The relationship between the Kurds of Iraq and the United States has, at times, not been without some complaints and reservation on the part of the Kurds. But as a whole, the United States has been a genuine and consistent support for the Kurds since the uprising of 1991.
The United States played a key role in establishing the 1991 No-Fly-Zone, which was put in place by a United Nations Security Council resolution. The outcome of that No-Fly-Zone is the Kurdish region we see today. Similarly in 2014 when ISIS launched an offensive to take Erbil, the US support boosted the morale of the Peshmerga to repel the attack and the overall US air support has been key to the Peshmerga advances ever since.
Having said that, there are two facts to be taken into account. The US support has led to successes of the Peshmerga and US itself. This was unlike the support given to the Iraqi army, which was unable to record any advances on the ground until after the Peshmerga had defeated ISIS in Shingal. In addition, every Iraqi army advance into Sunni areas has brought with it destruction, plunder, massacre and torture of civilians.
Whereas the Peshmerga have been able to, with US support and help from Kurdish forces from other parts of Kurdistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, stop the initial ISIS advance and launch counteroffensives. The Peshmerga were able to return peace and security to all populations under their control.
The Peshmerga not only did not cause the US any embarrassment in its fight. It, in reality, disproved the notion among people in those areas that the US itself is secretly supporting ISIS. A recent US intelligence report said that the majority of Iraqis, except the Kurds, believe the US is behind ISIS.
The second fact is that the Kurds have, since 1991, felt a special love for the United States, compared to other nations in the region. This feeling has in turn been great help to US decision-makers and American plans, especially during the Iraq war of 2003 when the Turkish parliament and most people in the region stood against the US plan.
The latest US move to aid the Peshmerga will only increase the Kurdish people’s love for the United States because the Peshmerga themselves are the people’s most beloved entity.
According to some American sources, the US aid to the Peshmerga amounts to US$900 million, and possibly more in the coming days. This amount would be used for Peshmerga’s food and ammunition supplies as well as training, and expected to last until 2018.
We have learned that the Peshmerga ministry can now pay each of the 60,000 Peshmerga soldiers on the frontlines $600 a month and the payments are expected to reach the Peshmerga by the end of this month. Obviously that money isn’t enough for the total number of 160,000 Peshmerga, 80,000 Zeravani forces and retired personnel, but it is still a considerable help and relief to the Kurdistan Regional Government at this time of financial crisis.
Most important of all are the conditions the United States has for the Kurds such as transparency, professionalization and merger of the Peshmerga soldiers of the 70 and 80 forces for the battle of Mosul. These conditions are all in the best interest of Kurdistan and not seen as preconditions at all. The United States is encouraging the Kurdistan Region to fight ISIS not another Kurdish force.
The ISIS threat in the region is still there and this threat is increasing day by day globally especially in Europe where they fear a nuclear or chemical attack by this group. This threat will always be there as long as there is a so-called ISIS state that gives new life and inspiration to the Muslim youth in Europe, America and other parts of the world to become lone wolves and voluntary fighters against the West.
No army could be as effective as the Peshmerga as it still sees itself as a freedom-fighting force and is shinning bright in the world spotlight at the moment. The Peshmerga is the counterbalance against ISIS and its efforts as the global symbol of jihad. Therefore the US decision to aid the Peshmerga is the right decision in every sense and for the US interests, too.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
