The long-anticipated peace process in Turkey collapsed since both President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) would gain less by its realization than expected, according to Turkish economist and writer Cuneyt Ulsever.Ulsever says the PKK was increasingly worried about the rise of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and its popularity at the expense of the PKK’s influence in Turkey, particularly after the June elections of 2015 which gave HDP a historic victory in elections and marginalized the PKK further. “The PKK tried to wait and looked for an opportunity” to resume clashes, the Harvard-educated economist says in an interview with Rudaw. “The election results in June 2015 made it clear for both the AKP and PKK that the peace process would not serve their interests,” he says.
Below is a transcript of his interview with Rudaw:
Rudaw: What was the reason for the collapse of the peace process in Turkey: the November riots of 2014 or the protests afterwards?
Cuneyt Ulsever: I think the process began to deteriorate at the June elections last year when Erdogan failed to receive the votes he expected. He assumed that since he had compromised too much with the Kurds, the nationalist voters refused to vote for him and that’s how he implicitly explained the inconclusive election results. He needed a pretext after that. And also when the PKK saw the HDP’s decent election results, it feared the HDP’s rise would diminish PKK’s dominance, which is why it went back to the war again. The election results in June 2015 made it clear for both the AKP and the PKK that the peace process would not serve their interests. In the end one thing led to another and the process collapsed altogether.
The PKK tried to wait and looked for an opportunity, and Erdogan gained both time and some votes by negotiating and keeping the Kurds. But in the end he realized that his losses would be far greater than his gains if he continued this approach.
Ankara seemed to be more worried about the 2014 November demonstrations (which took place in support of Kobani) than the PKK’s armed attacks. Do you think the government reached the conclusion that the Kurds could still destabilize the state and that led the government to change its approach?
There was no strategy. Erdogan wanted to make a deal with the HDP. In return for their support for presidential system in Ankara, he would support HDP’s plan for self-rule in the Kurdish areas. The whole idea was based on that. There was no mention of the Kurdish rights. But in June elections the HDP broke away from the PKK and opposed the government. With the catchphrase of “we don’t want you as president” and “we are the entire Turkey’s party” the HDP intimidated both the PKK and Erdogan and that led to the game over for all players.
Were there any other issues that pushed the process over the edge?
The killing of those who tried to cross the border to Kobani and the killing of the two policemen were important events. Before these two incidents, people thought that the peace process would resume again even if it would take a bit longer. But these two incidents changed the entire setting. All of a sudden two policemen were killed, which I’m still not sure whether or not the PKK committed the acts.
What does the Turkish community say about the war with the PKK? Has that changed their attitudes against Kurds and vice versa?
I think Turks in the west of the country have reached a conclusion that the PKK understands only the language of war. The elections result which gave Erdogan an almost 9 percent lift was an indication of that. These 9 percent say that PKK only understands the language of violence: ‘either we annihilate them or they annihilate us.’
You are an economist. How do the investors and entrepreneurs see the collapse of the peace process? Do they support a resumption of the talks?
They are very much worried about the collapse and wish for the talks to resume. It is not just about human lives, it is also about the economy which will not prosper when there are wars. We see this evidently in the tourist section. The grocers cannot sell their goods in the southeast. The market needs peace so that everyone can sell their products. That is the situation even in the west of the country. People are worried about the market and don’t spend enough. The market for Istanbul’s goods is primarily the southeast of the country and we see that their commerce has completely stopped due to the clashes in that area. Tourism has been hit very severely. It’s not just the Russian tourists, but also many other foreign travellers. But the majority of people are against the armed solution of the problem. If 20 percent of the nationalists maintain that the PKK should be dealt with militarily, the rest of the 80 percent say that violence has not led to peace since the 1990s. A friend of mine usually says ‘you kill 50 PKK guerrillas today; 100 more will join them the next morning.’
If the peace process is resumed, what will be the position of the Turks?
People are worried in Istanbul. They enter the subway quite worryingly (for terror attacks). People think twice before walking through the Istiqlal Street. They are worried even when they go out for dinner. People are sad when they see the parents of the dead soldiers in the evening news. So I think they would agree to anything just to have an end to the violence. Perhaps in the beginning some people would say that Ankara has sold them out and oppose the government in the talks. But I think things will change gradually when people again find peace and security when they go out. People will in the end prefer peace. Now the Istiqlal Street is empty. People are terrified when they hear something in the subway. Even if the peace is established people curse the PKK anyway. Because of the peace process the HDP was able to send 80 lawmakers to the Turkish parliament. Kurds should realize that and the fact that they don’t, worries me very much. Those who cursed the PKK voted for the HDP to get into the parliament and solve the issues. What happened then? They lost all the votes in the November elections. Believe me if there is an election today, the HDP will not pass the threshold to the parliament. And that will be catastrophic for whole of Turkey.
How can the state convince the people especially the Turks to restart the peace process?
This can be done together. They say a number of cities have been cleaned now after the clashes. There will be a temporary deal and the PKK will withdraw from the cities. This is a first step but the PKK should help to convey this message of peace to the public.
When the army says ‘our job is done’ then the politicians can say ‘now we can talk about peace’. But politics needs courage. There should be courageous politicians on both sides. This way they can regain the trust of the public.
They say Erdogan wants peace process to start again but because of the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) congress he is reluctant. They say if Devlet Bahceli is reelected as the MHP leader, the AKP will lose votes if they resume peace talks. Do you see any logic in that?
Obviously good deeds bring voters. There are cause and reactions even in politics. This is why I talked about courage in politics. I am sure the nationalists within the AKP will oppose the peace process. But they could not be more than 10 percent of the AKP members. And there will be no MHP if Bahceli is reelected as leader. Bahceli should leave MHP. His deputy Meral Akshaner is more moderate and could soften the party’s rhetoric.
Do you think Turkey will change its Syria policy and even its foreign policy?
Everybody knows that Turkish foreign policy has failed. Turkey is sidelined and lonely. But what approach will they take instead? There is no broad consensus. Erdogan as the president does not see foreign policy as its priority. He wants to conduct foreign policy very much like his domestic politics. He still insists that Turkey is the father of the Middle East. We have two entities: on the one hand we have Erdogan and on the other we have the government. Some time they agree sometimes they disagree and in the end Erdogan comes on top. The word ‘ummat’ (the Arabic word for the Muslim nation) was worrying when it was used at the Islamic conference recently. The foreign policy cannot be built on this rhetoric. We still remember when Erdogan talked about leading the Sunni world and that Turkey had red lines internationally. Our red lines were forgotten in Northern Iraq and they will be forgotten even in Syria. The PYD will most likely to enter the areas of red line. I have never seen Turkey as bare and embarrassed as now.
How will the international community react if Turkey changed its foreign policy?
Turkey should understand the new conditions in the Middle East. Iran has come back to the international community. Ankara cannot stop Kurdish aspirations for con-federalism. It has been well-established in Iraq and will be established in Syria. Turkey should view PYD (Syria’s Kurdish Democratic Unity Party) as friend and not as foe. That means that Ankara should change its policy towards Iran, Syria, Egypt and Kurds. Egypt’s Abdulfatah Sisi is a dictator but he is the status que and should be accepted as such. The US and Iran and the wider world should be convinced of the new Turkish policy. The world has changed. You cannot say that Kurds do not exist in this region. Because it is not true. Iran’s deal with the west was expected. There is no way to stop that or stop the PYD. Turkey should adapt to these new realities. And for that to happen, new policies are urgent.
What Turkish foreign policies should be changed to solve the Kurdish question in the country?
In order to change the foreign policy, the peace process needs to be resumed. Domestic and foreign issues are intertwined and influence each other. To what extent is PKK a domestic issue? Can we do one thing but not the other? Of course not.
Some suggest that Erdogan wants to make peace with Assad against the PYD?
That is not possible. Turkey needs to deal with the US, Russia and Iran in order to solve the question of PYD. Assad is not powerful enough to help in that regard. And these countries don’t want such a deal. There is a reality in Syria. The Latika region belongs to the Russians whether Assad is there or not. And the PYD area will become a Kurdish enclave and protected by the US. I also think that they will allow the ISIS to build its own state in the areas it currently controls. The ISIS is far more brutal than many other radical groups including the Al-Qaida. The world is facing a new reality and I think in the coming five years radical changes will occur here. This means that we will then deal with a ‘tamed’ and ‘civilized’ ISIS which will also be accepted by the world. The Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat was a world enemy for 20 years. But the world later changed its position and protected him against more radical groups like Hamas. Today you call someone a terrorist, tomorrow he will become your friend.
What is the role of the US and EU in regard to the Kurdish question?
The US sees the Kurds as their close allies. Until 2011, Turkey was the ally. But they have lost trust in Erdogan. The US wanted Erdogan out of office. But that did not happen. Now they make an alliance with the PYD, which is of no use to Erdogan. True, the US still calls the PKK terrorists, but that is not very important as Washington at the same time asks the PKK to be committed to the ceasefire and peace. In the end, the US needs PYD. It trusts PYD more than other groups. And Iran is increasingly involved in the process.
