Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia over their diverging interests in the region have been deteriorating since the Hajj stampede incident in September 2015 and Riyadh’s execution of a Shiite cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, in January – which was followed by an angry Iranian mob ransacking the Saudi embassy in Tehran. The two regional powers have been fighting via proxy actors across the region, most notably in Syria and Yemen. This all raises questions about what the wider implications will be for the region if this proxy war persists, and possibly intensifies, into the foreseeable future as the two powers jockey for predominant positions of power and influence in the region. “Both countries have an interest in working towards stability and normal diplomatic relations,” Richard LeBaron, a nonresident senior fellow of the Atlantic Council think-tank, told Rudaw English. “But there will be domestic rivalries in Iran that propel it toward radical positions and the Saudis, despite their military superiority, have used their regional power somewhat ineffectively,” he added. LeBaron believes that neither power “can expect major powers to support them wholeheartedly in their goals against each other.” “Even some of their traditional allies will hesitate to choose sides on all issues of interest to these two rivals,” he pointed out. Joel Wing, an Iraq analyst who runs the important Musings on Iran blog, estimates that a continued proxy war “means more violence for the Middle East, which Iran is far more capable of using than the Saudis.” “Iran has been able to organize fighters from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon for its cause. The Saudis are funding rebels in Syria and fighting in Yemen. It also spreads anti-Shiite hatred through various preachers, and the mosques it sets up in other countries,” Wing explained. Philip Smyth, a researcher at the University of Maryland on Shiite militias in the Middle East, says that Riyadh is searching “for all types of allies it can use in campaigns to put pressure on Tehran.” “These don’t necessarily need to be Sunni jihadists or Sunni Islamist groups,” he told Rudaw English. “It’s important to note that Riyadh sent a signal by having Turki bin Faysal give his approval to the MEK (People’s Mojahedin of Iran), an Iranian dissident group this summer. I would argue this is symbolic of Saudi’s pragmatism, but at times poor strategic planning in response to Iranian successes in Iraq and Syria.” If this proxy war continues to drag on into the foreseeable future, Smyth anticipates Tehran continuing to build up its Shia militia allies and proxies across the region. “They have done so with great success in the past five years and they have used the opportunity of war in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and low-intensify insurgency in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, to build stronger links with local Shia radicals,” he explained. “The Islamic Republic will increasingly rely on its proxies within the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) network of organizations to execute operations in the Middle East. This type of setup isn’t new and shouldn’t surprise anyone,” Smyth concluded.
