Yet there is little truth in this. Whether Baghdad or Erbil controls Kirkuk, it and other disputed territories remain just that. There was joint control of Kirkuk until June 2014 and then the KRG was asked to rescue the city when its Iraq defenders fled. Baghdad need not have attacked Kirkuk but chose to despite the constitution making it clear that force should not be used to settle internal differences. The KRG High Representative in London, Karwan Jamal Tahir, rightly says Iraqi actions are unnecessary, unjust, and illegal.
Iraq has so far got away with this because American and other diplomats were furious about the Kurdish rejection of their belated offer, apparently agreed with Iraq, to defer the referendum in return for open dialogue and a possible later referendum. The offer could have worked if delivered earlier. If it was agreed with Abadi, it makes his later actions all the more outrageous. If it wasn't then it undermines its credibility as a means to delay the referendum.
Deligtimisation by Western powers of the referendum was expected even if its harshness wasn't, at least by me, and has inadvertently provided cover for Iraq's extreme reaction. Furthermore, Kurdistan's complexities have been almost completely obscured by the crisis in Catalonia. Many more Brits have been to Barcelona than Erbil or Halabja and it is understandable that the Spanish imbroglio commands more attention but limited media bandwidth has also enabled Iraq to try to do its worst. Breaking the silence with salient facts is the priority.
More profoundly, President Trump's America is pulling up the drawbridge and despite its rhetorical opposition to Iranian expansionism, opposes what it sees as nation-building and has plumped for Abadi as the candidate best able to save Iraq from Iran, with the Kurds paying the price for this geopolitical calculation.
Abadi has apparently decided to shore up his domestic position by being tough on the Kurds as there are no votes in being kind to the Kurds. Some say that Kurdish withdrawal from high-profile participation in Baghdad deprived them of the political intelligence and heft to see and avert this. Some say the Kurds should back Abadi to prevent the return of Maliki and use their votes to be kingmakers again. And that may be a necessary task.
But much depends on Iraq's real strategic intentions in the current conflict. Are they trying to establish facts on the ground to then reach an accommodation with the Kurds on the best possible terms for Iraq. Or do they seek to take direct control of parts or all of the KRG. I publicly asked a senior Iraqi official this week to give an assurance that Iraq would respect the KRG's 2003 border but none was given. In fact, they have sought to do this by wresting control of the border crossing with Turkey.
Iraq has managed to make significant advances but in ways that show fundamental weaknesses. Their reliance on Iranian controlled Shia militia and Iranian military assistance are hostages to fortune. At another meeting this week, there was a touch of the Comical Ali by another senior Iraqi official in defending Baghdad's position. He denied that Shia militia were present because they have been incorporated into the Iraqi defence structure and are therefore under the control of the Prime Minister. True in theory but less so in practice. It reminded me of the witless representative of the political wing of what used to be the mainstream Irish republican organisation who once told me that 'The Official IRA does not exist and we are not a part of it.'
The Iraqi official also acknowledged that Qassem Soleimani was an adviser but argued that the Iraqi Army also had American and British advisers as if they are morally equivalent to the head of a terrorist organisation which is fundamentally hostile to the West.
Yet such arguments have little traction given the toxic mixture of primitive anti-imperialism and isolationism, which underpins widespread public indifference to external events and, sadly, even the Kurds who have done so much to help the West and deserve much better.
Yet, even if Iraq is seeking to push the Kurds into an impoverished and blockaded box, I wonder if the geographical and political weight of the Kurds can be contained so easily. One result of Baghdad's brutality could yet be increased Sunni resistance on the Kurdish doorstep to centralisation by Baghdad. The Kurds could be seen as desirable partners for moderate Sunnis and that could be of interest to the West fearful of a new jihadist threat to their interests and people.
The Kurds may have been mistaken in their assumptions that a mandate for moderate action to seek a divorce settlement was possible but they still form a fifth of the Iraqi population and could be more influential. Either way, they didn't deserve the response they received for their non-crime of holding a referendum, which is not barred by the constitution.
Whether the referendum result is frozen or cancelled in some way, the reality will always be that a good majority voted to leave a free union, as the constitution defines Iraq. It takes two to tango after all. A senior Iraqi official told me in a meeting that the turnout and therefore the Yes vote was lower in some parts of Kurdistan. Given that mathematics emerged from the Middle East, I wish I had had the wit or the chance to point out that averages necessarily consist of lower and higher figures. He was seeking to minimise the result, as you would expect, but it still happened.
International solidarity is more difficult. Reliable information is crucial if friends across the world can exercise maximum leverage on their governments to encourage a fair deal between Erbil and Baghdad rather than a vindictive and punitive peace. There is still much sympathy in the West for the Kurds to be mobilised.
By coincidence, there was a prominent photography exhibition last week in the Commons called 'Return to Kurdistan.' It was organised by the Gulan cultural group, in co-operation with the APPG, and consisted of images of Kurdistan from the past and the present and was seen by many parliamentarians. Returning to Kurdistan is just now difficult given the air blockade but other communication is possible and the Kurds and friends need to work together to maximise their clout.
But internal solidarity is also more vital than before. At a demonstration outside Downing Street a senior activist told me that disunity is the perennial problem for the Kurds. The bleak box that is maybe being prepared for the Kurds is now the opportunity and necessity for overcoming those differences, as seems to be the case for Iranian Kurds, for the next push to equality, freedom and statehood one day. Without making any parallels with them, the IRA slogan once had it, 'our day will come.' Inshallah.
Gary Kent is the Secretary of the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG). He writes this column for Rudaw in a personal capacity. The address for the all-party group is appgkurdistan@gmail.com.
