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In a few days, Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani will visit Diyarbakir. By the time you read this, he may already be there or have completed his visit. Diyarbakir, or Amed for the Kurds, is the largest predominantly Kurdish city in the world. It is also an important electoral district in Turkey. In the forthcoming Turkish municipal elections, the city is expected to divide its votes between Turkey’s Peace and Democracy (BDP) pro-Kurdish party and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).
It is therefore no surprise that Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan invited Mr. Barzani to Diyarbakir. Mr. Erdogan will have many photo opportunities around the city during Mr. Barzani’s historic visit, embracing the Iraqi Kurdish leader and showing him respect and every diplomatic courtesy. In doing so, the Turkish Prime Minister will demonstrate to Kurdish voters in Turkey that he is a friend to the Kurds – although not the ones linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
This represents an intelligent strategy for the AKP, and part of the reason for Turkey’s continuing good relations with Iraqi Kurdistan. Both Mr. Erdogan’s AKP and Mr. Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq (KDP) share pro-capitalist, conservative and traditional political outlooks. Their shared politics stand in stark contrast to that of the PKK and its political affiliates, who are born of the radical Turkish Left and various strains of Marxist-Leninism and Maoism. Erdogan and Barzani are also not competitors for the loyalties of the same political constituencies. The PKK umbrella, in contrast, competes with both of them – for votes in Turkey and Mr. Erdogan’s case, and for general support and sympathy in the case of Barzani and greater Kurdistan.
Even now, for example, pro-Barzani political parties in Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan) find themselves at odds with the pro-PKK Democratic Union Party (PYD). As a kind of Syrian branch of the PKK (denials notwithstanding), Mr. Erdogan’s government in Ankara also eyes PYD control of Syrian Kurdistan with a great deal of alarm. As a result, those who were once thought of as unlikely bedfellows join together in isolating the PYD: More often than not, Iraqi Kurdistan’s border is as closed to the PYD as Turkey’s is.
Besides this very logical political calculus, strong economic imperatives also encourage the ever improving friendship between Ankara and Erbil. Turkey needs oil and gas – especially oil and gas that don’t come from Russia and Iran – and Iraqi Kurdistan needs an outlet for its oil and gas, especially if such an outlet can remain outside of Baghdad’s control. Hence all the pipeline activity we recently heard about on the Turkish-Iraqi Kurdistan border, to Baghdad’s great consternation. Although Turkey would prefer to buy its oil and gas with Baghdad’s approval, it needs those resources one way or another. What’s more, Ankara also needs the Iraqi Kurds’ help with its own Kurdish-Leftist problem for the reasons mentioned above. Simultaneously, Turkish businesses remain more than happy to continue jumping into the Iraqi Kurdish market, earning handsome profits that their European and North American competitors were too hesitant to capitalize upon.
Ankara and Erbil’s mutual interests do not extend into everything, however, and require some careful balancing to pursue effectively. When the Turks apparently supported Jihadist groups fighting the PYD in Syria, for example, they likely went too far. Behind closed doors, both Erbil and Turkey’s Western allies probably pointed this out to leaders in Ankara, and they seem to be backing away from the policy now. Ankara would also rather not see even Iraqi Kurdistan achieve statehood, although preventing such an occurrence is no longer the obsession it used to be. At the same time, the Iraqi Kurds probably do not want to replace their reliance on Baghdad with a complete dependency on Ankara. Ideally, they would rather steer a course between the two, if such a “sweet spot” can be found, until they feel secure enough to declare their independence. Given popular sentiment on Iraqi Kurdistan’s streets, Erbil also cannot be seen to directly harm Kurdish aspirations in other parts of Kurdistan – even if the PKK plays the lead role in pushing those aspirations forward.
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since August 2010. He is the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and author of The Kurdish Nationalist Movement (2006, Cambridge University Press).
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