Analysis on why Mosul fell so fast into the hands of a small band of militants make interesting read. Was it because the officers of the Iraqi army quit, they told their soldiers to quit, or because the Islamic militants had got active help from groups inside Mosul?
It could all be true, but it may mostly have to do with the way the Iraqi military has been built in the past ten years. The widespread corruption in the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the political circles around him had also trickled down to the army.
How could all that work and $25 billion the Americans put into the new Iraqi army have led to the outcome we all saw? How is it possible that the Shiite Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq militia is a better fighting force than the Iraqi army?
Apart from being better trained by the Iranians and the help of many seasoned officers of the former army, the militiamen are also highly motivated, while many soldiers would only see the military service as a way to get rich.
As award-winning journalist Patrick Cockburn heard from well-informed sources, until very recently a position as division commander in the Iraqi army could be worth as much as $2 million.
“When one candidate asked where he could get that kind of money, he was told to borrow it and pay back $50,000 a month through various forms of extortion,” he wrote. “Checkpoints on roads acted like private customs posts, charging a fee to every truck passing through.”
No wonder the price for military positions had increased enormously in the last five years. A position that would cost $20,000 in 2009 would now be worth ten times that amount.
At the same time, soldiers would pay their officers half of their salary to be allowed to stay out of the barracks.
The image Cockburn paints is that of an army of fortune seekers, of people who were not so much interested in defending their fatherland as they were in lining their pockets.
This image matches the stories I hear from Mosul where the military was not only hated for the way it treated civilians but also distrusted for many atrocities, kidnaping and extortion that they did and blamed on the militias or gangs.
Corruption has left its marks on the Iraqi society. It is the answer to the question of why Baghdad and other places have changed so little in the past ten years while the Kurdistan Region became the economic motor and the most developed part of Iraq.
Corruption has invisible effects as the fate of the army in Mosul showed us. Corruption is a way of life where making money becomes the main goal and pursued at all costs.
Power and wealth collide in the worst possible way when money is earned over the backs of others and stealing is allowed only because the victim is a stranger, of another tribe, or the enemy.
Corruption in the army has many faces. Those who may not be interested in money, might still be less interested in their country. To them, religious loyalty comes first.
Many units are so deeply infiltrated by Sunni extremists or Shiite personnel backed by Iran that their American advisors could face serious risks to their safety, so US officials thought recently.
This could be why the Americans are hesitant to send trainers and advisers to help the Iraqi army. As late as 2011 some Iraqi soldiers had planted roadside bombs against the American military in Iraq.
It makes you wonder if any help the Americans or anyone else for may offer could be of any use, knowing full well that corruption is so deep in Iraq that it is seen as a vice, instead of a crime.
How can the failed state of Iraq be mended without first tackling corruption, its biggest enemy? If corruption is not fought aggressively and successfully, it will change Iraq into a state where money and religion taken over from democracy, loyalty and humanity.
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