Is the party over for Iraq’s Islamic Dawa?

By Fariq Habib

The Islamic Dawa was founded in 1957, only coming to power in Iraq after almost 50 years as a banned opposition party. It has clung to power for 13 years – a period marked by failure and internal, regional, and international rivalries. Now its grip on power is about to end.

This turn of events arose after the Sayirun alliance, headed by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and the pro-Iran Fatih alliance, headed by Hadi al-Amiri, took the initiative to form the biggest parliamentary bloc with a view to creating a government in Baghdad.

The end of the Dawa’s reign can be interpreted from the standpoint of supreme Shiite authority, and from internal, regional, and international perspectives.

The Shiites Supreme Authority in Najaf has had the final say on all Iraqi political subjects since 2003. 

Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s fatwas often changes political equations in Iraq. This authority recently set some difficult conditions for candidates for the office of prime minister and indirectly rejected all those who have been tested before.

This dealt a heavy blow to the Dawa Party and a number of other Shiite parties too. The Shiite authority is pushing for a new political settlement – apparently by sidelining the Dawa Party.

From an internal perspective, Iraq was ruled over the past 13 years by the Dawa Party’s three wings: Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Nouri al-Maliki, and Haider al-Abadi. This period was marked by sectarianism and failure. 

During these years, people even began to feel nostalgia for Saddam Hussein’s rule, and the communities of Iraq confronted one other. The Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds became enemies. That is why changing the model of governance in Iraq has become a national necessity.

From a regional and international perspective: the situation is influenced by rivalries between the US and Iran on the one hand, and between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar on the other. Since Iraq’s May 12 election, these rivalries have hampered efforts to form a new government.

Observers said Iraq may even break apart under these pressures.

Iran and the US should reach a compromise on the future government of Iraq. If pro-Iranian parties form the next Iraqi government, pro-US parties will try to obstruct it, and vice versa. Iraq will return to the instability of the past 13 years.

That is why the reasonable solution is for pro-Iran and pro-US parties to form the new Iraqi government together. This can be achieved if the Sayirun and Fatih coalitions are the main participants of forming a government – in which Abadi and Maliki supporters may subsequently take part.

Recent reports indicate the Shiite authority wants the Sayirun and Fatih coalitions to form the government and for Kurds to be active participants. This might have pushed Abadi to say: “I will not cling to power. I will be committed to constitutional mechanisms of forming a government and instructions of the religious authority.”

The question is whether a government formed by the same people who gave rise to corruption, sectarianism, and complacency over the past 13 years can correct itself, execute its affairs, and reduce the calamities Iraqis are facing.