The Kurdish exchange over Kirkuk: oil for land

 By Shorish Haji

 

 

Historically, a core reason behind the Kurdish failure to secure gains at the negotiating table is the all or nothing policy that Kurdish leaders have hopelessly pursued since the dawn of Kurdish nationalist revolts. This is true of early Kurdish leaders including Shekh Ubaidulla and Shekh Mahmoud and has continued to more recent nationalists such as Qazi Muhammad and Mustafa Barzani.

The pattern, however, is the same even in our own time, with Kurdish politicians conducting negotiations in the same old fashion: all or nothing.

There are indeed many reasons why Kurdish leaders deal in this way, but now is not the time to reflect over the details. Here, we only say that more often Kurds have gained next to nothing in various negotiations, partly due to the fact that they have  unsuccessfully insisted on having it all at once, instead of gaining some and working to gain more in the next negotiation. As a result Kurds have repeatedly returned from talks completely empty-handed. 

Now, what is of vital importance is the question of oil and land.   

A Kurdish delegation is in Baghdad to find common solutions to the lingering issues between the central and regional governments. By now, it is almost common knowledge what the Kurdish demands are: oil, Peshmerga and the implementation of the constitutional article 140, which deals with the so-called disputed areas. In short, oil and the future of Kirkuk are expected to occupy much of the negotiations.

Both Baghdad and Erbil will eventually try to leave the table with more gains for themselves, and toward that end they will make use of every tactic and strategy.  There is so much at stake between the two governments that it would be close to impossible to predict which side will secure more gains. This is why Kurds must be prepared for every eventuality. It is therefore important to abandon our “all or nothing” policy and instead focus on securing at least one strategic gain at this point: for instance, land for oil could work.

One thing is certain: neither Kurds nor the Iraqi Arab government will be able to achieve all its demands at the expense of the other side. But as far as the Iraqi state remains together, Erbil and Baghdad can hardly ignore each other.

They both need one another for survival and coexistence.

The Kurdistan region lacks: a strong financial infrastructure; a strong institutionalized Peshmerga force; food security; stable institutions; public awareness and public readiness to face unpredictable challenges in case of independence. In addition, regional and global conditions are not very supportive of a Kurdish state at the moment. Therefore, it is wise for Kurds to come to an agreement with authorities in Baghdad.

We need more than mere talks and meetings to solve the remaining issues between the two governments. We need to negotiate: you give some, you take some. In this regard, the most important issue for Kurds is the annexation of Kirkuk and other disputed areas to the Kurdistan Region.

We can certainly give something to the Iraqi government which they can sell to their own public in return for Kirkuk and other disputed Kurdish territories. In other words, we have to concede in something – oil -- to officially gain something else: our historical lands.

We have to come to an agreement with the Iraqi government to decide the future of Kirkuk. This is what we can do: we straightforwardly ask for the reincorporation of both Kirkuk and other Kurdistani areas outside the KRG and in return we officially recognize that the oil in Kirkuk and disputed areas is the property of the whole of Iraq and should be redistributed equally among Kurds, Arabs and other components of Iraqi society.

In this way, Kurds gain land and Baghdad gains access to the much-needed revenues. But if we do not act this way, Kirkuk and other disputed areas will forever remain a volatile issue easily manipulated by foreign powers and transformed into internal crises.

One last item is of equal importance and that is the constitutional rights of Arabs, Turkmans and Christians in Kurdistan. This should be strengthened so that they feel and see Kurdistan as their homeland in which their civil rights are protected by law and constitution.