Recently, around 74 members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria were picked up and imprisoned by the Democratic Union Party (PYD), shortly after crossing the border from Iraqi Kurdistan.
In response, Kurdish officials in the autonomous region closed the border and Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani warned the PYD not to impose itself as the sole controller of Syria’s Kurdish areas.
The PYD, which has close ties to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), is the dominant force in Syrian Kurdistan; it has little tolerance for groups it regards as competitors or threats.
The PYD has signed a power-sharing agreement with the Kurdish National Council (KNC), but on the ground all other Kurdish groups are still cowed by the PYD, which operates through a large network of fighters.
Meanwhile, it appears that the Kurdistan Region’s second-largest party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), has began to improve relations with the PYD, channeling funds to the group’s newly-formed security forces, known as Asayish.
This could mean that each Kurdish group in Syria is linked to a major political party in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Since last summer the KDP has tried to send back to Syria small groups of fighters who had finished their training in Kurdistan. But the PYD has stubbornly stalled these efforts, arguing that its own security forces are capable of maintaining safety in the Kurdish cities.
The KDP enjoys a degree of popularity among Syrian Kurds, particularly in the oil-rich province of Hassaka. But it has not managed to dig in its heels through smaller allies.
One reason that the KDP’s investment in money and time in Syria has so far failed, is that the PKK and its close ally PYD do not want the spread of KDP influence in Syria.
Initially, PYD leaders had promised Erbil they would form a joint military council with all other Kurdish groups in Syria. But the PYD’s own armed wing, the People’s Defense Units (YPG), refused to give in to any outside pressure.
The PYD may claim that its Asayish is the legitimate security force in Syria, and there may be some truth to this. But it is obvious that Iraqi Kurdistan’s PUK and KDP have politically turned the Kurdish areas of Syria into two zones under their direct guidance.
Most likely, Barzani and KDP will not quit talking any time soon. Neither side is interested in head-on clashes in Syria. In the meantime, I do not see a decline in PYD control over Syrian Kurdistan or any genuine power-sharing on the ground.
