The Fading Star of Kurdistan’s Islamic Parties
The results of last month's provincial elections in the Kurdistan Region are finally out and what they show us is that Islamic parties have lost a remarkable number of votes compared to previous elections.
The cause of this decline can be attributed to a number of factors. Cliché slogans and poor campaign management by Islamic parties are one reason. While massive development in the region and education reforms, particularly in religious subjects cannot be overlooked.
The Islamic Union of Kurdistan (Yekgirtu) that was once the most popular religious party in Kurdistan has faced a-13-percent decrease in its number of votes between last month’s Iraqi parliamentary elections and those of four years ago.
In the provincial polls the group didn’t fare any better. From September 21, 2013 when the autonomous region held parliamentary polls to April this year, Yekgirtu’s results show a-19-percent drop.
Not long ago leaders of Yekgirtu and their supporters were much inspired by the rise of Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power through elections. They gleamed at AKP’s successful governance and undoubtedly aspired to follow suit. Both parties have similar ideology for the state and religion.
Many thought that AKP’s triumphs might reverberate positively on the other side of the border in the form of more votes for Kurdish Islamic parties. But on the contrary, it was the Kurdish secular parties and the Kurdistan Region as a whole that embraced the new Turkey.
AKP’s rise had little or no impact on Islamism in the Kurdistan Region. In fact it soon turned out that the AKP was grappling with a fierce Islamic opponent of its own: the Gulen movement.
It can’t be denied that Islamic parties, in particular Yekgirtu, were once popular. They held regular seminars for young Kurds who frequented the mosques. They would organize Koran memorization contests, social and sports events.
The civil war between the secular parties in the 1990s had given Islamic groups the space they needed which they cleverly exploited to rally all voices of dissent against the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
But this is no longer the case. In addition to the new education system that has less emphasis on religious texts, the regional authorities and security forces have no stomach for Islamism. Students are now taught about other faiths, among them the Yezidi faith, and clerics are instructed by the government to focus more on day-to-day social issues and not preach intolerance.
The outcome of this is evident in the fact that Halabja that was for years the hotbed of Islamic parties has been won subsequently by secular parties such as the PUK and the Change Movement (Gorran). Even the KDP whose political and election campaign were limited in the area did relatively well as compared to Yekgirtu.
By the same token, Yekgirtu and the Islamic League (Komal)—with under 6 percent of the votes—were swept aside in Sulaimani, Erbil and Duhok.
The Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK), that is considered the mother group of several radical parties, such as Komal itself and Ansar al-Islam and was once strong enough to impose its will on the Kurdish government, won only a little over 16,000 votes in the April 30 elections.