The majority of people are expected to support a 'Yes' vote for the Kurdistan Region’s independence. The strong will of the people of Kurdistan in addition to its peoples’ accumulated grievances throughout history have made a powerful moral case for Kurdish self-rule.
The vast majority of Kurds do not feel attached to Iraq nor do they identify themselves as Iraqis because of genocide and politically targeting at the hands of previous governments in Baghdad like the Baathists’ regime.
However, the majority of society agrees that this pursuit should be viewed beyond partisan grudges and rather as a unifying national event regardless of the initiating party. It is wrong of the opposition to oppose the legitimate rights of the people merely due to their hostility against the leading political party.
The 'No' campaign on the other hand, which is diminishing, is very ill-advised and is seemingly not motivated by any form of Iraqi-Kurdish desire for oneness, which would have made more sense if the campaign was conducted in that way.
Concerning the timing, to wait for an “ideal” time is unrealistic considering the region's hostile neighbors. To compare the referendum with Brexit, the Scottish referendum, and others: Few war-torn states in the Middle East will reach the politically-developed level of advanced western countries anytime soon. Therefore if the KRG, without any solid guarantees, accepts the requests to wait for a bilateral agreement with the central government, backed by the superpowers, they would wait until the end of time.
Past experiences clearly demonstrate that it is highly doubtful any deal with Baghdad will ever last for more than a few months, at best, before a new issue comes up. Also it is not probable that the international community will go against their past trends and take a stand for Kurdish aspirations above the disastrous sovereign states in the region.
For any form of progress, the Iraqi political system needs to seriously reform and to completely abandon the inherently corrupt system left over by former regimes, a system designed to serve the Sunni domination of power and today gives leverage to Shias above all other communities in Iraq, including the Kurds.
As for Kurdistan, international law and a history of bloodshed stand by the side of Kurdish independence. However if the decision is made, there will be risks involved and Kurdistan is likely to face many critical challenges on the day after the referendum.
There are many scenarios ranging from insignificant to critical possible outcomes. What is certain is that the current nature of the Erbil-Baghdad relations need to be redefined before any constructive dialogue can take place between the two governments.
As a safe option, perhaps if a loose confederal system of governance is temporarily installed to ensure that the Kurds will not again be viewed as subordinates of Baghdad but rather as equal actors, the transitional period of preparing for separation will go more smoothly.
The structure could be a loose confederation where the two governments are two separate and equal powers under the umbrella of one joint international entity. The preparation process towards independence will not only take a day or two, so there needs to be an adequate governance system, different from the current unbalanced one to facilitate relations between the central and regional power.
A confederal system could call for the creation of a common market of goods, services, and capital giving the federal government only a limited, coordinating and harmonizing role. Most economic and monetary powers would remain with the two separate republics where Kurdistan and Iraq retain separate currencies, central banks, monetary and fiscal policies.
Most importantly for Kurdistan is for an agreement to be in place to provide rights for the withdrawal of either federation [or both] from the union following the expiration of a fixed-year period and a referendum, if the referendum will have not taken place before the agreement was made.
Such agreement will save both sides from confronting a severe and dramatic change to their status quo and instead bring about the reality on a more planned and practical bilateral agreement.
Biza Barzo A. Hazhar is a political researcher and writer with an academic background in international studies and politics. The humanitarian now works in Erbil and previously lived in Sweden.
The vast majority of Kurds do not feel attached to Iraq nor do they identify themselves as Iraqis because of genocide and politically targeting at the hands of previous governments in Baghdad like the Baathists’ regime.
The smaller portion of the Kurdish people who do feel empathy towards Iraq are those who have been or are beneficiaries of the Iraqi government, and do or have lived in Baghdad or other non-Kurdish parts, or those with mixed Iraqi and Kurdish family backgrounds. On the local level, the fact that there is a substantial degree of anger especially amongst the opposition party towards the Kurdistan Region President for initiating this quest cannot be denied.
However, the majority of society agrees that this pursuit should be viewed beyond partisan grudges and rather as a unifying national event regardless of the initiating party. It is wrong of the opposition to oppose the legitimate rights of the people merely due to their hostility against the leading political party.
The 'No' campaign on the other hand, which is diminishing, is very ill-advised and is seemingly not motivated by any form of Iraqi-Kurdish desire for oneness, which would have made more sense if the campaign was conducted in that way.
Concerning the timing, to wait for an “ideal” time is unrealistic considering the region's hostile neighbors. To compare the referendum with Brexit, the Scottish referendum, and others: Few war-torn states in the Middle East will reach the politically-developed level of advanced western countries anytime soon. Therefore if the KRG, without any solid guarantees, accepts the requests to wait for a bilateral agreement with the central government, backed by the superpowers, they would wait until the end of time.
Past experiences clearly demonstrate that it is highly doubtful any deal with Baghdad will ever last for more than a few months, at best, before a new issue comes up. Also it is not probable that the international community will go against their past trends and take a stand for Kurdish aspirations above the disastrous sovereign states in the region.
For any form of progress, the Iraqi political system needs to seriously reform and to completely abandon the inherently corrupt system left over by former regimes, a system designed to serve the Sunni domination of power and today gives leverage to Shias above all other communities in Iraq, including the Kurds.
As for Kurdistan, international law and a history of bloodshed stand by the side of Kurdish independence. However if the decision is made, there will be risks involved and Kurdistan is likely to face many critical challenges on the day after the referendum.
There are many scenarios ranging from insignificant to critical possible outcomes. What is certain is that the current nature of the Erbil-Baghdad relations need to be redefined before any constructive dialogue can take place between the two governments.
As a safe option, perhaps if a loose confederal system of governance is temporarily installed to ensure that the Kurds will not again be viewed as subordinates of Baghdad but rather as equal actors, the transitional period of preparing for separation will go more smoothly.
The structure could be a loose confederation where the two governments are two separate and equal powers under the umbrella of one joint international entity. The preparation process towards independence will not only take a day or two, so there needs to be an adequate governance system, different from the current unbalanced one to facilitate relations between the central and regional power.
A confederal system could call for the creation of a common market of goods, services, and capital giving the federal government only a limited, coordinating and harmonizing role. Most economic and monetary powers would remain with the two separate republics where Kurdistan and Iraq retain separate currencies, central banks, monetary and fiscal policies.
Most importantly for Kurdistan is for an agreement to be in place to provide rights for the withdrawal of either federation [or both] from the union following the expiration of a fixed-year period and a referendum, if the referendum will have not taken place before the agreement was made.
Such agreement will save both sides from confronting a severe and dramatic change to their status quo and instead bring about the reality on a more planned and practical bilateral agreement.
Biza Barzo A. Hazhar is a political researcher and writer with an academic background in international studies and politics. The humanitarian now works in Erbil and previously lived in Sweden.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
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