By Arif Qurbany
A delegation from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) visited the Iraqi capital Baghdad late last month where they met with Prime Minister Haider Abadi and leaders of Iraqi political factions.
Some PUK officials later said that they had discussed with Abadi the question of Kurdish independence and had in fact gone there to get Baghdad’s view on this subject. In reality that was not the main purpose of the delegation’s visit, but in discussing the deadlock between Erbil and Baghdad they had also touched on this subject.
They reported that Iraqi PM Abadi had said that Iraq will not stop the Kurds from achieving that right but that there should be a clear understanding between both sides when the decision to separate is finally made so that Kurdistan and Iraq could become two good neighbors.
These kinds of words, though they are very basic, are important. On the one hand they lift the mist over PUK’s position on the issue of Kurdish independence, which has been accused of not supporting such a move. On the other hand, it tells us what’s Baghdad’s view on this. Though Abadi does not have the final say, it at least tells us that the Shiites want to be rid of the Kurds.
Supporters of Kurdish statehood often say that never in our history has such an opportunity risen for independence, and this is correct despite Kurdistan Region’s economic, political and other crises.
As far as Iraq is concerned, it has a centralized Shiite system and in their fight with the Sunnis and efforts to redefine the country with a Shiite identity they see the Kurds as the main obstacle for making this possible.
The Shiites have been to a great extent successful in weakening the Sunnis and that is thanks to all Shiite groups adhering to the same strategy since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. They have uprooted the Sunnis in many areas and fought and weakened them elsewhere which has contributed to their plan. But what has slowed down their agenda and its completion is the Kurds in Iraq. That is why there are indications now that the Shiites may think that if the Kurds separate their own plan to make Iraq completely Shiite will succeed. From this standpoint, they may want the Kurds to go their way and leave Iraq to them.
What is important for the Kurds is to seize such chances that arise before them and make the dream of independence more likely to fulfill. Once all Arabs were united in their opposition to Kurdish statehood ambitions and spoke of the dangers of the breakup of Iraq, but now their internal rivalries and fight for the redefinition of the country has offered the Kurds yet another opportunity.
This new stance from Baghdad must have been taken and valued more seriously by the Kurds and serious efforts should have been made to reconcile local groups for the sake of preparing the ground for a referendum. Seizing this chance is imperative especially since the rise of new alliances in the region, Russia included, and their implications for the Kurds, as we already see in Rojava.
Another side of Abadi’s new stance is that it would put the Kurds to the test to see how serious they are about independence. Many in Kurdistan believe that none of Kurdistan’s political forces are sincere about independence and that they are using the issue as a political bargaining chip and empty slogans and nothing else.
It is also an answer to those who keep saying that without Baghdad’s consent going for independence is impossible. If Baghdad agrees to the Kurds holding a referendum, then all other regional concerns and obstacles would become irrelevant.
Most importantly, this would be a great test for groups who speak of independence and tells them: go ahead! Baghdad is now willing to discuss this and wants to be a good future neighbor. This last bit is also exactly what the Kurds want, too. We don’t want to cause more hostility in the region with our independence and want a peaceful separation.
Now it is up to us Kurds what we want to do and where we want to go from here.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
