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Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, leader of Syria’s jihadist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), recently invited Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters to join a united front against the regime of Bashar al-Assad and its Russian-backed offensive on Idlib.
In his video statement, published Friday, Jolani said the Turkish-backed militias “could help us by launching an operation in Aleppo, for example.”
“Dispersing the enemy and opening up new fronts is in our interests,” he added.
His words could resonate with elements of the FSA and split the various groups armed and trained by Ankara – backed primarily to fight the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in northern Syria.
The HTS, an alliance of armed groups previously affiliated with al-Qaeda, controls the majority of Idlib province in Syria’s northwest, bordering Turkey. Ankara, which has long opposed the Assad regime, established several observation posts throughout the province.
A long expected regime offensive on Idlib, backed by Russia, began just over two weeks ago, leading to the worst bloodshed Syria has seen in over six months. Regime forces captured several towns and villages in recent days with Russian air support.
Since the Turkish military intervened in Syria in August 2016, Ankara has exclusively armed and trained these fighters – first to combat the Islamic State (ISIS) in Operation Euphrates Shield, then to block the YPG from linking the Kurdish-controlled northeast to its northwestern exclave of Afrin. Turkey and its Syrian proxies then outright invaded Afrin in early 2018 in Operation Olive Branch.
Ankara has avoided clashes with Damascus since launching these incursions. However, many of the proxies it has used for the job have expressed their desire to expand their fight against the Assad regime.
The FSA offensive in al-Bab, 40 km northeast of Aleppo city, coincided with the last phase of regime’s ferocious Russian-backed offensive against its opponents in East Aleppo in late 2016.
Some FSA fighters in those days openly expressed the view that Euphrates Shield was a tactical move – the strategic objective being the fight against the regime.
“Our most important target is to break the siege of Aleppo. There, our FSA brothers are trapped,” said one FSA commander at the time.
“We don’t want to stop here or in al-Bab. Next is Aleppo,” another fighter said.
Ultimately, none of this happened.
However, the FSA’s desire to fight Assad is something the jihadist HTS could bank on to shore up its control of Idlib and other swathes of neighbouring Aleppo and Hama, collectively known as ‘Greater Idlib’.
The current offensive follows Turkey’s failure to enforce a demilitarized zone around Idlib, agreed with Russia last September, to stave off a regime offensive and contain the HTS.
Instead, Turkey’s proxy in Idlib, the National Liberation Front (NLF), ceded swathes of territory to the HTS in January. Far from containing the jihadists, Turkey’s proxies have allowed the HTS to expand further.
Orton was referring to recent regime shelling on one of Turkey’s observation posts around Idlib in early May, which wounded two Turkish soldiers.
Turkey is unlikely to feel it must placate its battle-hungry proxies by applying pressure on Damascus, Orton says, “especially because the Arab groups are so dependent” on Ankara.
Orton also points out the HTS “call for unity” arrived late and only followed “intense pressure from rebel groups and popular anger.”
“The reliance on the jihadists is, as ever, purely a matter of exigency,” he said.
“The NLF as a construct is aspirational, so it is easy to see a situation where that breaks down, though right at this moment that would have less to do with HTS,” Orton said.
“But HTS responded late because it is trying to preserve its forces to control Greater Idlib after this current operation, and if HTS decides that means dismantling parts of the NLF, it is difficult to imagine what stands in their way.”
Orton is also dubious as to whether the current offensive is designed to deal the final blow in Idlib. Rather, he believes the regime and Russia are merely looking to carve out a “slice” of the strategic province.
Greater Idlib is the most significant chunk of Syria still controlled by Damascus’ opponents. Besides this, the only remaining parts of the country outside regime control are the one-third of north and east Syria commanded by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and a sizable swath of northwest Syria, including Afrin, occupied by Turkey and its proxies.
“HTS wants to maintain a monopoly over Greater Idlib and they can’t do that if they get chewed up in battle,” Orton said.
In his video statement, published Friday, Jolani said the Turkish-backed militias “could help us by launching an operation in Aleppo, for example.”
“Dispersing the enemy and opening up new fronts is in our interests,” he added.
His words could resonate with elements of the FSA and split the various groups armed and trained by Ankara – backed primarily to fight the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in northern Syria.
The HTS, an alliance of armed groups previously affiliated with al-Qaeda, controls the majority of Idlib province in Syria’s northwest, bordering Turkey. Ankara, which has long opposed the Assad regime, established several observation posts throughout the province.
A long expected regime offensive on Idlib, backed by Russia, began just over two weeks ago, leading to the worst bloodshed Syria has seen in over six months. Regime forces captured several towns and villages in recent days with Russian air support.
Since the Turkish military intervened in Syria in August 2016, Ankara has exclusively armed and trained these fighters – first to combat the Islamic State (ISIS) in Operation Euphrates Shield, then to block the YPG from linking the Kurdish-controlled northeast to its northwestern exclave of Afrin. Turkey and its Syrian proxies then outright invaded Afrin in early 2018 in Operation Olive Branch.
Ankara has avoided clashes with Damascus since launching these incursions. However, many of the proxies it has used for the job have expressed their desire to expand their fight against the Assad regime.
The FSA offensive in al-Bab, 40 km northeast of Aleppo city, coincided with the last phase of regime’s ferocious Russian-backed offensive against its opponents in East Aleppo in late 2016.
Some FSA fighters in those days openly expressed the view that Euphrates Shield was a tactical move – the strategic objective being the fight against the regime.
“Our most important target is to break the siege of Aleppo. There, our FSA brothers are trapped,” said one FSA commander at the time.
“We don’t want to stop here or in al-Bab. Next is Aleppo,” another fighter said.
Ultimately, none of this happened.
However, the FSA’s desire to fight Assad is something the jihadist HTS could bank on to shore up its control of Idlib and other swathes of neighbouring Aleppo and Hama, collectively known as ‘Greater Idlib’.
The current offensive follows Turkey’s failure to enforce a demilitarized zone around Idlib, agreed with Russia last September, to stave off a regime offensive and contain the HTS.
Instead, Turkey’s proxy in Idlib, the National Liberation Front (NLF), ceded swathes of territory to the HTS in January. Far from containing the jihadists, Turkey’s proxies have allowed the HTS to expand further.
“Turkey’s actions since this Idlib offensive started have been very confusing; its positions were attacked directly and it didn’t respond,” Kyle Orton, an independent Middle East analyst, told Rudaw English.
Orton was referring to recent regime shelling on one of Turkey’s observation posts around Idlib in early May, which wounded two Turkish soldiers.
Turkey is unlikely to feel it must placate its battle-hungry proxies by applying pressure on Damascus, Orton says, “especially because the Arab groups are so dependent” on Ankara.
Orton also points out the HTS “call for unity” arrived late and only followed “intense pressure from rebel groups and popular anger.”
“The reliance on the jihadists is, as ever, purely a matter of exigency,” he said.
“The NLF as a construct is aspirational, so it is easy to see a situation where that breaks down, though right at this moment that would have less to do with HTS,” Orton said.
“But HTS responded late because it is trying to preserve its forces to control Greater Idlib after this current operation, and if HTS decides that means dismantling parts of the NLF, it is difficult to imagine what stands in their way.”
Orton is also dubious as to whether the current offensive is designed to deal the final blow in Idlib. Rather, he believes the regime and Russia are merely looking to carve out a “slice” of the strategic province.
Greater Idlib is the most significant chunk of Syria still controlled by Damascus’ opponents. Besides this, the only remaining parts of the country outside regime control are the one-third of north and east Syria commanded by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and a sizable swath of northwest Syria, including Afrin, occupied by Turkey and its proxies.
“HTS wants to maintain a monopoly over Greater Idlib and they can’t do that if they get chewed up in battle,” Orton said.
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