Iraq has two choices: Keep fighting the Sunni insurgents in Anbar and hope it will not further edge the country toward a full-scale civil war; or respond to the Sunni grievances by allowing Sunnis self-rule and greater autonomy in the majority-Sunni province. Anbar is Iraq’s largest province, and a base for the largest insurgency movement since the withdrawal of US forces in 2011.
Iraqi government forces are already losing control over the Sunni areas, and the Shiite-led government forces are not likely to regain command anytime soon. So why not make it official and recognize the Sunni populated provinces as autonomous regions?
Allowing Sunnis to establish one or more semiautonomous regions would be an appropriate response to Sunni grievances against the Shiite central government, which include arbitrary arrest and execution of Sunni civilians and a lack of basic services in Sunni-majority provinces.
More autonomy for the Sunni-populated areas would diminish local support for the growing insurgency in Anbar. Bombing mostly civilian-populated areas is not likely to end the insurgency. Bashar al-Assad has been doing this for three years in Syria. It does not work.
The insurgency in Iraq is more than just terrorism. It is true that the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), an al-Qaida breakaway, is controlling certain areas in Anbar. But this is not the root of the problem. Without support from local Sunni tribes, ISIL could not control a city such as Fallujah and prevent Iraqi forces from entering the vast Sunni-inhabited territories.
In 2008, the US was successful in defeating the Sunni insurgents, mainly because the local tribes stopped supporting al-Qaida. There are no longer US forces in Iraq, and the loyalty of tribal leaders is divided between insurgents and the government.
Safa Rasul Hussein, Iraq’s deputy national security adviser, told a Washington Post reporter: “We’ve seen in some tribes, the father has a position and his son has a different position... Some from the tribes are fighting with ISIS (ISIL), but some are also fighting against them.”
Ali Hatam, a Sunni tribal leader told Rudaw that “people will never let the Shiite-led government forces set foot in Anbar again.”
The current insurgency started in December 2013, when the Iraqi government forces stormed a Sunni opposition protest camp in the city of Ramadi, killing and wounding dozens of protesters. The Sunni protesters initially accused the Shiite-led central government of being “corrupt, sectarian, and authoritarian.” There were also demands for greater autonomy for the Sunni-populated areas.
The post-election and upcoming negotiations for forming the next government in Iraq is the right time for the Iraqi leaders to seriously discuss greater autonomy for the Sunni provinces in Iraq.
Replacing Nouri al-Maliki will not end the Sunni grievances, or the insurgency. Sunnis in general distrust Shiite politicians and it is likely that they will oppose any Shiite-led central government from handling their local security and services, no matter who is prime minister.
It has been five months since the Sunni insurgency started. The Iraqi forces are losing battles and control over Sunni cities and towns. Things are getting worse as the neighboring Jordanians and Saudis fear a potential spillover.
The solution is to allow the local Sunnis self-rule by establishing federal regions, while fighting the Islamic insurgents in Anbar. The process of establishing Sunni regions could take a long time, but the process itself will bring hope to the Sunni populations, and it might end local support for the insurgents in Anbar.
Majeed Gly is a political analyst at the Rudaw Media Network
