As I write this, many brave soldiers and journalists endure serious hardships and threats on the frontlines around Mosul. In November 2014 I told my students in America that I would be surprised if the “Islamic State” (ISIS) endured as a de facto state much beyond two years. They seemed surprised and doubtful of my assessment, which is hopefully now coming true. ISIS simply has too many powerful enemies arrayed against it to hold territory for very long. Your humble columnist is neither a soldier nor a journalist, however, so it would feel pretentious to say anything more than wishing the journalists and the anti-ISIS fighters luck and safety in their campaign to report on and rid us of the “Islamic State” (ISIS) cancer.
It is never too early, however, to ask “what happens after Mosul?” Every significant power with a dog in this fight – the government in Baghdad, various Kurdish parties, Shiite Arab militias, Sunni Arab militias, Iran, the United States, other Western countries, Turkey, Syria and other Arab states, comes to the ring with their own, often competing, interests. For all the actors with fighting forces active in Iraq, eliminating ISIS provides a unifying point to rally around. After the liberation of all territory in Iraq from ISIS control, however, that point of unity will quickly fade into a distant memory. The truly dangerous forks in the road may then present themselves.
Will the United States and other Western powers return to a posture of weary disinterest and diffidence towards Iraq’s internal political problems? Will the ruling Shiite parties in Baghdad resume their efforts to dominate the rest of the country at the same time that corruption and partisanship paralyze any semblance of good governance? Will Shiite militias and the Iraqi army settle scores in Sunni Arab areas, once again alienating the population there until the next revolt happens? Will the various territorial and financial disputes between Erbil and Baghdad resume with renewed vigour? Will the various Kurdish parties settle their differences enough to pursue a specifically Kurdish national interest, or will the Kurdistan Regional Government come apart at the seams? What will armed Kurdish groups in Iraq from Bakur (Turkish Kurdistan) and Rojhelat (Iranian Kurdistan) do after Mosul? Will Iran and Turkey face off in their competition over Iraq?
As we can see, more than a few serious problems loom ahead. How well the various forces cooperate today against ISIS may or may not affect these future problems positively. Some signs already appear quite negative. For instance, just as everyone remains busy focusing on the fight against ISIS in Mosul, Islamist parties in Baghdad quietly passed a law banning alcohol in Iraq. While alcohol itself is not so important (except perhaps for those of us trying to forget about Iraq’s many problems), the method and the mentality behind the move provide plenty of reason to worry.
Ammar Toma, a minister in Baghdad who voted in support of the ban, argued that the constitution already makes it illegal to sell, produce or import alcoholic drinks in Iraq: "The constitution says you cannot approve a law that goes against Islam," he told AFP, referring to an article stating that "no law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam may be established." There was no law I am aware of that promoted alcohol in Iraq, however. Rather, there simply existed an absence of any prohibition against alcohol. Article 2 of the Iraqi Constitution also guarantees “…the full religious rights of all individuals to freedom of religious belief and practice,” which one would assume includes secular individuals and Christians (for whom wine plays a part in religious rituals). The Quran itself also says that “There is no compulsion in religion.”
If we were to accept Toma’s reasoning, however, the Iraqi government has an obligation to enforce his party’s notions of Islamic law – including prohibitions on any number of things including alcohol, pork, uncovered women, pre-marital contact between the sexes, opposition to infallible government edicts (as in Iran), and so forth. Shariah law in Iraq, as interpreted by the ruling Shiite parties, thus naturally alienates secular groups, the Kurds, Sunnis, minorities such as the Christians, and pretty much anyone who is not a Shiite Islamist.
Most worrying of all, the mentality motivating such legislators in Baghdad says “It’s going to be our way or the highway.” We have already seen the results of this kind of governance, of course – a Kurdish drive for secession from Iraq and the Arab Sunnis’ embrace of any armed group promising deliverance from Baghdad. While the psychopathic nature of ISIS jihadis soon alienated most Arab Sunnis, another group will unlikely take their place under such circumstances.
For the sake of all the brave fighters around Mosul right now, and for the civilians caught in the middle, the people of Iraq deserves better than this. Legislators in Baghdad must make a real effort to get things right for once. Such an effort begins with humble, tolerant, and honest governance.
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
