On Friday, a US contractor was killed and several American soldiers were injured in a rocket attack on their base near Kirkuk. The rockets used in the attack appear to be of the same Iranian make as a 2009 shipment from Iran to Hezbollah that the Israelis intercepted. Seth Frantzman of the Jerusalem Post notes that these were also the same kind of rockets that Iran seems to have provided to Syria, and which Assad used to attack Eastern Ghouta in 2017.
Some three dozen of these 107mm rockets were fired at the US base by unknown assailants. However, given the above, it seems quite likely that they were launched by Iranian proxy groups in Iraq such as the Hashd al Shaabi Shiite militias. They probably did so at Iran’s behest, as a means of pressuring American forces in Iraq to leave.
The Iranians may also be looking for ways to make the current status quo in the region - which includes debilitating US-imposed sanctions on Iran’s oil export- painful for the Americans. Such an attack likely forms part of the pattern that includes recent missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia, attacks on oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, and similar mischief.
With US personnel having died in the latest attack, many wonder how Washington will respond. Doing nothing will no doubt embolden those in Tehran behind the attack and cost more American lives and credibility in the near future. Given that the US failed to respond to previous Iranian attacks on US forces in Iraq (last November), or on their Saudi allies on various occasions during the past year, Washington’s credibility seems to be at stake.
Responding with a direct strike against Iranian assets, however, would make the Americans look like the aggressors and help the besieged regime in Tehran rally its base. Hardliners in Iran no doubt calculated as much before planning the recent attacks on both the Americans and the Saudis.
Ideally, the Americans could identify the actual Iranian proxies behind the latest casualties in Kirkuk and respond with force against them. If the perpetrators turn out to be Hashd al-Shaabi, however, such forces remain an official part of the Iraqi military – which would complicate matters for Washington and Baghdad. American intelligence capabilities in Iraq also do not seem up to the task of foreseeing and dealing with such attacks as they occur, which would offer the very best approach to this sort of problem.
An alternate approach for Washington might involve adopting Israel’s tactics and hitting Iranian military assets in Syria. Israel, while usually not claiming or denying responsibility, regularly strikes Iranian weapons shipments and even regular forces in Syria. Iran has difficulty responding to the Israeli attacks because Israelis are not deployed in areas Iran enjoys any influence in and having their Hezbollah allies in Lebanon launch attacks on the Israelis would threaten all of Hezbollah’s political gains in that already fragile country. If the United States began hitting Iranian targets in Syria, however, the most likely quid- pro- quo would see a significant uptick in attacks on relatively exposed American forces in Iraq.
It therefore appears that the Americans lack any easy answers to Iran’s limited, asymmetric attempts to provoke them. No matter what course of action Washington chooses – including doing nothing – an increase in tension and conflict seems the most likely outcome.
Although neither Tehran nor Washington wants war, both seem willing to risk a spiral of actions and reactions that could lead to serious armed conflict. Decision makers in Tehran cannot abide the current sanctions on Iran but remain unwilling to simply surrender to American demands regarding their nuclear program and activities in the region. At the same time, leaders in Washington appear determined to prevent the Iranians from further extending their power.
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
