Since 2003, most of us who closely watch Iraq knew that the threat to call a referendum on independence forms one of the cards up the Iraqi Kurdish sleeve. Any real move towards an Iraqi Kurdish state would need to be preceded by such a referendum, in order to provide the project with legitimacy both at home and abroad. Even just throwing this card down on the table involves significant risks, however, which explains why Kurdish leaders in Erbil remained cautious during the past ten years.
A referendum on Kurdish independence, whether in the form of confederalism or outright secession, would likely awaken forces that would prove difficult to contain or control. I have no doubt that the vast majority of Kurds in southern Kurdistan would vote for independence, that they deserve independence and that they will enjoy the enthusiastic moral support of fellow Kurds in neighboring states if they opt for independnece. Once these long-repressed passions are fully aroused, putting them back in the bottle might prove impossible. So although Iraqi Kurdish leaders may wish to play the referendum card in order to strengthen their negotiating position with Baghdad, they may quickly find themselves unable to step back from the process if they actually place the card on the table.
Although this is precisely the dynamic that many Kurds want to witness, there may be pressing strategic imperatives to step back. Landlocked southern Kurdistan needs at least one neighboring friend for such a venture. Although relations with Turkey have improved considerably, they may not have improved enough. While Turkey may not be the only possible friend in town, Iran hardly seems a likely alternative and Syria remains in the throes of civil war at the moment. States further afield would also need to be solicited for support and recognition. While the United States and European countries might find themselves forced into supporting the Kurds in spite of their present official positions, this seems very uncertain. Israel and Canada also come to mind as potential supporters – Israel because of its sympathy for the Kurds and shared strategic interests, and Canada because of the independent and principled foreign policy positions the Stephen Harper government seems fond of taking, not to mention the fact that Canada held two referendums of its own in Quebec.
The issue of the disputed territories also needs to be taken into account. Would everyone in these places vote in such a referendum, or perhaps in their own separate referendum? If so, under what legal and practical basis? While Baghdad might prove willing to let the Kurdistan Region go its own way, especially while it has its hands full in places like Faluja, allowing it to leave (or “confederate”) with Kirkuk and other disputed areas is a different story. The chances of an armed confrontation between Erbil and Baghdad would increase considerably in such a scenario.
Of course, Iraqi election results have now come in, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Party apparently won a plurality of the votes and some 92 seats in the next parliament. A large array of political groupings, including all the Kurdish parties (with 62 seats), most of the Sunnis and a lot of the other Shiite parties, seem determined to prevent Mr. Maliki from heading the next government. Meanwhile Maliki’s State of Law Party appears equally determined to have no one else but him be the next Prime Minister, and no one now underestimates Mr. Maliki’s ability to strategize and successfully maneuver through Iraq’s Byzantine political alignments.
The risks of brandishing the referendum card must therefore be weighed against the risks of enduring a third term under Prime Minister al-Maliki. While Mr. Maliki made some overtures to the Kurds following the election last month, he qualified his willingness to negotiate: “If Kurdish conditions and demands are legitimate and in accordance with the constitution, they are welcome for talks to form the government.” Everyone knows very well how Mr. Maliki interprets the Constitution, of course, and how he completely ignores it whenever it suits him. It is therefore not too surprising that Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani may finally reach for his hidden card:
"All options are on the table," he told Reuters. Declaring that the present situation in Iraq was unsustainable, he said: "It is time for final decisions. We are not going to wait another decade and go through the same experience again. If we boycott the process, we will boycott everything.”
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He is the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and author of The Kurdish Nationalist Movement (2006, Cambridge University Press) and co-editor (with Mehmet Gurses) of the forthcoming Conflict, Democratization and the Kurds in the Middle East (2014, Palgrave Macmillan).
