Brexit drama rushes towards the finale
There will be a major film, probably many, about the bitter and brutal Brexit battle as it went to the wire and the UK left, or not, at the end of October. Let’s provisionally call it Two Weeks in October.
The decision by Prime Minister Boris Johnson to suspend parliament for longer than normal has all the elements of a thrilling drama – a sudden decision, cunning advisers in the shadows, a secret visit by emissaries to the Queen at her holiday home in Scotland, acres of hyperbolic and choleric reaction including threats of civil disobedience, and fevered discussions between unholy alliances of foes.
Johnson’s decision to suspend parliament is a calculated confrontation and a high-stakes gamble to build his authority to do a new deal with the EU on the terms of withdrawal by making it much more difficult for parliament to take no-deal off the table. The EU may not move for anyone but will certainly not move for a Prime Minister who cannot win votes in the Commons.
The roots of the stand-off go back to casual and complacent decisions by the former prime minister David Cameron whose impending memoirs are now coincidentally much more saleable than before.
He appeased a minority in his own party that held the EU responsible for the weaknesses of the UK. To win the leadership of his party in 2005, he promised to withdraw his party from the mainstream Conservative alliance in the European Parliament and ended many routine conversations between allied parties in the EU.
He then promised an in/out referendum but never expected to have to honour it because he thought his hands would be tied by a continuing coalition with the pro-EU Liberal Democrats. He unexpectedly won a majority, dispensed with their services, and, having failed to get much movement on hot potato issues from the EU, embarked on a referendum.
Cameron wanted to lance the boil once and for all but, like most people, thought the status quo would prevail. He stayed his hand with internal opponents knowing he had to unite his party afterwards. He made no effort to put conditions on the referendum by, for instance, demanding a super-majority of the kind that is common with most clubs making constitutional changes.
Technically, the referendum was advisory but the government promised to implement it. The result was narrow – 52 percent to 48 – and revealed the chasm between elected representatives and the people. The people surprised themselves with the result and parliament and government had to decide exactly what it meant.
One can argue that the referendum was ill-conceived, an emotional spasm based on people seizing an opportunity to say they were unhappy, less perhaps with the EU than their lot in life. There has been much talk about lies, dark money, data abuse, but in the end it was a legitimate poll and it has to be implemented.
But what was ‘it’? Advocates of Brexit pooh-poohed the idea of no-deal during the referendum and told everyone how easy a deal with the EU would be. There were several ways to do Brexit but no consensus was reached either within the governing party or more widely about what it could mean. Furthermore, Cameron’s initially popular successor, Theresa May, flunked an election where many assumed she would get a thumping majority and was beholden to small factions in parliament.
Purists hardened their positions. Many Brexiteers decided the May deal was a pig in a poke and Brexit in name only while others united to stop the deal because they wanted something different or just to stay in the EU. May’s deal was, in my view, a reasonable start but was defeated three times and she had to resign. Johnson entered the frame.
It is now a matter of numbers and strength in the Commons. Johnson has decided to ignore the weakness of his position, a majority of just one, and go for broke. He is counting on his opponents being more divided than his party, which wants Brexit because it can be destroyed by hardliners, while the opposition parties want either to stop Brexit or achieve a better one.
They seemed unlikely to unite behind Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn as even a temporary caretaker prime minister and were running out of time to affect a legislative change that bans no-deal and delays departure to allow an alternative deal or revoking Brexit. Johnson has now deprived them of time and made it extremely difficult. However, he may have bitten off more than he can chew and begun to unite the disparate elements into a force that can, with the support of the Speaker, do that.
But Johnson has other options. He can orchestrate an election before or after the due date for departure. It is more risky beforehand because the Brexit Party could stand against Conservative candidates unless the two parties form a coalition in favour of no-deal. I don’t think Johnson wants no-deal, except as a bargaining chip, because his party will forever own even a small proportion of predicted chaos and shortages.
He can, in the end, decide when an election is called if he were to lose a vote of no-confidence and the Commons fails to agree on a replacement prime minister without an election. He can constitutionally hold it hours or days after the Brexit deadline expires.
Or he may find that some of his MPs decide to sacrifice their careers and vote against their government, abstain, or even vote for a new Prime Minister willing to seek a further delay and then a new deal subject to a fresh referendum between that new deal and Remain. The arithmetic is complicated by a number of Labour MPs who insist that Brexit, maybe even a no-deal one, has to be implemented.
An objectively weak prime minister is conducting determined psychological warfare with tactics that are not unconstitutional but are highly unusual. The question is whether opponents of no-deal can overcome their weaknesses. No-one can yet see how this gripping drama will end in late October.
The decision by Prime Minister Boris Johnson to suspend parliament for longer than normal has all the elements of a thrilling drama – a sudden decision, cunning advisers in the shadows, a secret visit by emissaries to the Queen at her holiday home in Scotland, acres of hyperbolic and choleric reaction including threats of civil disobedience, and fevered discussions between unholy alliances of foes.
Johnson’s decision to suspend parliament is a calculated confrontation and a high-stakes gamble to build his authority to do a new deal with the EU on the terms of withdrawal by making it much more difficult for parliament to take no-deal off the table. The EU may not move for anyone but will certainly not move for a Prime Minister who cannot win votes in the Commons.
The roots of the stand-off go back to casual and complacent decisions by the former prime minister David Cameron whose impending memoirs are now coincidentally much more saleable than before.
He appeased a minority in his own party that held the EU responsible for the weaknesses of the UK. To win the leadership of his party in 2005, he promised to withdraw his party from the mainstream Conservative alliance in the European Parliament and ended many routine conversations between allied parties in the EU.
He then promised an in/out referendum but never expected to have to honour it because he thought his hands would be tied by a continuing coalition with the pro-EU Liberal Democrats. He unexpectedly won a majority, dispensed with their services, and, having failed to get much movement on hot potato issues from the EU, embarked on a referendum.
Cameron wanted to lance the boil once and for all but, like most people, thought the status quo would prevail. He stayed his hand with internal opponents knowing he had to unite his party afterwards. He made no effort to put conditions on the referendum by, for instance, demanding a super-majority of the kind that is common with most clubs making constitutional changes.
Technically, the referendum was advisory but the government promised to implement it. The result was narrow – 52 percent to 48 – and revealed the chasm between elected representatives and the people. The people surprised themselves with the result and parliament and government had to decide exactly what it meant.
One can argue that the referendum was ill-conceived, an emotional spasm based on people seizing an opportunity to say they were unhappy, less perhaps with the EU than their lot in life. There has been much talk about lies, dark money, data abuse, but in the end it was a legitimate poll and it has to be implemented.
But what was ‘it’? Advocates of Brexit pooh-poohed the idea of no-deal during the referendum and told everyone how easy a deal with the EU would be. There were several ways to do Brexit but no consensus was reached either within the governing party or more widely about what it could mean. Furthermore, Cameron’s initially popular successor, Theresa May, flunked an election where many assumed she would get a thumping majority and was beholden to small factions in parliament.
Purists hardened their positions. Many Brexiteers decided the May deal was a pig in a poke and Brexit in name only while others united to stop the deal because they wanted something different or just to stay in the EU. May’s deal was, in my view, a reasonable start but was defeated three times and she had to resign. Johnson entered the frame.
It is now a matter of numbers and strength in the Commons. Johnson has decided to ignore the weakness of his position, a majority of just one, and go for broke. He is counting on his opponents being more divided than his party, which wants Brexit because it can be destroyed by hardliners, while the opposition parties want either to stop Brexit or achieve a better one.
They seemed unlikely to unite behind Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn as even a temporary caretaker prime minister and were running out of time to affect a legislative change that bans no-deal and delays departure to allow an alternative deal or revoking Brexit. Johnson has now deprived them of time and made it extremely difficult. However, he may have bitten off more than he can chew and begun to unite the disparate elements into a force that can, with the support of the Speaker, do that.
But Johnson has other options. He can orchestrate an election before or after the due date for departure. It is more risky beforehand because the Brexit Party could stand against Conservative candidates unless the two parties form a coalition in favour of no-deal. I don’t think Johnson wants no-deal, except as a bargaining chip, because his party will forever own even a small proportion of predicted chaos and shortages.
He can, in the end, decide when an election is called if he were to lose a vote of no-confidence and the Commons fails to agree on a replacement prime minister without an election. He can constitutionally hold it hours or days after the Brexit deadline expires.
Or he may find that some of his MPs decide to sacrifice their careers and vote against their government, abstain, or even vote for a new Prime Minister willing to seek a further delay and then a new deal subject to a fresh referendum between that new deal and Remain. The arithmetic is complicated by a number of Labour MPs who insist that Brexit, maybe even a no-deal one, has to be implemented.
An objectively weak prime minister is conducting determined psychological warfare with tactics that are not unconstitutional but are highly unusual. The question is whether opponents of no-deal can overcome their weaknesses. No-one can yet see how this gripping drama will end in late October.
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Gary Kent is the Secretary of the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) and a Fellow of Soran University. He writes this column for Rudaw in a personal capacity. The address for the all-party group is appgkurdistan@gmail.com.
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