By Thomas Buonomo
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei frequently warns Iranian officials and the Iranian public in his speeches that the United States is constantly attempting to infiltrate Iran through political and cultural channels. He argues that no concession from Iran is likely to change the US’s ostensibly implacable hostility against it, short of Iran ceding its sovereignty and Islamic identity.
Although Khamenei’s reasons for remaining wary of the US are well-founded—rooted as they are in the acrimonious and at points sordid history of US-Iran relations over last several decades—it is critical to be cognizant of the risk of subconsciously drifting from vigilance to paranoia. The latter has arguably caused him to disdain opportunities for improved relations with the US out of fear that they would inevitably lead to the subjugation of Iran, as he perceived occurred under the Shah. (Various historical accounts lead one to believe the historical reality was more complex.)
A review of the US’s relations with Iran’s regional neighbors demonstrates that although it would prefer that these governments provide greater political representation as well as social and cultural freedom--understanding how important these values are, both inherently and in terms of their implications for the stability of these countries and their markets—the US’s ability to influence their behavior is actually quite limited.
The preventive US war with Iraq was an exception to the rule and unfortunately turned out disastrously, in large part because of U.S. policymakers' own incompetence. The U.S. invasion of Iraq likely would not have happened if the September 11th attacks on the US had not given the Bush administration a window of opportunity to capitalize on American fears of a covertly state-sponsored terrorist attack and remove a longtime nuisance to the US (and, it should be recalled, menace to the region).
Shortly after the U.S. withdrew its military forces, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki--who Iran had been pushing over the more moderate Ayad Allawi--squandered his country's opportunity for political reconciliation by persecuting his opponents and repressing nonviolent demonstrations.
The Obama administration also intervened in Libya when an opportunity arose to support the Libyan peoples’ struggle to free themselves from the despotic rule of Muammar Qaddafi, who had promised to exterminate them like “rats” for daring to rise up against him. This intervention also turned out poorly despite the Obama administration’s hope that a minimalist approach would prove more successful than the Bush administration’s invasion and ad hoc military occupation. (It may yet be premature to judge the Libya case, however, and the moral consequences of intervening must be weighed against those of not intervening.)
The US has otherwise generally pursued modest efforts to nudge the countries of the region toward reform in their own best interest. It arguably has been too timid in doing so, considering how these governments cynically obstructed economic and political reforms for decades until internal pressures finally caused public frustrations to boil over, culminating in the Arab uprisings from 2010-present.
As US relations with Egypt over the last few years have demonstrated, however, there are no easy answers to these problems, particularly given the dynamics of the current international order. Vladimir Putin, namely, has been eager to exploit tensions between the U.S. and countries such as Egypt over human rights. He has offered arms deals in pursuit of strategic realignments without any semblance of human rights expectations when autocrats such as Sisi have tired of the US’s lecturing on reforms that would necessarily result in a diffusion of power and accompanying financial patronage.
The US has likewise admonished Saudi Arabia ad nauseum about the need for reform to no avail. Unfortunately it is not so simple a matter to abandon a government that produces roughly 9.6 million barrels per day (b/d) of the world’s approximately 96 million b/d demand to the fates, as Iran would like the US to do. The US may have a strong distaste for the Wahhabis but it is also wary of what they might be capable of doing to the US and global economy in their death throes. Better to manage the problem and counter it through cultural and public diplomacy initiatives than risk inadvertently making it worse, the U.S. foreign policy establishment’s consensus appears to be.
Khamenei’s absolutist position toward Israel does not make a U.S. strategic realignment in the region any more likely. From the US’s consensus perspective up to this point at least, Saudi Arabia may be propagating its xenophobic worldview around the world and that may be the ideological sustenance from which so-called takfiris are spawned but this noxious propaganda activity apparently has yet to reach the threshold that it may outweigh the benefit of Saudi Arabia’s moderation on the Israel-Palestinian issue or risk of oil supply disruption. This has increasingly become a dubious cost-benefit analysis as the Islamic State continues to ravage Syria and Iraq while executing devastating and costly terrorist attacks in the heart of the Western world but at present it still appears to stand.
Although Iran has an opportunity to take advantage of this situation for its own benefit, Khamenei is squandering it by maintaining such a self-righteous policy toward Israel, which at this point indefensible considering his support for Assad, who has killed far more of his own people than the Israelis have killed Palestinians. All of the governments with a stake in these conflicts could put their energies to more constructive use by focusing on getting their own houses in order rather than continuing to play the futile moral blame game.
A moderation of Iran’s policy toward Israel would open a path for the US to diversify its strategic relations in the Gulf away from an over-reliance on the House of Saud, exerting pressure on the latter to reform or face the risk of eventual distancing by the US. This would not require Iran to terminate its support for the Palestinians but it would require it to moderate it within a two-state framework and adhere to the minimal standard of prohibiting deliberate targeting of innocent Israeli civilians, which it should be doing in any case. Support for terrorism has been highly detrimental to Iran from both a moral and strategic standpoint.
There is of course no guarantee that the US would reciprocate by exerting substantive leverage on Israel to achieve a two-state solution. The US Congress is politically captured by the Israeli settler lobby and the only US presidential candidate that seriously challenged it in their AIPAC speech in March was Bernie Sanders (who, ironically and poetically, also happens to be the only Jewish candidate running for the office).
Iran should consider that AIPAC is much older and more well-established than its moderate counterweight, J Street, but that given time and the right security conditions vis a vis Iran and Israel, the latter might surprise everyone by how it is able to shift the balance of power. Despite its formidable financial resources, AIPAC and allied organizations do not represent the majority of American Jews, nor are they omnipotent, as the Iran nuclear agreement demonstrates.
Khamenei should be most wary of his own paranoia infiltrating Iran’s national security policymaking. His policy toward Israel in particular, whether motivated by self-aggrandizement, a highly selective sense of moral outrage, or genuine fears of Western subjugation, is playing into the hands of American and Israeli hardliners who view confrontation with Iran as being in their interest. Greater introspection, moderation, and poise from Iran should in turn empower moderate voices in these governments. There is little cost and potentially much benefit from exploring such an approach.
Thomas Buonomo is a country risk analyst with Stratas Advisors. His writing has been published by the Atlantic Council, The National Interest, The Hill, CQ Roll Call, Hurriyet, Informed Comment, Oil & Gas Investor, E&P, Renewable Energy World, Huffington Post, Small Wars Journal, The Humanist, Rudaw, and other publications. His views are his own and do not represent those of Stratas Advisors.
