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Last week, as tensions between Iran and the United States began mounting, I ran into a Kurdish friend from Rojhelat (Iranian Kurdistan). We chatted a bit, and as we parted he quipped “Maybe next time I see you, America will be at war with Iran – and then we can finally get this regime of mullahs off our back!”
While it remains hard to gauge how most Iranian Kurds feel about the issue, this friend’s perspective is certainly not uncommon. Throughout modern history, many Kurds in all parts of Kurdistan welcomed the opportunities that came with a sudden crisis or weakening of the states ruling over them.
In Turkey, formerly loyal Kurdish subjects of the Ottoman Empire sought to take advantage of the weakness of a new post-World War I Turkish state to pursue their own ambitions for autonomy or Kurdish statehood. In Iran, Soviet occupation during World War II offered a brief window of opportunity to declare the establishment of the Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad. Later, the revolution that removed the Shah from power saw many Iranian Kurds pushing for autonomy yet again, only to have their ambitions repressed once more as well.
In Iraq in particular, periods of weakness in Baghdad saw the most Kurdish gains, beginning in the 1920s with the Barzinji revolts and moving on to 1958 with the overthrow of the Iraqi Hashemite monarchy. The new Qassem regime, fearing monarchists, Nasserists, communists and other opposition groups, turned to Kurdistan for support, invited Mullah Mustafa Barzani back from exile and offered a good many concessions to the Kurds in the process. The Qassem-Kurdish honeymoon quickly ended as the Qassem regime secured itself and gained power, however – a process that would repeat itself under new administrations in the 1960s and 70s.
The 1990-91 Gulf War then saw Iraqi Kurds make the most gains, with a de facto autonomy that would gain official recognition following the American-led overthrow of Saddam in 2003. Like in previous eras, unfortunately, the Maliki and then the Abadi governments promised the Kurds many things while weak, only to renege on their arrangements as soon as they felt stronger.
A similar dynamic came to Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava) in 2011, with the Syrian civil war so weakening the Assad regime that even the very oppressed Kurds of Rojava suddenly managed to gain their own autonomy. Against all odds and hopes, Kurds in Syria managed to truly take advantage of Damascus’ sudden weakness. As the Assad regime regains its power, however, it threatens to reimpose its oppressive rule over them.
So what if America, through design or accidental war, suddenly struck Iran and its regime? Would the people of Iranian Kurdistan be able to take advantage of a suddenly weakened Tehran?
This columnist is not so certain they could avail themselves of such an opportunity. To begin with, an American military conflict with Iran would probably go no further than an air campaign against Iranian forces and nuclear installations. The United States has no appetite for a ground invasion of a country the size of Iran and a replay of the 2003 Iraq war.
Iranian Kurds would also need a certain amount of unity and preparation to take advantage of any opportunities offered by the political vacuums of war. The Kurds of Syria enjoyed this only thanks to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its establishment of an affiliated movement in Syria. Without the fighters of the PKK and the monopoly of power established by the affiliated Democratic Union Party (PYD) forces, Syrian Kurds would likely not enjoy even de facto autonomy today.
In Iraq, two hegemonic parties — the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) — managed to take advantage of the Gulf Wars to gain Kurdish autonomy. Even there, however, divisions between the two parties almost squandered all their opportunities and gains in 1994 and again in 2016.
Iranian Kurdish political movements, meanwhile, remain more divided and splintered than most – with multiple Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran parties, multiple Komala parties, the Free Life Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PJAK), the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) and others. None of these parties can even set aside their differences long enough to unite even briefly against Tehran.
As a result, and despite the fact that it pains me to say so, a weakening of the government in Tehran would most likely end up as another risk and wasted opportunity for the people of Iranian Kurdistan. Genuine liberalization and democratization, coming from within Iran itself, offers better prospects for Iranian Kurds than any military attack from the outside.
While it remains hard to gauge how most Iranian Kurds feel about the issue, this friend’s perspective is certainly not uncommon. Throughout modern history, many Kurds in all parts of Kurdistan welcomed the opportunities that came with a sudden crisis or weakening of the states ruling over them.
In Turkey, formerly loyal Kurdish subjects of the Ottoman Empire sought to take advantage of the weakness of a new post-World War I Turkish state to pursue their own ambitions for autonomy or Kurdish statehood. In Iran, Soviet occupation during World War II offered a brief window of opportunity to declare the establishment of the Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad. Later, the revolution that removed the Shah from power saw many Iranian Kurds pushing for autonomy yet again, only to have their ambitions repressed once more as well.
In Iraq in particular, periods of weakness in Baghdad saw the most Kurdish gains, beginning in the 1920s with the Barzinji revolts and moving on to 1958 with the overthrow of the Iraqi Hashemite monarchy. The new Qassem regime, fearing monarchists, Nasserists, communists and other opposition groups, turned to Kurdistan for support, invited Mullah Mustafa Barzani back from exile and offered a good many concessions to the Kurds in the process. The Qassem-Kurdish honeymoon quickly ended as the Qassem regime secured itself and gained power, however – a process that would repeat itself under new administrations in the 1960s and 70s.
The 1990-91 Gulf War then saw Iraqi Kurds make the most gains, with a de facto autonomy that would gain official recognition following the American-led overthrow of Saddam in 2003. Like in previous eras, unfortunately, the Maliki and then the Abadi governments promised the Kurds many things while weak, only to renege on their arrangements as soon as they felt stronger.
A similar dynamic came to Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava) in 2011, with the Syrian civil war so weakening the Assad regime that even the very oppressed Kurds of Rojava suddenly managed to gain their own autonomy. Against all odds and hopes, Kurds in Syria managed to truly take advantage of Damascus’ sudden weakness. As the Assad regime regains its power, however, it threatens to reimpose its oppressive rule over them.
So what if America, through design or accidental war, suddenly struck Iran and its regime? Would the people of Iranian Kurdistan be able to take advantage of a suddenly weakened Tehran?
This columnist is not so certain they could avail themselves of such an opportunity. To begin with, an American military conflict with Iran would probably go no further than an air campaign against Iranian forces and nuclear installations. The United States has no appetite for a ground invasion of a country the size of Iran and a replay of the 2003 Iraq war.
Iranian Kurds would also need a certain amount of unity and preparation to take advantage of any opportunities offered by the political vacuums of war. The Kurds of Syria enjoyed this only thanks to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its establishment of an affiliated movement in Syria. Without the fighters of the PKK and the monopoly of power established by the affiliated Democratic Union Party (PYD) forces, Syrian Kurds would likely not enjoy even de facto autonomy today.
In Iraq, two hegemonic parties — the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) — managed to take advantage of the Gulf Wars to gain Kurdish autonomy. Even there, however, divisions between the two parties almost squandered all their opportunities and gains in 1994 and again in 2016.
Iranian Kurdish political movements, meanwhile, remain more divided and splintered than most – with multiple Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran parties, multiple Komala parties, the Free Life Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PJAK), the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) and others. None of these parties can even set aside their differences long enough to unite even briefly against Tehran.
As a result, and despite the fact that it pains me to say so, a weakening of the government in Tehran would most likely end up as another risk and wasted opportunity for the people of Iranian Kurdistan. Genuine liberalization and democratization, coming from within Iran itself, offers better prospects for Iranian Kurds than any military attack from the outside.
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David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East. |
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