Rumors said that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions of launching a new military operation against Syrian Kurds were put down during his visit to Tehran, but the reality on the ground shows otherwise.
While Russia and Iran remain staunch supporters of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, both countries urged Turkey against conducting further military campaigns in northern Syria during their trilateral summit last month.
Turkey has recently renewed threats to carry out a new military operation against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria’s Manbij and Tal Rifaat towns in a bid to complete the 30 kilometer “safe zone” it began creating along its southern borders in recent years.
However, reports emerging from the summit claim that Russia has pledged to remove Kurdish fighters from the Aleppo-Hasaka highway, also known as M4, and to hand them over to the Syrian regime forces.
M4 is seen as the de-facto border between the Syrian regime forces and the SDF on one hand and the Turkish armed forces backed by Syrian proxies on another. With variances at different points, it categorically corresponds to Erdogan's 30 km security zone.
However, an unprecedented number of airstrikes and drone attacks targeted Syrian Kurds following the summit. The life of a senior Kurdish commander was claimed in a Turkish airstrike, making July the deadliest month for the Kurdish fighters in 2022. Ankara seems to have been granted the green light to use the airspace.
Turkey is said to have struck a conciliatory deal with Tehran.
''Iran made a deal with Turkey at the Tehran conference. The deal is that Turkey can conduct unlimited airstrikes against the PYD [the ruling Kurdish party in Rojava]. In exchange, Turkey will not invade Aleppo,'' US Middle East researcher Nicholas Heras said via WhatsApp.
''Iran is willing to trade the PYD to further its war with Israel'', Heras added.
Previously used in Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya, Ukraine, and recently - notably intensively - in northeast Syria (Rojava), Turkey's strategy of drone strikes against the Kurdish forces is lethal.
The highly advanced airspace technology of Bayraktar TB 2 results in heinous damage on the ground.
Drone strikes seem to be an alternative for Ankara which is still longing for the green light from Tehran and Moscow to launch its full-scale invasion. Undeniably, the impact made by the armed drones in Rojava is substantial.
On 20 July, a Turkish drone struck a car some 40 km deep in Syrian territory. Earlier in the day, two SDF members were killed by Zor Maghar in western Kobane in a similar act.
Another attack in eastern Qamishli on July 22 killed three members of the Women's Protection Units (YPJ), an SDF-affiliated force. The strike was resounding for a set of reasons.
First, one of the targeted YPJ members was high-profile field commander Salwa Yusuf. She was a deputy commander of the SDF and played a major role in leading the force in the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS) since 2017. While the Global Coalition offered condolences, failing to mention the perpetrator, the SDF in a statement pledged retaliation.
Second, Qamishli's airspace is protected by Russia or believed to be. Third, the attack occurred at the eastern entrance of the city which was namely excluded from the joint Turkish-Russian patrols enshrined in the Sochi agreement of 2019. The attack came just after the three fighters exited a meeting held in the city.
Back in Kobane, where the US-led Global Coalition and the Kurdish partnership was first forged, Sahin Tekintangac, a local commander of the People's Protection Units (YPG), was reported “neutralized” by the Turkish Intelligence Services (MIT), on July 23.
On the same day, 19 villages underwent Turkish bombardment in Tal Tamr.
Three members of the Assyrian Khabur Guards were reported injured.
On Monday, an SDF commander was reported killed in Ain Issa. On the following day, a Turkish drone in northern Raqqa killed another soldier marking the third death in less than 24 hours.
Two Turkish soldiers were reported killed by Kurdish fighters in Euphrates Shield zones on Wednesday. Seven people were injured on a separate occasion in Tal Rifaat.
On the following day, four members of the internal security forces (Asayish) were killed near Tal al-Semin camp in northern Raqqa.
From another point of view, recent escalation seems to be used as a pressing card by Russia against the Kurdish forces to acquiesce.
This has a foundation to build upon in the sense that the Turkish threat has pushed the Syrian Kurds to the lap of the Syrian regime. This, ironically, plays into the hands of the parts involved in the Astana talks.
Recently, Syrian regime forces were heavily deployed to posts held for years by the SDF. The Syrian army has been deployed to Tal Rifaat, Manbij, Kobane, and Ain Issa.
The US expressed its deep concerns, called for immediate de-escalation, and urged all parts to respect the ceasefire agreement.
This being the case, the Kurds seem to possess few options that could entail making painful concessions.
It was in May when Erdogan announced his country would carry out a military incursion against the Kurdish fighters.
Erdogan seeks to push the SDF some 30 kilometers deep in Syrian territory to create a ''security zone.'' However, the latter, maintains that any Turkish operation will undermine the fight against ISIS.
Turkish officials say they do not need permission from any country to carry out its military incursion that “could start any minute.”
Strikingly, Russian military police patrolled eastern Qamishli areas for the very first time with a depth of 30 km.
Amid this uncertainty of the affair, Erdogan is scheduled to meet Russia's Vladimir Putin in the city resort of Sochi on August 5 with northern Syria expected to put forth on the table of discussion.
Lazghine Ya'qoube is a translator and researcher focusing on the modern history of Mesopotamia, with a special focus on Yazidi and Assyrian affairs in Turkey, Syria and Iraq.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
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