Foreign and local investors in the Kurdistan Region should remain confident and secure, despite improving ties between Ankara and Baghdad. That is because geography and regional circumstances mean that Ankara’s relations with Erbil are of greater strategic importance to Turkey than its ties with Baghdad. Turkey, the Kurdistan Region’s largest trade partner, has already shown that it overwhelmingly backs investments and trade with the Kurdish enclave.
Late last month, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari visited Ankara and met with his Turkish counterpart, nearly two years after diplomatic relations between the neighboring countries soured over different views on the war in Syria and Baghdad’s treatment of its very large Sunni population. Both officials vowed to put aside past differences and turn a new page in relations.
Investors in Kurdistan have greater reason to feel secure: In the past the United States had been consistent in its strong disapproval of the growing business and oil ties between Ankara and Erbil, and especially of any energy pipelines between the two. But of late, Washington appears to have reached an understanding about Kurdish-Turkish energy cooperation.
By its silence over burgeoning energy ties between Ankara and Erbil – including a recent multibillion dollar agreement for pipelines to get landlocked Kurdistan’s rich oil and gas reserves to markets in Turkey and beyond – Washington is understood to give its tacit nod.
Although the reasons behind this apparent change in US policy remain unclear, certainly the increasingly autocratic rule of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, his pro-Iranian tilt, the backing for the Syrian regime next door and his government’s inability to control the deadly cycle of sectarian violence across Iraq would logically factor into Washington’s change of heart.
Many had believed that improved Baghdad-Ankara ties would be at the expense of Erbil-Turkish relations, meaning that Turkey would likely downgrade its diplomatic, energy and trade involvement with the Kurdish enclave in exchange for better ties with Baghdad.
Investors and oil companies had worried that such a mending of ties between Baghdad and Ankara would negatively impact the growth of Kurdistan’s energy sector, including an important pipeline that is due for completion at the end of this year.
Erbil-Ankara relations remain secure because Maliki seems to have nothing to offer Turkey that is more attractive than the burgeoning energy and trade deals it has with the Kurdistan Region.
It is true that the history of Turkish-Iraqi relations is replete with agreements, machinations and deals to undermine the Kurds. The two neighbors have had more than 60 security or military agreements and understandings over the past century to suppress Kurdish nationalism. But this has changed since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002.
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who is considered the main architect of the new Turkish foreign policy, clearly signals the importance of Kurdistan for Turkey in his book, Strategic Depth.
The recent comprehensive energy deal to construct new multibillion dollar gas and oil pipelines between Turkey and Kurdistan reinforces Davutoglu’s vision for Turkish- Kurdish ties in the future, which is to fully integrate the Kurdistan Region economically -- and potentially politically -- into Turkey’s sphere of influence.
For the Kurds, Turkey is the gateway to the outside world, especially Europe. Kurdistan has most of its business and economic transactions with Turkey. Turkish companies are dominant in Kurdistan and over 30,000 Turkish nationals work in the region.
In recent years, Kurdish leaders and people have downgraded relations with their traditional eastern ally, Iran, as they look to Turkey as a better option to realize their economic and political goals.
Realistically, if the Kurds want to be strong and realize their historical ambition of declaring an independent Kurdistan, they need to have an important denominator. For that, they either have to have autonomous regions similar to Iraqi Kurdistan in Syria, Turkey and Iran or have all Kurdish populations living within the official boundary of one state. In this equation, Turkey is the best realistic option for the Kurds.
In theory, Iraq has a border with Turkey. But practically, the real border begins with Kurdistan and ends with the international-type checkpoints of the Kurdistan Region in Erbil, Duhok and Sulaimani -- not to mention the de facto Kurdish control over Kirkuk as well.
Even if Ankara decided to deal with Baghdad and ignore Kurdistan, it has to go through Erbil to reach Baghdad for trade and business; the same is true for Baghdad. Thus, Kurdistan cannot be easily sidelined either by Baghdad or Ankara.
In addition, the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline (IPT), which carries oil from fields in Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, is at the mercy of the Kurds. Without Erbil’s cooperation, it would be hard for Iraq to export its oil and for Turkey to receive the transit fees for each barrel exported.
Policy makers in Ankara also realize that any potential move that would harm Iraqi Kurds will be seen as a betrayal by the Kurds in Turkey and Syria.
Therefore, the Ankara- Baghdad rapprochement and Maliki’s visit to Ankara is highly unlikely to disturb any political and diplomatic equation between Ankara and Erbil.
Turkish- Kurdish relations will remain intact, unless there is a change of leadership in Ankara in the immediate future. And even if the more nationalist parties such as the Republic People’s Party (CHP) or the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) come to power in 2015, Ankara-Erbil ties will be deep enough institutionally and economically to remain unbroken.
