Turkey’s Syrian mercenaries: Fighting Ankara’s war in Afrin

In December 2016, Ankara betrayed the Syrian rebels it initially supported, forcing them to leave Aleppo to the Assad regime. Ankara kept training and paying the hapless Sunni Arab and Turkmen rebels, however, planning to use them for its own designs. Having reconciled itself, at least for the time being, with Assad remaining in power, Turkey preferred to deploy the “Free Syrian Army” (FSA) remnants against Syrian Kurds. It first did so in places like Jarablus and al Bab, invading in August 2016 in order to prevent the Syrian Kurdish canton of Afrin from being linked up with Kobane and Jazira.

The 2016 operation was not militarily difficult, however, as Islamic State (ISIS) forces controlling Jarablus, al Baab and other areas about to be attacked by the Kurds voluntarily withdrew to let Turkey and the FSA in (after some fighting between ISIS and Turkish forces around al Bab). The Turkish and FSA soldiers thereby got a fairly easy series of parades and photo-ops in Syria.


Not so with Afrin today. The Kurdish-led People’s Protection Forces (YPG and YPJ) have vowed to resist the existential threat from Turkey. They appear ready and able to fight for every inch of the land they defended from both ISIS and the Assad regime. YPG/YPJ forces also appear to have more battle experience and determination than the Syrian Arab-Turkmen cannon fodder Ankara is throwing at them. 

Despite the extreme asymmetry in power between NATO-supplied tanks and aircraft and a people’s militia, the first week of Turkey’s military campaign appears to be coming to a close with not a single significant military gain for Turkey – and possibly a good many more casualties than Ankara is admitting.  

The highest number of casualties at the beginning of this campaign, however, seems to come from the FSA mercenaries Ankara is forcing into Afrin. 

In an interview with the Guardian newspaper, an FSA rebel commander stared at his force’s vehicles stuck in the mud in Afrin and said “It’s going to be a tough battle, maybe five or six months. [But] we have nobody except Turkey.” 

The newspaper went on to say that “…rebel officials and commanders interviewed by the Guardian say Turkey has helped them train thousands of fighters who could form the core of a unified rebel army, providing a lifeline in their battle against Assad. They say a victory in Afrin would open a ground corridor into Idlib province, controlled by HTS and under regime assault, allowing them to launch a full-scale attack to purge al-Qaida from the area."

The part about “purging al-Qaida from Idlib” is a lie for the British journalists of the Guardian, of course. A large chunk of Turkey’s FSA mercenaries appear to be jihadis themselves, including at least one infamous Chechen commander. 

What they really mean is "A victory in Afrin would allow them [the FSA] to resume the war against Assad." In other words, if Turkey was less concerned about their pro-PKK Syrian Kurdish countrymen, and if Kurdish-held areas did not separate Idlib from Turkey, the FSA could resume the civil war Turkey forced them to abandon in Aleppo.  

This is probably why Damascus is allowing the YPG Kurds to reinforce Afrin through regime-held areas. Assad and Russia cannot in their right minds allow Turkey to take Afrin. They want the Kurds to ask regime forces to come back to Afrin, but even that risks being tricky, as neither Turkey nor Damascus want to be directly fighting each other. 

So the YPG task centers on simply inflicting higher and higher casualties on the Turks and their allies. 

The "Free Syrian Army", which are now just mercenaries for Turkey, lose no matter what – they now die for Turkey's interests, and those interests no longer relate to Assad. Which is probably just as well, since many of these fighters would ethnically cleanse Afrin and other areas without a second thought. The non-Islamists amongst them would probably have a better chance for the future if they switched sides and joined the defenders of Afrin, in which case they would at least be with their fellow countrymen. 

Another loser in the whole ill-advised military campaign against Afrin (besides the people of Afrin of course), would have to be the United States. If Turkey succeeds in its campaign, the Americans will look impotent as their best and most reliable Syrian ally is weakened considerably – compromising the fight against ISIS and further tarnishing Washington’s image as a reliable ally. 

If Turkey’s campaign continues to stall, on the other hand, Ankara will furiously blame the Americans for arming and supporting the Syrian Kurds. Rather than look at its own post-attempted coup purges of its military (whose most able officers and pilots have been jailed), corruption and growing authoritarianism, leaders in Ankara will deflect as much blame as they can onto Washington. 

As a result, one would have expected more serious efforts by the Americans to put a stop to this lose-lose war between two of its allies. 

US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s statement of January 22, unfortunately, was extremely disappointing: “Turkey has legitimate concerns about terrorists crossing the border into Turkey and carrying out attacks,” he said, adding that the United States has asked Turkey to “just try to be precise, try to limit your operation, try to show some restraint.” 

Even ignoring the fact that there have not been any “terrorists” crossing from Afrin into Turkey, such weak language betrays the Syrian Kurds and does nothing to stop Turkey from destroying itself, the last of the FSA, and Afrin. 

A much better American statement would have stated that Turkey was never attacked or even threatened from Afrin, demand an immediate stop to the unjustified operation and promise a firm American commitment to keep the Turkey-Syrian border peaceful and quiet. Unfortunately, such is apparently too much to wish for from the White House or State Department these days… 

David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.