Washington’s Fear of Kurdistan

In last week’s column, I criticized the United State’s apparent willingness to heavily arm just about anyone except the Kurds – Shiite militias (via the Iraqi Army), Syrian Sunni rebels of questionable allegiance, a NATO “ally” that regularly peddles conspiracy theories about the Americans, and very repressive regimes in general. Washington shies away from providing more to the Kurds because it fears strengthening the push for an independent Kurdish state. 

This happens despite the fact that the Kurds appear to be a much more dependable ally of the Americans.  From 2003 to 2011, not a single Coalition soldier died in Iraqi Kurdistan.  Kurdish movements from other parts of Kurdistan likewise have never targeted Americans, even when Washington was arming the repressive regimes they rebelled against.  This week it might therefore prove useful to discuss what the American policymakers fear from the prospect of Kurdish independence.

First and foremost, we should remember that America is a “stability seeking power.”  The country that created and benefits the most from the post-World War Two international order remains very leery of any changes to the order’s most fundamental underlying principle – the inviolability of current borders.  If a Kurdish state emerged in any part of Kurdistan – peacefully or via armed conflict – leaders in the West fear that state would harbor irredentist aspirations to liberate the rest of Kurdistan.  Once the genie of border revisions has been released in even a part of Kurdistan, no one is sure they could get it back in its lamp. This seems particularly true if the nascent Kurdish state does well for itself while ethnic kin in neighboring states remain oppressed minorities. The demonstration effect will give Kurdish rebels all across Kurdistan something tangible to aspire to, much the way Iraqi Kurdish autonomy is already doing.

American diplomats and policy makers also spend a lot more time speaking to the diplomats and policy makers of other existing states than leaders of “sub-state groups.”  They get socialized to their points of view.  So when a Turkish ambassador or Iraqi minister asks them to refrain from “destabilizing their government by supporting the Kurds,” they tend to listen readily.  The argument has a naturally compelling logic, especially for a country that suffered through its own very bloody war of attempted secession not so long ago.  In the case of completely delegitimized, “rogue states,” Washington prefers to support governments in exile such as the Syrian National Council than secessionist movements seeking to redraw boundaries and challenge the whole system. 

In the case of Iraq, supporting the Kurds’ ability to secede carries an added embarrassment for Washington: An admission that the state they spent so much blood and money rebuilding after 2003 is a failure.  If Kurdistan seceded, what remained of Iraq would include a much larger Shiite majority and a correspondingly greater chance of close, enduring alignment with Iran rather than the United States. The Arab world would no doubt accuse Washington of having planned the creation of “another Israel” in their midst all along.

In the case of the Kurdish movement in Turkey and Syria, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) long association with Marxist-Leninism and now anarchist “anti-statism” helps alienate American elites, no matter how well the PKK and its sister parties fight the Islamic State. Turkey also draws a lot more water in the region – with its huge economy, population and geo-strategic position – than any Kurdish group.  Even as Washington’s relations with Ankara sink to historic lows, it is still not enough to cause a reappraisal of whom to listen to and whom to back. Only a very severe falling out with Turkey might prove sufficient to move the Americans to look for new allies against Ankara’s wishes.

All these obstacles to a “special relationship” between America and the Kurds should be weighed against the alternatives and potential benefits of backing the Kurds, however. Your humble columnist does not think leaders in Washington have displayed the imagination or courage to look sincerely at their real choices in the region, as opposed to a false dichotomy of a Kurdish Pandora’s Box versus an idealized, stable Middle East full of eager, dependable friends.  American fears of independent Kurdistans also seem to prevent the Americans from acquiescing to the kind of extensive autonomy the Kurds, given their history, need in order to feel secure within present state boundaries.  The resultant message from Washington seems to be “help us with our interests, but stop causing trouble for the sake of your own interests.” 

That message needs to be changed, especially if Washington wants a more effective local fighting force against the Islamic State.

David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He is the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and author of The Kurdish Nationalist Movement (2006, Cambridge University Press) and co-editor (with Mehmet Gurses) of Conflict, Democratization and the Kurds in the Middle East (2014, Palgrave Macmillan).

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.

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