It is no secret that the Kurds, and especially those of the pro-PKK PYD in Syria, have proven themselves the most effective fighting force against the “Islamic State” (IS). The heroic defense of Kobani against all odds, the liberation of Tel Abyad, the retaking of Hassakeh and countless other defeats for IS were all inflicted by the very moderately armed Kurds of the PYD and the Arab and Christian militias affiliated with them. In the nightmare that is the Syrian civil war, the PYD has also proven to be the closest thing to a “good guy” one will find, empowering women, defending minorities and not massacring or ethnically cleansing anyone (unlike virtually every other fighting group in the country).
At the same time, Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga, often with help from the PKK, made significant advances around Mosul, Makhmour, Sinjar and Kirkuk, reclaiming nearly all the land IS captured last August. Just like the PYD in Syria, PKK fighters in Iraq (many of whom are also women) did not ethnically cleanse or massacre any civilian populations but rather defended people from IS. All of this has been welcome good news while the Iraqi army and non-Islamist Arab forces in Syria suffered setback after setback against the jihadis. The few military advances the Iraqi army enjoyed were often spearheaded by virulently anti-American Shiite militias, who proceeded to behead prisoners and ethnically cleanse Sunni Arabs from areas they captured.
It is also no secret that Turkey’s government has been tolerating or even supporting IS rather than combatting it. Turkey’s policy included loose borders with ISIS (compared to much tighter borders with areas the PYD controls in Syria), denying the Americans use of the shared Incirlik air base to bomb IS, arms deliveries marked as “humanitarian aid” which appeared destined for the Jihadis, flash drives the Americans captured from a top IS oil smuggler that indicated collaboration with Turkish officials, and apparently friendly relations between Turkish soldiers and IS militants along the Syrian-Turkish border. Although Turkey appeared to be cracking down a bit more against IS during the last year (under great pressure from NATO allies, no doubt), Ankara still openly supports radical al Qaeda-affiliated jihadi groups in Syria such Jabhat al Nusra and Ahrar ash Shams. Ankara did all this to weaken Assad and the Kurds.
Yet this week we learned that American officials made a deal with Turkey. Although many of the details remain secret, it looks like in return for use of the air base at Incirlik and Turkish military action against IS, the Americans are distancing themselves from the PYD and looking the other way while Ankara resumes its war against the PKK. Washington and Ankara also announced the likely establishment of an “IS-fee safe zone” in northern Syria, west of the Euphrates river, although it remains unclear how exactly this zone will be created. American officials described the deal as a “game changer.”
The deal may be a game changer, but probably not in the way they think. Shortly before the deal was announced, a bombing targeting a socialist and Kurdish youth group in Suruc, the town in Turkey just north of Kobane (the group was preparing to bring humanitarian aid to Kobane), killed 32 of the young idealists. While IS curiously failed to claim responsibility for the bombing, Kurdish public opinion and the PKK held Ankara responsible, accusing the government of either colluding with IS to bomb them or looking the other way. The PKK stupidly took the bait and assassinated two Turkish policemen it accused of assisting the suicide bomber. Although they had not bothered to go to Suruc to offer condolences, this provided Turkish President Erdogan and Prime Minister Davutoglu the pretext to launch their new war against “terrorism,” attempting in the process to lump the PKK in with IS.
At the time of this writing, Ankara has sent around 2 planes to bomb empty lots near IS-held buildings in Syria and arrested some 137 IS suspects, most of whom will probably be released shortly. In contrast, around 200 air sorties against some 400 PKK targets have been launched, and more than 847 PKK suspects were arrested. PYD positions near Kobane were also apparently shelled by Turkish forces across the border. Meanwhile IS spokesmen have not said a single word criticizing Turkey for its new “war” against them, but the ceasefire between Ankara and the PKK that held since March 2013 does appear dead. We will probably not see Turkish forces take on IS fighters in any significant way, and the Americans’ permission to use the Incirlik air base will save them a bit of jet fuel but not have much impact on the campaign against IS.
President Erdogan is also now suddenly demanding that the 80 Leftist and Kurdish MPs of the HDP party have their parliamentary immunity stripped because of their “ties to the PKK.” It is these MPs whose electoral success on June 7 denied him a majority government and the ability to invest himself formally with Putin-like powers. Although he clearly condemned the assassination of the two Turkish policemen, the charismatic co-chair of the HDP, Selahattin Demirtas, is no doubt Mr. Erdogan’s main target in this whole shadow puppet game. With a new war raging against the Kurds, Erdogan will do what he can to prevent the formation of a coalition government, preferring new elections with the troublesome pro-Kurdish party banned or its leading MPs in prison. He may hope for a “rally around the flag” effect from voters--at the price of renewed war with the PKK and many dead.
In short, the deal some American officials just cut with Erdogan seems to involve a black betrayal of what have been the Americans’ most stalwart allies in the fight against IS, the condoning of a witch hunt against democratically elected opposition MPs in Turkey, and a serious setback in the campaign against IS. This is all in return for the use of a redundant air base and a shadow puppet Turkish war against IS. At least European NATO leaders had the decency to call for “restraint” and “proportionality” in Turkey’s attacks against the PKK, while Washington only speaks of “Turkey’s right to defend itself.”
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He is the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and author of The Kurdish Nationalist Movement (2006, Cambridge University Press) and co-editor (with Mehmet Gurses) of Conflict, Democratization and the Kurds in the Middle East (2014, Palgrave Macmillan).
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
