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Sunni Arabs largely boycotted the January 2005 Iraqi elections to form a Constitution-drafting assembly and a subsequent election in Kirkuk that year. The error cost them dearly. The constitution was drafted mostly without them (although nowadays they are probably thankful for the Kurdish insistence on decentralized federalism), and Kirkuk’s provincial council fell solidly into Kurdish hands. Realizing their mistake, Sunni groups made sure to participate in subsequent elections and referendums, no matter how imperfect the process or results. When Sunni Arabs’ choice of Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiya list won the most votes in 2010, but was denied the right to be the first to try and form a new government or even a real post in Maliki’s “unity government,” the regime in Baghdad lost more legitimacy than any boycott would have cost it.
With new legislative election coming up later this month in Iraq, the Kurds should remember this lesson. While it may feel good to make a “moral statement” and boycott elections, does anyone really think the current Prime Minister and his people really care about such symbolic acts? On the contrary, they would most likely be very pleased to enjoy a larger proportion of seats in the Assembly. It would make their job of consolidating power in the executive branch of the government that much easier. For similar reasons, Mr. Maliki and company are probably somewhat pleased that instability in Anbar may postpone polling or reduce voter turnout there – the fewer Sunnis (Arab or Kurdish) vote in this election, the better the result for them.
Since 2003, the Kurdish strategy has been to secure Erbil through active participation in Baghdad. The policy has not gotten them everything they wanted, especially regarding disputed territories, hydrocarbons and funding for the peshmerga, but in other ways it has paid off splendidly. We need only compare this policy’s results to some seventy years of revolts and isolation. Today the Kurdistan Region of Iraq enjoys official recognition from Baghdad and the world, very extensive autonomous powers, security like it has never known before and impressive economic progress. Kurdish participation in the security forces and government also gained them training, equipment and a good working relationship with many Arab and Turkmen friends in Iraq. In politics, one cannot have too many friends.
Nor could the growing relationship with Turkey and the rest of the international community have occurred if the Kurds were not in Baghdad or worse, were in the midst of an apparently secessionist revolt against Baghdad. A presence in Baghdad got the world used to seeing and working with the Kurds, and the Kurds’ position of trying to contribute to the success of post-Saddam Iraq reassured nervous statesmen of the world. Most of all, the Kurdish position of “we will not leave Iraq unless Iraq leaves us,” meaning that as long as Iraq remains democratic and constitutional the Kurds will play a part in it, gives Erbil the moral high ground and better chances of international recognition and support should secession ever become necessary.
Plenty of policies in Baghdad appear less than constitutional these days, of course (although the Kurdistan Regional Government has also pushed the boundaries of constitutional legality on some issues). The Kurds’ best option in such cases remains to elect as many parliamentarians as they can to point out such illegality and attempt to take action against it. The Kurdistan Alliance can always walk out of the government in Baghdad for a time, as they threaten to do often. This hurts the legitimacy of the government in Baghdad as much or more than a boycott. Without elected members of Parliament, however, there would be no one to walk out.
For these reasons and others, on April 30th Iraqi Kurds should vote early and vote often.
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since August 2010. He is the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and author of The Kurdish Nationalist Movement (2006, Cambridge University Press).
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