Winston Churchill and Chemical Warfare
Tom Tugendhat, the Conservative MP who chairs the Foreign Affairs Committee, recently told the House of Commons that “the then colonial secretary, one Winston Churchill, was the first person to use chemical weapons against the Kurds. Indeed, it was the Royal Air Force that dropped them ... we do not always have a glorious history.”
APPG Chairman Jack Lopresti MP asked the Commons Library, an acknowledged and unbiased source of information, to examine the issue. The researcher said “the consensus seems to be that no gas was used, although it was certainly considered and commanders called for supplies of chemical weapons.”
The Library notes that Churchill tends to be quoted selectively about backing chemical weapons use but that the often truncated quote, in language that is offensive but was commonly accepted at the time, suggests that he was referring to tear gas.
The full Churchill quote, dated May 12, 1919, reads: “It is sheer affectation to lacerate a man with the poisonous fragment of a bursting shell and to boggle at making his eyes water by means of lachrymatory gas. I am strongly in favor of using poisoned gas against uncivilized tribes. The moral effect should be so good that the loss of life should be reduced to a minimum. It is not necessary to use only the most deadly gasses: gasses can be used which cause great inconvenience and would spread a lively terror and yet would leave no serious permanent effects on most of those affected.”
The library also points to a 2009 American academic study by RM Douglas, which “has been influential in contesting claims that the British used chemical weapons although, almost a century on, it is difficult to be 100 percent sure what happened.”
Douglas notes: “It has passed as fact among historians, journalists and politicians, and has been recounted everywhere from tourist guidebooks to the floor of the US Congress: British forces used chemical weapons on Iraqis just after World War I,” but Douglas’s research indicates no such incident ever occurred.
Douglas finds that these claims “rest on very shaky foundations.” He examines a 1986 essay by historian Charles Townshend, which cites a 1921 letter from an official at the British Air Ministry saying that tear gas shells had been used against Arab rebels with “excellent moral effect.”
Douglas reveals that British forces had asked permission to use gas shells, but had not yet employed them in the field, while the reference to an “excellent moral effect” represented “the Air Ministry’s estimation of what gas bombs dropped from aircraft, if used, could be expected to achieve, rather than what gas shells had already achieved.”
Douglas adds that the Colonial Office sought clarification of the bombing claim from Army General Headquarters in Baghdad, and was told that “gas shells have not been used hitherto against [Iraqi] tribesmen either by aeroplanes or by artillery.”
Douglas concedes that high-profile British ministers very much wanted to use them, “but wanting to use them does not mean they did,” although he also notes their use was British policy in two brief periods in 1920-21. However, “in both cases, practical difficulties rather than moral qualms … prevented their use.”
Douglas also says that before 1920, the British War Cabinet expressly denied requests by field commanders to use tear gas in occupied Mesopotamia. He writes that this changed in June 1920, when an organized Arab rebellion erupted and Churchill, then War Secretary and a vocal advocate of non-lethal gas use, gave field commanders permission to use “existing stocks” of tear gas artillery shells.
Douglas points out there were no existing stocks of such weapons in Mesopotamia and, when the nearest supplies from Egypt arrived, the rebellion was over and the shells went unused.
In 1922, a Royal Air Force commander sought permission to convert unused artillery shells into air bombs. Churchill signed the request, but rescinded his permission days later when the Washington Disarmament Conference passed a resolution banning the use of tear gas. The shells, again, went unused.
Tugendhat told me that mustard gas shells left over from Gallipoli were used and that this is outlined in a history of the RAF. If that is true, the British should take it on the chin. After all, the British Empire was guilty of many horrors, which underpins the old saying that the sun never set on the British Empire because God didn’t trust the British in the dark.
But the historical controversy provides a cautionary note about modern myths, which are much easier to spread via social media. As one who observed the Kurdistan referendum, supported self-determination, and now think independence is necessary but was also sympathetic to the UK’s honorable diplomatic position in favor of dialogue and deferral of the referendum, I reject the suggestion that British policy was shaped by the prospect of BP winning a contract to handle oil production in Kirkuk.
The search for reliable oil supplies has long been a driver of foreign policy, and that once involved imperialist and colonial policies. But the idea that BP stands for British Policy in the modern age is a conspiracist trope. Red herrings pollute the waters, needlessly corrode Anglo-Kurdish relations, and obstruct efforts to encourage the UK to be bolder in its protection of Kurdistani rights.
Gary Kent is the Secretary of the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG). He writes this column for Rudaw in a personal capacity. The address for the all-party group is appgkurdistan@gmail.com.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
APPG Chairman Jack Lopresti MP asked the Commons Library, an acknowledged and unbiased source of information, to examine the issue. The researcher said “the consensus seems to be that no gas was used, although it was certainly considered and commanders called for supplies of chemical weapons.”
The Library notes that Churchill tends to be quoted selectively about backing chemical weapons use but that the often truncated quote, in language that is offensive but was commonly accepted at the time, suggests that he was referring to tear gas.
The full Churchill quote, dated May 12, 1919, reads: “It is sheer affectation to lacerate a man with the poisonous fragment of a bursting shell and to boggle at making his eyes water by means of lachrymatory gas. I am strongly in favor of using poisoned gas against uncivilized tribes. The moral effect should be so good that the loss of life should be reduced to a minimum. It is not necessary to use only the most deadly gasses: gasses can be used which cause great inconvenience and would spread a lively terror and yet would leave no serious permanent effects on most of those affected.”
The library also points to a 2009 American academic study by RM Douglas, which “has been influential in contesting claims that the British used chemical weapons although, almost a century on, it is difficult to be 100 percent sure what happened.”
Douglas notes: “It has passed as fact among historians, journalists and politicians, and has been recounted everywhere from tourist guidebooks to the floor of the US Congress: British forces used chemical weapons on Iraqis just after World War I,” but Douglas’s research indicates no such incident ever occurred.
Douglas finds that these claims “rest on very shaky foundations.” He examines a 1986 essay by historian Charles Townshend, which cites a 1921 letter from an official at the British Air Ministry saying that tear gas shells had been used against Arab rebels with “excellent moral effect.”
Douglas reveals that British forces had asked permission to use gas shells, but had not yet employed them in the field, while the reference to an “excellent moral effect” represented “the Air Ministry’s estimation of what gas bombs dropped from aircraft, if used, could be expected to achieve, rather than what gas shells had already achieved.”
Douglas adds that the Colonial Office sought clarification of the bombing claim from Army General Headquarters in Baghdad, and was told that “gas shells have not been used hitherto against [Iraqi] tribesmen either by aeroplanes or by artillery.”
Douglas concedes that high-profile British ministers very much wanted to use them, “but wanting to use them does not mean they did,” although he also notes their use was British policy in two brief periods in 1920-21. However, “in both cases, practical difficulties rather than moral qualms … prevented their use.”
Douglas also says that before 1920, the British War Cabinet expressly denied requests by field commanders to use tear gas in occupied Mesopotamia. He writes that this changed in June 1920, when an organized Arab rebellion erupted and Churchill, then War Secretary and a vocal advocate of non-lethal gas use, gave field commanders permission to use “existing stocks” of tear gas artillery shells.
Douglas points out there were no existing stocks of such weapons in Mesopotamia and, when the nearest supplies from Egypt arrived, the rebellion was over and the shells went unused.
In 1922, a Royal Air Force commander sought permission to convert unused artillery shells into air bombs. Churchill signed the request, but rescinded his permission days later when the Washington Disarmament Conference passed a resolution banning the use of tear gas. The shells, again, went unused.
Tugendhat told me that mustard gas shells left over from Gallipoli were used and that this is outlined in a history of the RAF. If that is true, the British should take it on the chin. After all, the British Empire was guilty of many horrors, which underpins the old saying that the sun never set on the British Empire because God didn’t trust the British in the dark.
But the historical controversy provides a cautionary note about modern myths, which are much easier to spread via social media. As one who observed the Kurdistan referendum, supported self-determination, and now think independence is necessary but was also sympathetic to the UK’s honorable diplomatic position in favor of dialogue and deferral of the referendum, I reject the suggestion that British policy was shaped by the prospect of BP winning a contract to handle oil production in Kirkuk.
The search for reliable oil supplies has long been a driver of foreign policy, and that once involved imperialist and colonial policies. But the idea that BP stands for British Policy in the modern age is a conspiracist trope. Red herrings pollute the waters, needlessly corrode Anglo-Kurdish relations, and obstruct efforts to encourage the UK to be bolder in its protection of Kurdistani rights.
Gary Kent is the Secretary of the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG). He writes this column for Rudaw in a personal capacity. The address for the all-party group is appgkurdistan@gmail.com.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.