Albert Einstein famously defined insanity as “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” American support for strong central governments and the “territorial integrity” of states in the Middle East and North Africa might fit this description. Alert readers might immediately object, exclaiming “Wait! Didn’t the Americans support Kurdish autonomy in Iraq and a decentralized, federalist constitution for the country?” Yes and no. The autonomy the Americans wished to support in 2005 lacked any financial and security checks and balances.
In the view of Coalition Provisional Authority officials, the Kurds could rule their own region but their security forces had to take orders from Baghdad “in the interests of a unified military.” Paul Bremmer and his advisors pushed hard for the disbanding of the Peshmerga and their incorporation into the regular Iraqi army.
In financial matters as well, Americans thought the Kurds should defer to the government in Baghdad. Hat in hand, they would request their monthly hand-out from the central government. Since they participated in and had representatives to this central government, it was their government too, American diplomats reasoned. On the oil issue as well, the American view supported a more centralized approach than America itself pursues with its own fifty states. Baghdad would sign the contracts, manage the oil, market it and collect the revenues. Kurdistan was supposed to trust in promises written on paper that it would then receive its due.
On the oil issue as well, the American view supported a more centralized approach than America itself pursues with its own fifty states. 
Thankfully, Kurdistan Regional Government leaders ignored American preferences on these matters. They bargained very hard during the constitutional drafting process, insisting on the right to keep their independent “regional security force” (which they helpfully renamed “national guards” in English for the Americans – although that still translates to “peshmerga” in Kurdish). If they had not done so, the Islamic State might be in Erbil and Kirkuk city today.
The Kurds also insisted on a guaranteed share of the national budget, based on the population of their region. On oil, they recognized the principle of sharing revenues across the country irrespective of which regions and governorates produce hydrocarbons. They refused to cede management of the entire industry and especially their own oil and gas resources to politicians in Baghdad, however. Through Articles 112 and 115 of the Constitution, they enshrined their rights to manage their own new oil resources, sign contracts and according to some interpretations, even their own exports. Contracts the Kurds signed with oil and gas companies included requirements to provide natural gas to new power stations, build roads, and engage in other development activities. If they had not done this, the electricity, public services and roads in the Kurdistan Region might be in as bad shape as in the rest of Iraq, with hundreds of billions of dollars mysteriously unaccounted for.
After some eight years of growing authoritarianism in Prime Minister Maliki’s Baghdad, all the while supported by Washington and its “one Iraq policy,” the Americans then expressed surprise at the dysfunctional state of affairs in Iraq. Washington refused to support decentralization in the fiscal and security realms where it mattered most, claiming this would “undermine Iraq’s territorial integrity.” In other words, Washington eschews real checks and balances to secure autonomy and minority rights lest they empower minorities “too much.”
After the Islamic State (IS) rampaged across the country last summer, the solution they supported was a new government in Baghdad under Prime Minister Abadi. They pushed the Kurds hard to commit to the new government and give things yet one more try. With few practical options in the face of the IS onslaught, the Kurds agreed to try again. While Abadi’s heart appears to be in the right place, older stronger forces in Baghdad appear to be playing an old tune. The Kurds are still not receiving the heavy weapons that even illegal Shiite militias in the south get. Despite a new deal on oil and the budget, officials in Erbil claim they have lived up to 97% of their end of the bargain while Baghdad only lives up to 20% of its commitments. In other words, the Kurds are delivering oil for sale – virtually all the quantities promised – while Baghdad collects the revenues from sales abroad and gives Erbil only a trickle of the money owed it.
The Kurds are still not receiving the heavy weapons that even illegal Shiite militias in the south get.
It is in this context that Washington refuses to directly arm the Kurds, insisting that all weapons must be delivered to Baghdad first. Washington has also still not offered its support to the Kurdish view on the oil and gas issue and the right of regions and governorates (including Sunni Arab ones) to have more control over their own exports, contracts and finances. Perhaps officials in Washington now expect a different result from promoting the same policy again, one where leaders in Baghdad will play nice and share power and create a democratic yet centralized and strong Iraq.
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He is the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and author of The Kurdish Nationalist Movement (2006, Cambridge University Press) and co-editor (with Mehmet Gurses) of Conflict, Democratization and the Kurds in the Middle East (2014, Palgrave Macmillan).
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
