What Are the Prospects for Syria’s Kurds After Assad?

By Ari Mamshae

The Democratic Union Party (PYD), which was able to take control of the country’s Kurdish regions in a deal with the Damascus regime, faces formidable challenges in sustaining its rule over Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan).

To begin with, Rojava is surrounded by unwelcoming players. In addition, PYD leaders are pursuing policies that are earning them no favors. With the survival of Bashar al-Assad hanging in the balance, the Kurds of Rojava need external support to survive.

Despite the complex predictions of the situation in a post-Assad era, the current internal voices against the Kurds will become louder. The Western-embraced Syrian National Council is denying the Kurds a self-rule region. The Sunni jihadists, who are meanwhile at war with Assad and the Kurds, see Rojava as pro-regime and as infidel Marxists. And even if Assad survives, he will not accept the loose autonomy he granted to the Kurds during the conflict. Therefore, no matter the outcome or who triumphs, Rojava is locked from the west and south.

What remains is the north (Turkey) and east (Iraqi Kurdistan).

 For now, Turkey is definitely not happy with yet another Kurdish region on its border, particularly one that is known to be an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). This very fact has also impacted foreign support for Rojava, because the European Union and United States consider the PKK a terrorist organization.

Even the PYD’s fight against Islamic rebels, which the US defines as its staunchest enemies, has brought them no support. The PKK and PYD’s anti-Western position and Marxist ideology have impacted Rojava’s international image.

All these have been reasons for the lack of support from the main international powers involved in Syria.

Even Iraqi Kurdistan, where the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), has so far not enjoyed the good relations with Rojava that it was otherwise supposed to have.  The KRG’s main concern about the PYD is its sole grip on power, at the expense of other political parties. The KRG has publicly said that it wants the PYD to cooperate with the main political parties in Rojava and involve them in administration of the region, even its armed forces.

The current situation cannot persist for the PYD. First and foremost, the PYD must know that “unity at home” leads to “victory abroad.” Sharing power with the other Kurdish factions will make a significant contribution to the unity in Rojava. There should be no sole ownership of Rojava. PYD’s reluctance to a fair partnership with the others will be a shot in its own foot. Any inter-Kurdish rivalry means the demise of the administration. Once power-sharing with the other political parties is practiced, more support will be garnered for Rojava from the KRG and KDP.

Is there any Kurdish political party that is not happy with the achievements of the Syrian Kurds? That includes the KDP, which does not turn its back on fellow Kurds when Kurdish identity is at stake. For instance, even during the PYD-KDP disputes, Rojava continued to receive weapons and money from the KDP for the fight against Islamic rebels. This was declared by PYD leader Salih Muslim himself.

Regarding Turkey, the PYD’s attitude is heavily dependent on the peace process and the PKK’s position. But the PYD must identify Rojava’s own geopolitical realities, since it shares the largest border with Turkey.

The PYD should know that the failure of the peace process in Turkey will not bring it any advantage, should it continue to bear the same position towards Ankara. Turkey absolutely does not want to see the PKK present in Syria and will take any measure to prevent a strengthening of the PKK position there.

No Kurd would want the nascent semi-autonomy in Syria to be lost again.

But to maintain and strengthen control, the PYD needs to change its attitude towards Turkey and not publicly support the PKK. Turkish anxieties must be assuaged, and Ankara must be made to feel that Rojava is not just a PKK-dominated enclave. That will eventually lead to the cutting of Turkish sponsoring of anti-PYD groups. The PYD can offer Turkey a market in Syrian Kurdistan, in exchange for lifting its embargo. Once Turkey feels that Rojava is not a PKK enclave, relations will start to improve.

There is also room for Turkey to change its position towards Rojava. Witness the dramatic change of Turkey’s relations with Iraqi Kurdistan since 2007, when 200,000 Turkish soldiers were on the verge of intervention.

When the PYD differentiates itself from the PKK and promotes better relations with Turkey, international support for the PYD and the Kurdish administration in Syria will also follow, leading to foreign recognition for Syrian Kurdistan. Among key things that the PYD should do is to abandon the outdated Marxist-Maoist ideology inherited from the PKK. It is hard to approach the Western countries with this ideology.

Once the Kurds in Rojava, particularly the PYD, learn to play these games, a more promising prospect will appear for Kurdish autonomy in Syria. 

Ari Mamshae is a graduate of University of Kurdistan Hewler and a researcher into Middle Eastern affairs and the relationship between oil economy and democracy.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.