Looking at the rumpus over the recent Trump-Putin summit in Helsinki, especially the US president's annoying knack for monopolising the news cycle, one could be forgiven for thinking that most of the world's big problems have been solved, leaving Russia's alleged meddling in the 2016 US election as the sole outstanding issue.
In actual fact, the Middle East alone continues to be a sufficiently complicated welter of conflicts and crises to keep diplomats of the US, France, Britain, and their Arab Gulf partners on their toes for a lifetime.
For some time now, the US-led bloc has appeared to accept the not-so-benign imperialism of Russia, Turkey, and Iran as a matter of course, something like an unfolding of preordained destiny. Yet a sudden reversal of the fortunes of the Middle East's reigning powers is hardly beyond the realms of possibility.
Paying close attention to political and economic realities, making objective assessments of rivals' weaknesses and adopting a more assertive security policy could still enable the US to wrest back the advantage at an opportune moment.
It is true that Russia dominates Syria thanks to a deadly combination of air power, boots on the ground, and a friendly regime in Damascus. And not a day goes by without reports of more territorial gains by Russian-backed regime forces at the expense of rebel groups from the south to the north.
Still, both Moscow and the minority Alawite regime lack the credibility and the moral authority to win the hearts and minds of ordinary Syrians, who have been seeing the mass slaughter and displacement of their compatriots by President Bashar al-Assad's forces since 2011 just for demanding their rights, dignity, and opportunity.
The unpopularity of the Russians, Iranians and their common client, the Assad regime, despite their present military supremacy is a factor that ought to be strategically exploited, ideally until they agree to a negotiated political settlement involving the Syrian opposition.
It may seem premature to talk about Syria's reconstruction when low-intensity wars are raging in different parts of the country, but this too is an area where the US and its allies enjoy a natural advantage, given the financial and technological resources at their disposal.
Then there is Iraq, which had been written off as George Bush's gift to Iran when the US-led invasion toppled Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003.
If truth be told, the many successes of the pro-Iranian camp in Iraq so far have been tempered by almost as many setbacks, the latest being the violent demonstrations against poor governance in mainly Shia areas.
Instead of abandoning the Sunnis, Shias, Kurds, Turkmen, and other ethnic groups to the tender mercies of Iran's sectarian grand strategy, the US should redouble its engagement using all the tools at its disposal.
For better or worse, the euphoria of victory over ISIS last year that emboldened the government of Haider al-Abadi to crack down hard on the KRG for the September 25, 2017, Kurdish independence referendum has run its course.
What remains unchanged is despair and discontent over Iraqi politicians' refusal to get their act together and deliver jobs, public services, and a reliable electricity supply.
Under the circumstances, the US, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE could offer an array of incentives to Abadi's government to shake off cash-strapped Tehran's embrace, treat Iraq's minorities with dignity and respect, and address the problem of economic underperformance.
For good measure, those countries could quietly lend the central government the technical expertise it needs to fulfill its latest tall promises to the people of Basra and other southern provinces.
Even if the help proves inadequate to stave off the next round of unrest, at least it could potentially enable the US and its Arab Gulf partners to regain some of their lost clout in Baghdad.
The objective should be not to project foreign influence for the sake of it, but to alleviate the suffering of innocent peoples, heal rifts between communities, restore stability and security, promote devolution of powers, and facilitate economic renewal.
To be sure, the trouble spots of the Middle East are scarcely confined to Syria and Iraq. From Lebanon to Yemen and from Gaza to Turkey, the West and its Arab Gulf partners find themselves constantly performing delicate balancing acts to avoid having to take sides in every conflict.
To complicate matters, a dangerous new fault-line has developed across a vast region from Tunisia to Somalia pitting the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned Sunni bloc led by Qatar and Turkey against the socially progressive Sunni bloc spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Even so, averting one's gaze from the Middle East powder keg is not an option.
By all means, the US should investigate whether Trump's campaign colluded with the Russians to influence the 2016 election.
For its part, Europe must continue to punish Russia for its annexation of Crimea and the poisoning of a former double agent in Britain.
But none of the above can excuse the squandering of any opportunity by the West and its allies to make a strong comeback in the Middle East.
Arnab Neil Sengupta is an independent journalist and commentator on the Middle East.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
In actual fact, the Middle East alone continues to be a sufficiently complicated welter of conflicts and crises to keep diplomats of the US, France, Britain, and their Arab Gulf partners on their toes for a lifetime.
For some time now, the US-led bloc has appeared to accept the not-so-benign imperialism of Russia, Turkey, and Iran as a matter of course, something like an unfolding of preordained destiny. Yet a sudden reversal of the fortunes of the Middle East's reigning powers is hardly beyond the realms of possibility.
Paying close attention to political and economic realities, making objective assessments of rivals' weaknesses and adopting a more assertive security policy could still enable the US to wrest back the advantage at an opportune moment.
It is true that Russia dominates Syria thanks to a deadly combination of air power, boots on the ground, and a friendly regime in Damascus. And not a day goes by without reports of more territorial gains by Russian-backed regime forces at the expense of rebel groups from the south to the north.
Still, both Moscow and the minority Alawite regime lack the credibility and the moral authority to win the hearts and minds of ordinary Syrians, who have been seeing the mass slaughter and displacement of their compatriots by President Bashar al-Assad's forces since 2011 just for demanding their rights, dignity, and opportunity.
The unpopularity of the Russians, Iranians and their common client, the Assad regime, despite their present military supremacy is a factor that ought to be strategically exploited, ideally until they agree to a negotiated political settlement involving the Syrian opposition.
It may seem premature to talk about Syria's reconstruction when low-intensity wars are raging in different parts of the country, but this too is an area where the US and its allies enjoy a natural advantage, given the financial and technological resources at their disposal.
Then there is Iraq, which had been written off as George Bush's gift to Iran when the US-led invasion toppled Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003.
If truth be told, the many successes of the pro-Iranian camp in Iraq so far have been tempered by almost as many setbacks, the latest being the violent demonstrations against poor governance in mainly Shia areas.
Instead of abandoning the Sunnis, Shias, Kurds, Turkmen, and other ethnic groups to the tender mercies of Iran's sectarian grand strategy, the US should redouble its engagement using all the tools at its disposal.
For better or worse, the euphoria of victory over ISIS last year that emboldened the government of Haider al-Abadi to crack down hard on the KRG for the September 25, 2017, Kurdish independence referendum has run its course.
What remains unchanged is despair and discontent over Iraqi politicians' refusal to get their act together and deliver jobs, public services, and a reliable electricity supply.
Under the circumstances, the US, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE could offer an array of incentives to Abadi's government to shake off cash-strapped Tehran's embrace, treat Iraq's minorities with dignity and respect, and address the problem of economic underperformance.
For good measure, those countries could quietly lend the central government the technical expertise it needs to fulfill its latest tall promises to the people of Basra and other southern provinces.
Even if the help proves inadequate to stave off the next round of unrest, at least it could potentially enable the US and its Arab Gulf partners to regain some of their lost clout in Baghdad.
The objective should be not to project foreign influence for the sake of it, but to alleviate the suffering of innocent peoples, heal rifts between communities, restore stability and security, promote devolution of powers, and facilitate economic renewal.
To be sure, the trouble spots of the Middle East are scarcely confined to Syria and Iraq. From Lebanon to Yemen and from Gaza to Turkey, the West and its Arab Gulf partners find themselves constantly performing delicate balancing acts to avoid having to take sides in every conflict.
To complicate matters, a dangerous new fault-line has developed across a vast region from Tunisia to Somalia pitting the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned Sunni bloc led by Qatar and Turkey against the socially progressive Sunni bloc spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Even so, averting one's gaze from the Middle East powder keg is not an option.
By all means, the US should investigate whether Trump's campaign colluded with the Russians to influence the 2016 election.
For its part, Europe must continue to punish Russia for its annexation of Crimea and the poisoning of a former double agent in Britain.
But none of the above can excuse the squandering of any opportunity by the West and its allies to make a strong comeback in the Middle East.
Arnab Neil Sengupta is an independent journalist and commentator on the Middle East.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
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