The Turkish Defense Ministry recently announced the third phase of Operation Claw in Kurdistan Region’s northern Sinat and Haftanin regions near the Turkish border. The first and second phases were conducted in Khakurk region, also near the border.
These recent Turkish operations against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters are much different from those it carried out against the group 35 years ago because they are conducted with a different military plan and strategy.
To understand these plans and strategies, Turkish army’s previous operations in Kurdistan Region must be highlighted.
The Turkish army’s key operations in Kurdistan Region
The Turkish army has carried out tens of operations against the PKK in Kurdistan Region since 1984, including airstrikes. The PKK is a Kurdish militant group that has fought the Turkish state for greater political and cultural rights for Turkey’s Kurds for decades. The group has long based itself in the Qandil mountains along the Turkey-Iraq-Iran border.
Operation Sandwich was the first big operation against the PKK in the Heftenin, Zap, Metin, Avashin and Khakurk areas between September-December 1992. Turkey deployed tens of thousands of soldiers to the newly-established Kurdistan Region.
Turkey launched Operation Steel in March 1995 in the Heftenin and Khakurk regions and it ended in May of the same year.
Another key operation was Operation Hammer, which lasted from May to July 1997 in the Kurdistan Region while the local Kurdish parties - the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) - were in a heated civil war. Heavy clashes took place between Turkish soldiers and PKK fighters.
Both the Steel and Hammer operations failed, leading to the launching of Operation Dawn between September 25 to October 15 in 1997 which resulted in the deaths of tens of fighters from both sides.
Why is Operation Claw different?
Turkish operations in the 1990s were different from the recent ones as the former operations were aimed at destroying the PKK positions in Kurdistan Region and preventing PKK attacks on border and the entrance of its guerrillas into Kurdish-populated parts of southeast Turkey.
However, the three phases of the Operation Claw are not limited to these objectives. This time, the operations last longer and include a wider range of area and the Turkish army has established bases in order to keep their troops there permanently. It also endeavours to protect its troops in the region through utilizing modern technology and weaponry. Thus the Turkish drones and warplanes monitor the region and bombard suspected areas.
Now, Turkey’s main objective is to drive the PKK fighters out of its borders and have full control over these areas.
The significance of Khakurk, Heftanin, and Zap
The PKK has been setting up positions in Heftanin, Matin, Zap, Avashin, Basya, and Khakurk in the Kurdistan Region’s northeast corner since 1982 - two years before the PKK began its military struggle against the Turkish state. These areas are mountainous and rugged, therefore it is not easy for Turkey to control them. This fact has benefited the PKK significantly.
The PKK used these areas as a camp to train their fighters and prepare them for the fight against Turkey. It also administers its institutions from this area. Heftanin, Avashin and Khakurk are areas which the PKK uses to get in touch with Kurdish parts of Iran, Syria and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. We can say that these areas are the spine of the PKK , known by the group as the “Media Protection Region” and it treats the region as its own soil.
Khakurk region is located on the borders of Bakur (Turkish Kurdistan), Bashur (Iraqi Kurdistan) and Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan). If Turkey can control Heftanin and Sinat, as it did to Khakurk, it will limit the movement of the PKK fighters. Turkey will not stop there. It may also launch operations to control the Matin, Zap and Avashin-Basyan areas.
Therefore, Turkey is establishing a “safe zone” in Kurdistan Region through its multi-staged Operation Claw as it is unable to establish one on its borders with Rojava. This move is carried out in the pretext of national security.
Turkey has not faced any regional or international resistance against this, making it easy for it to deploy forces there and possibly annex it to itself as it did to the Northern Cyprus.
Can Turkey control these areas?
The Turkish government sought support from the international community and both Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in vain. Therefore, it launched operations in the Khakurk region unilaterally on March 11, 2018 where it entered the Kurdistan Region at a 30 kilometres depth. However, Operations Claw phases one, two and three have been launched since May 27 in the region.
Senior PKK commander Murat Karayilan has confessed in a recent interview with PKK-affiliated media that Turkey controls strategic areas like Shaki Mount, Evdel Kovi, Karker Mount and Lelkan. However, Karayilan added that the PKK is still dominant in the region, which is surprising due to by the long-staying of Turkish forces there.
It is difficult for Turkey to maintain control in these areas as the PKK fights with small groups in different spots and are very familiar with the area. Another reason is the costliness of their stay as it requires millions of dollars while the country is experiencing a financial crisis.
It has already suffered from costly attacks on the group, but settling their troops in a rugged area like this could require a larger budget.
The operations have also claimed the lives of many Turkish soldiers.
Conclusion
The decades-long clashes between the PKK and Turkish state have not yielded anything for either sides because they cannot win militarily: the PKK cannot make Turkey implement its demands through war and, likewise, Turkey cannot annihilate the PKK through military operations.
The regional countries like Iran and Iraq do not want the PKK-Turkey conflict to be resolved as they want to use the PKK to hit Turkey’s interests. The PKK has benefited from Turkey’s issues with its neighbors, typically in Syria. It has also covertly established relations with both Iraq and Iran. Whenever the PKK is weak, these countries try to strengthen it.
Therefore, as long as the current political, social, and regional conditions continue, the PKK can guarantee its presence.
Necmi Salah is the manager of Turkish Desk at Rudaw Media Network.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
Translated by Karwan Faidhi Dri.
