United Nations. Kurds have often felt betrayed by US administrations, especially after events like that which unfolded in October 2019 in northeast Syria. Do you think the US does not have a coherent policy towards the Kurds? Or do you think the American interests are simply just more aligned with states, rather than people and ethnicities?
Well, I don't think in this case the US does have an effective Kurdish policy. Although, unfortunately that doesn't distinguish us from a lot of other countries, especially in Europe. And I think that when you look at the long history of Kurdish nationalism it is something that's been, had chances when it could possibly break through and become, get statehood. But others where it's been set back. So it's been my view for sometime now that with, what I consider to be the functional break up of Iraq, that the US should at least recognize statehood for Kurdistan, within the territory of Iraq that the Kurds control. It's a harder question what to do with the other Kurdish areas in other existing states around the region. And I think this is something that the US should consider more strategically, because the consequences could be very significant and I think very positive.
You supported the Kurdistan Region of Iraq's independence. Why did Trump not endorse the Kurdistan Region plebiscite in September 2017?
Well that was before I joined the administration and I think that was under the influence of the State Department and others who never favoured having the referendum and who frankly don't favour the breakup of Iraq or the recognition that Iraq has in fact broken up. And there was a lot of argument at that time that having the referendum would in fact play into the hands of the opponents of Kurdish independence. But I thought that really the Iranian Revolutionary Guards who did try and take advantage of the situation would have done something similar whether there was a referendum or not and that the referendum was simply a pretext for them to take steps they would have taken otherwise. I thought the referendum, at least in principle, was a good idea to convince people of the strength of feeling among the Kurds for independence.
After the Kurdistan independence referendum, the Popular Mobilization Forces backed by Iran attacked Peshmerga forces in Kirkuk and other areas of Iraqi Kurdistan. Why was the White House remained silent about these attacks on Kurds?
Well I think it was for many of the same reasons that they opposed the referendum to begin with and really failing to understand what the motivations of the Iranians and their Iraqi allies were. I think this was part of the problem of aligning with Iranian forces, Iranian militias, Iraqi militias and Iranian regular military forces in the effort to destroy the ISIS territorial caliphate. Because what we were doing when Obama started this, I think unknowingly or at least inadvertently, was strengthening Iran's hand across the region. And I think that is now coming back to haunt us. And it certainly gave the Iranians a capability to act against the Kurds in Iraq in a very serious way.
What is the current American administration’s position towards the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, broadly speaking?
Well, I think the administration as a whole, and certainly in Congress on a pretty bipartisan basis, has a great deal of sympathy for the Kurdish position overall. It's not a well-informed feeling, I guess is what I would say. I don't think it fully appreciates the difficult circumstances that Kurds find themselves in and I think there's still a strong feeling that people hope that Iraq itself is not going to break apart. As I say, I think given the policy of Iran in particular, there's no effective way you're ever going to see the kind of government in Iraq that we saw created at the end of World War I and that effectively ended, I think, with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. So I think it's unrealistic, but I think it's because people haven't fully appreciated the significance of de facto Kurdish independence in northern Iraq for 25 plus years.
Trump claimed, as you mentioned in your memoir, that without the backing of American F-18 fighters, the Kurds always run from a fight. Was there no one in the US administration to explain to him that he misperceived the situation?
Well I think a number of people explained to him that he was wrong. I mean, everybody fights better with F-18 protection, there's no doubt about it. And it was a misimpression of the role of the Kurds in Iraq and Syria in the campaign against ISIS. I'm not sure where he heard it, perhaps from Erdogan before I arrived on the scene, perhaps from others. But it was definitely not the view of most people in the Pentagon who had fought along with the Kurds in the anti-ISIS campaign. But it was one of those things that Trump got in his head and once he got it in there it was very hard to get it out.
Why is Trump so easily persuaded by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan? Why is he so compliant towards his Turkish counterpart?
Well I wish I could give you a good answer to that question. I don't understand it myself. I don't think it has anything to do with Trump investments in Turkey or anything like that. I think it's of a piece with Trump's relationship with Vladimir Putin, with Xi Jinping, with Kim Jung-Un, with other authoritarian leaders. It's very hard to explain. Even Trump himself has noticed it and says he can't explain it either. But it obviously runs great risk for the US and for its allies, as what we saw in northeastern Syria on several occasions really proves.
President Trump abruptly ordered the withdrawal of some of the US forces from Syria while Turkish forces attacked the Syrian Democratic Forces in October 2019. With strong objections from within the US and from some European states to Trump's decision, how could White House officials, including yourself, have convinced Trump to hold the decision and send back some forces into Syria?
Right, well I was gone by late 2019. Where I was more involved was in late 2018 when Trump had basically agreed to an Erdogan proposal to take all US forces out of northeast Syria. And we persuaded him in fact that was not a great idea. But what played out over the next year was Erdogan and Turkey continuing to press for a withdrawal. And finally succeeding in late 2019 to get Trump to do again what he had first said in 2018, this time more successfully. But as you say, he was persuaded to modify the order again. This is part of the difficulty of keeping Trump pursuing a consistent policy over a sustained period of time. So I don't know how long this current situation in northeast Syria will last. It's one of the reasons I'm concerned that, if Trump wins reelection, that after November the 3rd, there's really no telling what he will do next. Having achieved reelection, he's freed from the political constraint that helped us very much in late 2018 for sure, in making sure American forces and other coalition forces remained in northeast Syria.
You have said that the US representative for Syrian affairs, James Jeffrey, is aligned against the Kurds. What led you to this observation?
Well I think it was actually Mike Pompeo himself who first said that that was the case. And then, in watching the interaction during one of the meetings I had in Turkey in Ankara in early 2019, I was very worried about what the objective would be. I did not think there was a compromise with Turkey that involved any movement of Turkish military forces south of the border with Syria, into northeast Syria. There were obviously already Turkish forces in northern Syria, west of the Euphrates. They'd gotten there in different circumstances over different periods of time and I wasn't proposing necessarily to reverse that. But I just felt once Turkish forces got into that zone in northeastern Syria, which they had invaded back in the 1950s, among other things, that it would be an impossible job for us to maintain stability there. And I think even though there are some American forces still in northeast Syria, I think the situation is unstable. So the last thing we needed was diplomats on the US side that were making this issue even more complicated by thinking that there could be a constructive Turkish role there.
What is the best way for the Kurds in Syria to have a viable [autonomous] region in the future in northeast Syria, given the current circumstances in the region?
Well I think the best solution would be a return to the status quo in 2018 to get coalition forces back inside that triangle of northeast Syria, east of the Euphrates. Keep Russian air power out of the region. Keep the Iranian and Russian forces out of the region, and keep Assad's forces out of the region. So anything that moves in that direction, I think will actually result in more stability and a greater opportunity to have an effective negotiation with Assad. I think to an extent the Kurds are negotiating from a position of weakness with Assad. Obviously that doesn't augur well for the best outcome. Even if Assad makes concessions, I wouldn't trust him to keep them. So I think it's just going to undertake a lot of diplomatic and political effort, but there may be a chance to do it when, if Biden is elected and there's a new president to try and get that status quo from 2018 restored.
What should the Kurds in Syria do to not be abandoned by the Americans and have their rights enshrined within the Syrian constitution?
Well I think the it's very important to keep up contact both with the State Department, but also in Congress and at the Pentagon where I think there's more support for the Kurdish position, for a variety of reasons. Certainly one of which was the common fight against ISIS. I don't think there's risk in the next 100 days or so before the US election of any substantial change in the US posture. I think at this point Trump doesn't want to undertake anything that could cause problems on November the third. But I think you need to be ready after that, whether Biden wins or Trump wins, for the inauguration in January, because I think at that point the chances for a shift in policy well or ill are obviously much greater. And I think this means continued consultation in Europe where the Kurds have many friends as well and a very extensive diplomatic and political effort bringing the significance of this area to the attention of people in the United States, in particular, I think is very important.
If Trump is defeated in the upcoming US presidential election, do you see your book ‘The Room Where It Happened’ as one of the reasons behind his defeat?
Well, you know, I don't know the answer to that question and I wouldn't count Trump out yet. The Democrats lost the 2016 election to Trump. I don't think he won it. I think Hillary Clinton ran a very bad campaign. There's still roughly a hundred days left, that's an eternity in American politics. But I do think laying out how Trump performs as president, the book has been very widely read and people can read it and draw their own conclusions.
On Iran, the assassination or the killing of Qassem Soleimani, do you think it was the right decision?
Yes, I do. This was a very important commander of the Revolutionary Guards, the Quds Force and he had caused enormous damage to the United States and American military personnel and those of our other coalition partners over a sustained period of time. He was a key element of Iran's effort to gain hegemony over the broader Middle East and he was a key part of the government of a state sponsor of terrorism and the head of a terrorist organization, as the United States designated it. So I think that was the right thing to do and I wouldn't rule out other steps against the Revolutionary Guard. I think one of the things that we should look for in Iran is the overthrow of the regime. I think that one way that happens is if the regular military and the Revolutionary Guard fragments. So this could exacerbate the instability that already exists in Iran where I think the regime is very unpopular. And I think it should be US policy to overthrow the Ayatollahs and restore the government to the people of Iran.
Do you think that Mr. Trump is genuinely interested in the overthrow of the Iranian regime?
No, I don't. I think that's been one of the problems. I think it was the right thing to do, to get out of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. He had campaigned on that in 2016 and was long overdue to withdraw when he finally was able to do it in May of 2018. I was glad to have a hand in getting that done. But I don't think that's enough. I don't think the Ayatollahs have given any sign whatever that they've made a strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons and I don't think they will do that, because I think they believe the nuclear capability will help keep them in power, which is the principle reason I think they need to be removed from power and get in place a government that really will renounce the search for nuclear weapons.
