What Compelled the Turkish-Kurdish Peace Initiative?

By Hiwa Zandi 

1.   Introduction

In part I of this article, we looked at Kurdish suspicions raised over the Turkish-Kurdish peace process initiative. It was highlighted that the suspicion originates from Turkish political establishment’s past political betrayals and lack of initiative in proceeding with the current negotiated peace plan.

In this part, we will put the peace process initiative into context to underscore the underlying reasons prompting the Turkish government to initiate the peace process.  For this purpose, a number of external and internal political, economic and security pressure factors will be highlighted. These factors cumulatively indicate that the peace process was not a Turkish government project initiated on its own accord in good faith to resolve the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. Rather, these compelling external and internal factors played an instrumental role in pushing Turkey to negotiate the rapprochement plan. 

2.   Factors Compelling the ‘Peace Process’ Initiative:

Since the start of twentieth century, and preceding to that during the Ottomans, all successive Turkish governments have reacted to any Kurdish resistance movement with heavy handed violent means. It did not make any difference whether the ruling party or regime was secular, leftist or Islamic oriented. They all used any resource available in crushing Kurdish resistance movements.

 It is therefore atypical to consider that the Turkish government genuinely intends to resolve the Kurdish political problem peacefully.   

It is therefore atypical to consider that the Turkish government genuinely intends to resolve the Kurdish political problem peacefully. In particular, deeper analysis of the situation indicates that there are specific external and internal factors that obliged Turkish government to consider the peace process.

The external factors are based on political, security and economic reasons. We will highlight the main factors as in the following:

Firstly, the US political, economic and security interests in the region, also influenced by Israel’s future security interests, have shifted considerably towards the direction of stressing Turkish-Kurdish appeasement. At same time, Turkey’s geo-strategic importance for the US has reduced considerably after the end of cold war. This security and geo-strategic changes, combined with the growing European focus on Kurdish human rights in Turkey in the context of Turkey’s EU accession, have resulted in the US becoming more proactive in pressing Turkey for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish problem in Turkey.

This US shift can also partly be identified with the burgeoning US strategic interests of creating a stable political and security climate in the region. In this context, pacifying or neutralising Iran’s regional political and security threats is crucial. Iran has not backtracked from its nuclear programs and its anti-US-Israeli activities in the region. The different economic and security sanctions imposed on Iran during the last decade have not changed Iran’s behaviour.

At the same time, the foreseeability of the US military action against Iran in the near future is remote. However, this does not stop the US from taking or supporting security countermeasures in the context of weakening Iran’s security standing in the region. In this context, diverting PKK guerrillas from Turkey to a region in close proximity with the Iranian border is a step forward to hinder Iran’s growing security threats in the region. The PKK guerrilla redeployment will reinforce its existing force established in the area. It will also strengthen its Eastern Kurdistan (Iranian Kurdistan) offshoot the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) which struggles against the Iranian regime to relinquish Kurd’s civil rights.

  This US shift can also partly be identified with the burgeoning US strategic interests of creating a stable political and security climate in the region. 

In the even the US takes military action against Iran, this PKK-PJAK reinforcement will provide significant military assistance to the US in the Western front. There are reports indicating that the Iranians are already implementing security countermeasures by intensifying military build-ups in the Western border region.

The second important factor is related to the PKK’s political and security gains in the Western (Syrian) Kurdistan region through its affiliated political wing the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its associated armed force called the People’s Defence Units (YPG). PYD has already freed majority of the Kurdish populated areas in the Western Kurdistan. A self-governing Kurdish entity has developed and its reversal is rather impossible.

Turkey cannot conduct military intervention in Syria to stop the growing PKK political and security power in the Western Kurdistan because of the Russian opposition to intervention in Syria. Turkey used to confront PKK in a partisan warfare setting. The group was largely mobile and hiding in the mountains. However, through the sweeping political changes in the Middle East, Turkey had to deal with this new political reality of a PKK controlled self-governing entity that exists within a specific geographic region sharing hundreds of kilometres of border with Turkey.

These geo-political developments warranted Turkey overhaul its political and security standing. Turkey was forced to accept the Kurdish reality and embrace PKK and Kurds in general as partners in the realm of politics rather than foes in the context of ‘terror’.

Thirdly, and perhaps one of the most decisive compelling factors is Turkey’s growing economic relations with the Iraqi Kurdistan. There is a significant level of trade of approximately $11 billion per annum between the two sides making Turkey the biggest trading partner of the Iraqi Kurdistan. The Turkish companies are at forefront in investing in construction, housing, healthcare, infrastructure and energy sectors of the Iraqi Kurdistan. These economic relations is further strengthened by striking significant oil development deals. Under the deals, Kurdish oil is planned reach Turkey and international markets through oil pipelines.

  Turkey was forced to accept the Kurdish reality and embrace PKK and Kurds in general as partners in the realm of politics rather than foes in the context of ‘terror’. 

Given that the Iraqi Kurdistan is a lucrative market for the Turkish companies and contains large amount of energy and mineral reserves, Turkey would only be enticed to make further economic inroads into the Iraqi Kurdistan. These growing significant economic relations are vital for Turkey’s future economic growth. This requires Turkey to create a stable political and security environment in the region. As the decades fighting with PKK underscores, a stable environment, particularly in the North Kurdistan (Turkish Kurdistan) cannot be achieved without making political ‘concessions’ to the PKK. In this way, with initiating the peace process, Turkey is seeking to stabilise the region and secure Turkey’s future economic growth.

3.   Internal factors

The internal factors are also multifaceted. Firstly, in addition to gaining political power in the Western Kurdistan, PKK has also gained successful military grounds in a number of peripheral border regions of the North Kurdistan. Before the peace process, PKK even announced that it is adopting a new military strategy of establishing permanent basis in the North Kurdistan instead of the previous hit and run tactics. This development was a new precedent in the history of PKK’s armed movement.

From a political and military point of view, these gains were a game changing development. Turkey would enter a critical stage of the conflict if PKK continued freeing peripheral Kurdish regions and stretch its military power through establishing permanent guerrilla bases. Turkey thus confronted the possibility of PKK extending its Western Kurdistan’s self-governing rule to Turkey’s peripheral border regions. Therefore, by initiating the peace process, Turkey also sought to restrain PKK from making further military advancements inside Turkey.

Secondly, the intensification of PKK’s guerrilla warfare with increased raids on the Turkish military outposts and camps resulted in increased death toll of the Turkish soldiers.  Public outcry put significant pressure on the Turkish government to stop Turkish soldiers being increasingly killed. The Turkish government could only stop the Turkish soldiers from being killed by PKK announcing a ceasefire under a negotiated peace plan.

  By initiating the peace process, Turkey also sought to restrain PKK from making further military advancements inside Turkey. 

The third important factor, but to a lesser extent, is Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s attempt to change the political system in Turkey. Erdogan intends to replace the current parliamentary system with Presidential governance. He is also intending to become the first President under the new political system. Since Erdogan does not have the backing of the main opposition parties, he needs the support of the Kurdish BDP deputies in the parliament to bring about these pre-planned changes. Therefore, initiating the peace process with the PKK would not only result in gaining Kurdish vote in Turkey in the upcoming elections but also induce the Kurdish MPs to back Erdogan’s Presidential political agenda.

4.   Conclusion

The Turkish government has commenced the peace process initiative as a result of a number of important external and internal factors. The main external factors include, firstly, the US push for the Turkish-Kurdish rapprochement. This is because the US strategic interests lies in creating stability in the region. Secondly, PKK’s political gains in the Western Kurdistan is pushing Turkey to accept the Kurdish reality and deal with the Kurdish problem in a peaceful manner. Thirdly, Turkey’s growing economic relations with the Iraqi Kurdistan requires Turkey bringing stability to the region and making peace with the PKK.

The main internal factors include: firstly, the PKK making significant military advancements inside Turkey. Secondly, the public become very concerned about the rising deaths of the Turkish soldiers. Thirdly, Erdogan needs to gain Kurdish vote in the upcoming elections and the Kurdish MPs support to replace the Turkish parliamentary system.

Click here to read part I of this article:

http://rudaw.net/english/opinion/13072013?keyword=HIWA%20ZANDI 

* Hiwa Zandi is a lawyer, political commentator and Kurdish history researcher. He obtained bachelor of International Relations and Bachelor of Laws from the University of Queensland, Australia. He joined the Supreme Court of Queensland as a lawyer in 2010.  Email: hiwa_zandi@hotmail.com