Kurdistan in a ‘War Game’: Inching towards Independence

The critical role of the Kurds in the ongoing war against Islamic extremism in the Middle East was once again proven in a political and military simulation organized by Tel Aviv University in recent weeks.

The simulation assumed a specific military scenario in which Iran would withdraw from ongoing nuclear negotiations with the United States and the European Union to pursue a nuclear weapons program, and the Islamic State would invade vast territories including Jordan and parts of the Shiite mainland in Iraq. During the simulation, political experts represented many of the various actors involved in the region, including the Islamic State (IS), United States, the European Union, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Egypt, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia and Israel. The simulation primarily focused on the likely outcomes of such a scenario, while also seeking to estimate the amount of leverage of the aforementioned actors upon each other, as well as on the overall situation. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was among the entities represented in the simulation as part of Iraq, which towards the end of the simulation began acting as a sovereign entity.

Represented by the Kurdish Studies Program of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, the most surprising conclusion for the KRG from the simulation was the willingness of almost all actors to interact with the landlocked, relatively small regional government. During the simulation, the Islamic State expanded its territorial control to include the cities of Karbala and Najaf in the predominately Shiite areas of southern Iraq in the absence of an organized Iraqi military power to confront it. As a result of the IS advance, the KRG appeared as the only stable actor in the country with which international and regional powers can interact. In retrospect, the role of the KRG in the imagined scenario reflected the Kurdish region’s particular political position at the current moment, however with dramatically improved relations with regional and global actors.

First and foremost with a rapidly disintegrating and war-torn Iraq, the KRG managed to secure a green light from the United States to perform unilateral oil sales via Turkey. This primarily resulted from the deterioration of Iraq’s financial situation as a result of mounting defense expenditures and the need to provide the KRG with 17 percent of the budget share. In the absence of weapons support to the KRG from the central Iraqi government, the Kurdish semi-autonomous region secured heavy weapons deliveries from the political experts representing the United States upon KRG assurances to take an active part in a prospective operation to recapture Mosul from the Islamic State.

Unsurprisingly, Iran politely refused KRG’s inquiries to provide military and financial aid by highlighting its increasing role in supporting the Iraqi government to regain control of Shiite areas in southern Iraq from the Islamic State. Furthermore, an active member in the current U.S.-led international coalition against the IS, Saudi Arabia, agreed to grant the KRG a sum of US$5 billion to cover its immediate expenses instead of acting as a mediator between the Kurdistan Region and international buyers as the KRG pursued its independent oil exportation policy.

Both members of the so-called Eastern Bloc, Russia and China, showed willingness to cooperate with the KRG in business matters. Russia refused to support Kurdish independence but China said it would have to consult with Iran on this matter. Russia took the matter even further by officially requesting that the KRG approve concessions for Russian oil companies in the Kurdistan Region. Meanwhile, experts representing Egypt made it clear that their current domestic turmoil precludes the country from supporting Kurdistan’s unilateral policies.

The dramatic changes in the political and military situation in the Middle East imposed equally remarkable alterations in the policies of regional and global actors in addressing the KRG. Critical region actors, Turkey and Israel, preserved their positions vis-à-vis the Kurdistan Region with slight policy adjustments. Turkey was among the first countries that offered covert military and financial support to the KRG following the breakout of the regional crisis. Although the country overtly maintained its neutral status, it offered to send weapons and ammunition to the KRG Peshmerga forces in a clandestine manner.

Israel, as one of the only buyers of Kurdish oil and an outspoken supporter of the KRG’s independence, stated in the simulation that it would continue to support the Kurds, but this time with heavy weapons and tactical training of its forces. However, Israel also joined other actors in being hesitant to support Kurdish self-proclaimed autonomy in Syria.

The brief, but thought-provoking simulation in Tel Aviv once again demonstrated the critical role the Kurds play in the political dynamics of the Middle East, a fact increasingly noticed by regional and international actors. Such comprehension of the Kurds’ capacity to influence regional politics continues to bring more financial, military and political support, particularly for the KRG. This can be easily observed, both from the current political situation and the recent Tel Aviv University simulation. The democratic and secular image the Kurds have created in the past few years stands as one of the major factors that has paved the path for global recognition of their right to self-rule and eligibility for global support.

As long as this image is preserved, increasing global support for the Kurds in general and the KRG more specifically, will allow the Kurds in all four parts of Kurdistan to capitalize on the ongoing regional chaos and garner greater autonomy.

-Prof. Ofra Bengio, Head of the Kurdish Studies Program, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv 

-Ceng Sagnic, Junior Research Fellow, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv 

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.