By Halmat Palani
Barack Obama’s election as US President and his speech to the Muslim world in Cairo in 2009 raised hopes for improving diplomatic relations with Iran and ending decades of hostility. However, the Arab spring, the Syrian civil war and the rise of ISIS complicated US policy, but it did little to stop the Obama administration from appeasing the Islamic regime.
In line with liberal international relations theory, President Obama’s keenness on reaching a deal is grounded in the belief that economic opening and reduction or end to sanctions will eventually open the door to socioeconomic changes and inevitably political liberalization, but this approach is unlikely to lead to any major political change Iran.
The administration’s current approach may in fact further entrench regime legitimacy among the people. The logic of the President’s current approach is not sound because it is grounded in a western-centric understanding of legitimate government, which does not apply in a non-western country like Iran.
Government legitimacy from a western perspective is quite distinct from that of a theocratic Islamic state such as Iran, a fact that is obvious to many but lost to the current Obama administration. Legitimacy from a US perspective is founded upon the idea that a government that is not ruled by the people is not or cannot be legitimate.
In Iran government legitimacy is more grounded in economic performance. Good economic performance will earn a government legitimacy among the people despite the fact that it might commit harsh human rights violations or censor and imprison people who may dare to practice their political ideas or speak out against the regime. This is the case with oil rich Middle Eastern states who often use economic prosperity to buy the loyalty and obedience of their citizenry.
In a recent article on US-Cuba relations in the Foreign Policy magazine, Aaron David Miller says that even internal pressure was unable to overthrow the regime, a reference to Iran’s 2009 Green Movement. The Green Movement failed, but it demonstrated to the world how Iranians feel about the authoritarian clerical rule. The rise of the 2009 Green Movement also prompted some of the international pressure and sanctions on the regime and marked the beginning of the split of the rulers into two camps.
First, the rise of the so called “moderate” Hassan Rouhani as President and his promise to uphold the “rights of the people” gave hope to some Iranians demanding social and political rights in a country where oppressive poverty is yet another reality of life.
However, since his election human rights organizations and activists have reported an increase in human rights violations, executions, and unjust imprisonment of members of religious and ethnic communities such as Bahais, Kurds, Baloch, and Ahwaz Arabs.
According to Amnesty International, Iran executed nearly 704 political prisoners in 2013 alone with no right to due process or fair trial. Half of those executions were carried out since June 2013, right around the time of Rouhani’s election victory.
The regime executed 21 prisoners in the first week of 2015, according to Iran Human Rights. The rate of executions is expected to increase despite Rouhani’s reputation as a moderate leader.
Moreover, the most recent report by UN human right rapporteur to Iran Ahmad Shaheed, reveals, “Between July 2013 and June 2014, at least 852 individuals were reportedly executed representing an alarming increase in the number of executions in relation to the already-high rates of previous years.”
Opposition figures of the Green Movement continue to remain under house arrest and minority organizations such as Kurdish, Baloch and Arab political parties and civil society organizations remain banned as the number of political prisoners increases.
Change does not come overnight, but the imprisonments, politically-motivated persecution of journalists and bloggers, human rights, labour, civil and student activists is alarming and must not be overshadowed by the nuclear talks.
It is of paramount importance to stop Iran’s nuclear threat, but it is also equally important to tackle the serious threat that the Islamic regime poses to regional stability, sectarian tensions and most importantly the freedom and human rights of its people, especially the various ethnic communities who make up more than 50% of Iran’s population.
The US and International community especially the P5+1 must not ignore Iran’s belligerence in the region and its suppression of political activists and the voices of freedom and democracy.
A nuclear deal without considering these major issues is unlikely to lead to any meaningful change in Iran’s domestic and regional policy. Thus, even if a deal is struck Iran will continue to push forward with its Islamic revolution in the region and crackdown on dissidents at home and abroad.
The US approach to Iran must therefore be a dual track policy that gives equal weight to issues of human and minority rights while attempting to neutralize the nuclear threat.
* Halmat Palani is a graduate of Political Science at University of Simon Fraser in Vancouver, Canada.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
