In 2006, US Vice-President Joe Biden, then a senator from Delaware, proposed a plan to keep Iraq united and bring American soldiers home. The plan called for granting the Sunnis, Kurds and Shiite semi-autonomous federal regions.
In an opinion piece in the Washington Post in August 2006, Biden argued that the sectarian fighting between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq had led to more bloodshed than the violence inflicted by foreign terrorist organizations.
A long-term solution, he said, should not solely focus on terrorism but needed to address the underlying causes of the violence: the sectarian war and the lack of functioning institutions. Both tasks, Biden argued, could not be tackled solely by the United States.
He criticized the Bush administration for not having a coherent Iraq strategy, while those who were optimistic that the American military presence would control violence criticized Biden’s plan, saying it would divide Iraq.
History has proved Biden correct. The biggest challenge facing Iraq is not the rise of the Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS) but the social, economic and political factors unleashed by a sectarian conflict that has made Iraq a fertile ground for terrorist organizations. Addressing the sectarian conflict requires a broader engagement by the US and its regional allies.
Many at the time dismissed Biden’s vision, but the mood seems to have shifted in Washington. There is a growing consensus among policymakers in Congress and the White House that the sectarian conflict between Shiites and Sunnis lies at the heart of Iraq’s current problems.
Iraqi Kurds loom large in this debate. They are praised for their fight against IS, for protecting persecuted Yezidis and Christians and for creating an island of stability within an increasingly chaotic Iraq.
Critics of Obama’s policy, which advocates for a unified Iraq, argue that the country is already a de facto divided state and the US should back Kurdish aspirations for independence. A strong and stable Kurdistan, the logic goes, could become a reliable US ally in the region.
This new thinking is evidenced by the Obama administration’s decision to bypass Baghdad and directly arm Iraqi Kurds, and the muted response by American policymakers.
Yet, the US still does not have an Iraq strategy.
To provide a long-term solution to the IS threat, Iraq needs a government that embraces Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites. Maliki’s sectarian policies have played an important role in igniting the current sectarian conflict and his removal is a welcome development. But it is not enough.
Iraqis must form a united front against IS and create an inclusive government. The country’s biggest challenge will be to carry out out both tasks simultaneously.
Forming a government that represents all ethnic and sectarian groups is no easy task when a radical, well-armed group that has a considerable social base is making steady advances within your borders. It is a task that calls for joint action by Iraqis and international actors.
US airstrikes may have stopped the advance of IS into Erbil and Baghdad, but Washington does not have enough leverage to force Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds into a joint military action against IS and speed up the process of forming a new government. It needs help from other stakeholders.
By mobilizing Shiite militias around Baghdad, Iran played an important role in halting the IS advance toward the capital. Tehran also played a key role in Maliki’s decision to finally relinquish power.
As a result, the US needs to work with Iran to engage Shiites to counter the IS threat and create an inclusive government. The US will need its Sunni allies to play a similar role on the Sunni front.
A key piece of the Iraq puzzle is the Kurds, a group that will play a critical role in determining Iraq’s future course. The US intervention defending Erbil against IS and the arming of the Kurds by the CIA has given Washington enough leverage over Kurds to work toward a long-term solution to the chaos in Iraq.
Iraq’s problems call for a wider and more comprehensive engagement. Despite the shift in Washington’s thinking on Iraq since Biden devised his plan 8 years ago, there is one thing still intact: Washington does not have an Iraq strategy. And as it stands now, the US also doesn’t have the political will to become more involved.
* Gonul Tol is Executive Director of the Center for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute.
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