Adel Bakawan
I am too often asked in my public appearances, by email and on social media about the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIS) and the reason behind its continuation. They ask why the ultra-jihadi group is still alive and kicking. “What is it that makes the group survive?” I was once asked at a conference. And “why in spite of all the bombs and attacks and world coalitions, ISIS is still here and far from being defeated,”
Before answering these questions, let me rephrase it differently: Is ISIS the genuine archenemy of any group or country? Is there any state that considers ISIS an existential threat?
Let me disappoint you with my own view in this regard and quite frankly say that at present I do not see any regional or international powers that would regard ISIS as its archenemy. Quite the opposite. These same powers would see the immediate fall of ISIS as contrary to their own interests. Further more, ISIS maybe the “bad” but acceptable option among many “worse” options. Let us examine what I just outlined above.
Turkey is one of the regional powers with a special status in the Middle East and a decisive impact on this region’s political equations. As a regional superpower, Ankara is concerned with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and not ISIS. It sees the PKK and its many offshoots as public enemy number one. Ankara has made no secret of that and constantly reiterates it publically. The main concern for Turkey is indeed not the liberation of Mosul or Raqqa, but gaining control of Syrian Kurdistan, Rojava, which it fears to become a stronghold of its archenemy. Accordingly, not only destroying ISIS is not a Turkish objective, but on a strategic level, Ankara should work for its persistence. Otherwise, The Turks would strengthen their own enemies in the PKK. Thus, seen in this light, Turkey may sing ‘long live ISIS.’
Saudi Arabia is another power in the Middle East with considerable status and position in the region. For the Saudis the imaginary foe is, however, not a band of ISIS assassins, but the Islamic Republic in Iran. This means that the fall of ISIS would directly strengthen the hegemony of Shiite Iran in the Arab peninsula and beyond-- from Damascus, to Beirut and Manama and Sanaa. The Saudis fear Iran would soon take a foothold in areas now controlled by ISIS diehards. Again, seen in this light, even for the Saudis, ‘long live ISIS.’
The Islamic Republic of Iran itself has a special view of ISIS, which so far has not posed a real threat to Tehran and its security. Quite the contrary, the presence of ISIS in Syria and Iraq has led these two countries to seek support in Iran and see the Islamic Republic as a savior. Apparently, Tehran will maintain this protection racket as long as ISIS remains in these two countries. This again means that the fall of ISIS will not serve the national interest of the Islamic Republic.
The dismantling of ISIS could in the long run help an Arab nationalist sentiment to emerge in its place, which as many researchers point out, would likely try to depict Iran as the main enemy. This would indeed not be in the interest of Iran, so for Tehran too, ‘long live ISIS.’
Even for Israel the survival of ISIS matters. Israel’s two main enemies, Assad’s Syria and the Hezbollah are both deeply engaged and preoccupied with ISIS and as far as ISIS is there, there will be no real opportunity for these two enemies to bother Israel and its short term interests. So even for the Israelis, ‘Long live ISIS.”
Putin’s Russia has long contemplated an opportunity to reenter the Mideast through which it could impact power relations on a world stage. ISIS granted Moscow this golden opportunity and the more the ISIS war continues, the bigger will be Russia’s presence in the Middle East as regional countries in fact beg Putin to stay. So even for the Russians “Long live ISIS.”
The United State does not want to be involved militarily in this region, or at least it does not wish to deploy its army, and as US policymakers have already said, Washington has made its mind that ISIS should no longer be a main enemy. Thus, ISIS is an enemy that must be annihilated now, much like the Taliban in Afghanistan.
For the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) the archenemy is Baghdad and not Mosul. As long as ISIS remains in Mosul, the KRG will prove to be an acknowledged regional actor that is protected and supported internationally. The fall of ISIS would immediately push the KRG into loggerheads with Baghdad. Thus, as in the case of Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, even the Kurdistan Region thinks about its long-term archenemy in Baghdad more profoundly than about annihilating ISIS.
In these circumstances, what prevents ISIS from falling is not its own strength. Neither is it due to its several thousand fighters. The main reason is regional and global politics.
And what will happen to ISIS in these complicated circumstances while strategic and political conditions are shifting constantly?
Indeed, what will become of it? As Oliver Roa says, ISIS could simply destroy itself and come to en end in the same ashes it has created. But it could also abandon “Global” jihad and “the Caliphate” illusion and instead become an “Islamo-nationalist” movement, much like the Palestinian Hamas. In such a situation, we should expect talks and negotiations between ISIS and the West. Although the former scenario is more likely than the latter.
Adil Baxawan is a Kurdish researcher and writer, specialized in Islamic history. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
