LONDON – Self-determination should be a straightforward concept. The right of nations freely to choose their sovereign status is enshrined in Article I of the founding charter of the United Nations and as such has the weight of international law.
The principle can range from a nation’s right to independence as a sovereign state to the right of a minority to enjoy democratic representation and respect for its cultural rights within a unitary state.
In the realm of realpolitik, of course, it is never that simple. The Kurds, better than any nation, know that national rights can be subsumed to the interests of the powerful. The principle of self-determination as set out by US President Woodrow Wilson at the end of World War I failed to result in the promised creation of a Kurdish state.
In the ensuing century, scores of other new states emerged, many of them former colonies of the European powers. Other nations emerged or re-emerged from the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
As recently as 2011, the people of South Sudan voted overwhelmingly to break away from the dominant North which had suppressed their rights since independence.
International lawyers have been divided over how self-determination is pursued in practice. For much of the 20th century the territorial integrity of established states appeared to trump the rights of those seeking to secede from them.
But, as the Cold War period gave way to an era of globalization and ostensibly enhanced international cooperation, world powers began to take a more relaxed attitude to the redrawing of borders – in at least some parts of the world.
There was rightly no outside interference in the decision of Czechs and Slovaks to dissolve their union in 1993, and the same is true as Scotland prepares to vote this year on whether to leave the United Kingdom.
What, then, of Crimea, where the local pro-Russian parliament has called a snap referendum to decide whether the region should remain in Ukraine or join the Russian Federation?
The fact that the Ukrainian authorities in the region have been pushed aside, while key installations have been surrounded by forces either loyal to Moscow or drafted in by it, obviously casts doubt on the legitimacy of such a vote, scheduled for March 16.
That is not to say, given the strength of pro-Russian feeling in the region, that a majority might not be willing opt for union with Russia. But would that represent an exercise in self-determination, or would it amount to the abuse of the principle in the interests of big power politics?
Also, where would it leave more than a quarter of a million Crimean Tatars who are now looking to Turkey to defend their rights as they face the threat of a Russian takeover?
The US and the European Union have joined the Ukrainian government in declaring the referendum move as illegal, effectively putting the principle of Ukraine’s territorial integrity above the rights of a pro-Russian population in Crimea that might vote to break away.
Crimea is a special case, of course, in which the Kremlin’s bullying tactics, Western bluster, and the internal political crisis in Ukraine serve to obscure any genuine issue of self-determination.
It does raise the question, however, as to where outside powers might stand on other situations where people are struggling either for self-determination or to preserve existing rights.
Take the situation of the Kurdish nation. Any bid for outright independence by the Kurds of Iraq or Syria would currently be anathema in world capitals, however dysfunctional their host countries or artificial their original borders.
The sentiment is not confined to world powers. In an interview with Rudaw last week, George Sabra, head of the opposition Syrian National Council (SNC), reminded Syria’s Kurds that they should concentrate on toppling Bashar Assad’s regime rather than be insisting on guarantees of self-rule in a future government.
Kurdish leaders have for the most part opted for pragmatism, setting aside the idea of independence in favor of securing autonomy within existing borders.
Even the formerly separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has opted for an accommodation with Turkey that would guarantee Kurdish rights rather than seeking to split the Turkish state.
In Iraq, where functioning autonomy has been established after decades of repression by the central government, the Kurdish leadership has sought to make federalism work despite a frequently turbulent relationship with Baghdad.
As Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Region, said in Moscow a year ago: “We know well that there is a real world in which we live, and we have to take this reality into account.”
More recently, however, he expressed growing impatience with Baghdad’s attitude in its budget dispute with Erbil by accusing the Iraqi leadership of seeking to break “the pride and dignity of the Kurds.”
The only thing keeping the Kurds attached to Iraq was the constitution, otherwise they could announce a referendum and seek independence, he has previously warned.
If Kurds were to determine that their Iraqi partners had violated the terms of the federal agreement and, as a consequence, decided to go their own way, where would the rest of the world stand? Would foreign powers back the principle of self-determination, or would their desire for the continued territorial integrity of Iraq win the day?
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