The majority opinion is that the fall of ISIS will change the status quo in the region. But the possibility of the region maintaining the status quo remains valid, for any change in the Iraqi and Syrian political landscape is interrelated with international political equations and struggles for regional power balance.
However, international and regional powers fighting ISIS are making preparations to face the eventualities which could possibly ensue from the collapse of ISIS.
Most changes which might possibly follow from the destruction of ISIS are expected to affect the Kurdistan Region. But the government has made no preparations to confront these possible changes. The media and research centers have sidelined this issue too.
The Kurds of Southern and Western Kurdistan have had an important and decisive role in the fight against ISIS, bringing them to the attention of the international community. There has, therefore, been much talk by the international community about their future for two reasons. First, due to the Kurdish question being a legitimate cause. Second, due to the sacrifices the Kurds have made in the war on terror.
Political analysts largely think that the Kurds would be the biggest beneficiaries of the war against ISIS, but situations on the ground tell a different story. There is now growing fear that the Kurds could fall victim to the interests of superpowers, keeping power balance in the region at their cost.
In addition, the Kurds are now facing internal problems and could face new challenges after ISIS is destroyed. However, resolving outstanding problems and cultivating unity among Kurds could prevent these challenges.
The war on ISIS, although costing the lives of more than a thousand Peshmerga and injuring thousands more, thwarted some internal problems in the Kurdistan Region, i.e. preventing the public discontent from reaching flashpoint. This has been due to the Kurds understanding the risks ISIS has been posing to the region.
New challenges will surface in the Kurdistan Region, which require advance preparation to confront.
It is likely that the disagreements between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) will reach flashpoint after the war on ISIS is over, causing regional war and creating another problem for the Kurdistan Region.
It is also probable that problems will erupt between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi Hashd al-Shaabi militia over the disputed areas, most likely starting from the town of Khurmatu.
Instead of settling the dispute between the two, the Iraqi government will be trying to exacerbate the dispute and deepen the economic crisis which has plagued the Kurdistan Region for over two years by putting pressure on the Havana and Bay Hassan oil fields in Kirkuk.
Moreover, Iran will be trying to step up its interference in the internal affairs of the Kurdistan Region. The potential further plummeting of oil prices will put the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in a more difficult situation, to the extent that it might no longer be able to pay the half salaries it gives to its employees from time to time. This might further intensify the already strong public discontent, causing confrontation between the people and the government. Furthermore, the deadlocked political process in the Kurdistan Region will be contributing to the escalation of public discontent into flashpoint.
We need to change the structure and form of governance in order to eliminate or minimize these dangers, and this change should ensure that the KDP is no longer the image of the government. Some of the changes to ensue from the demise of ISIS are expected to primarily affect the KDP, and then the people of Kurdistan. The reality is that some of the existing dangers and threats are due to the KDP, and this is because of its national rhetoric, its role in regional power struggles, or its flawed policies. This is, however, not to judge whether the KDP is right or wrong in the policies it exercises.
In his latest statement about the outstanding problems of the Kurdistan Region, Barzani suggests that the makeup of all three presidencies of the region’s governance apparatus be changed. This shows that Barzani understands the dangers of these possible eventualities.
We can capitalize on Barzani’s initiative to resolve some of these problems. The integrity of the Kurdistan Region is now under threat due to the city of Sulaimani perceiving itself to be sidelined.
This feeling of being sidelined by the people of Sulaimani could end if the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) takes over the government and ensures that most of the government’s key departments are run by the people of Sulaimani. This will put to rest fears that the Kurdistan Region might fall apart, and might lead to a reduction of the pressure which Iran puts on the region. The PKK will no longer be a threat too, and relations between Erbil and Baghdad could consequently normalize due to the PUK’s relations with Iran and the Shiites.
The current situations in the Kurdistan Region favor that the PUK leads the government and that the KDP takes a back seat.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
