Dissolution of Hashd part of Iraqi Army's long sectarian to-and-fro

The domination of military institutions in Iraq through sectarian conflict has a long history.

When the Iraqi Army was first established, effort was made to institutionalize it in a manner that would prevent it becoming part of political and ethnic conflict. The advent of the Baath Party regime, however, put an end to these efforts. Army neutrality was ended as part of a full Baathist control of all state institutions, including those of the security and military. 

Following the fall of Saddam Hussein, Paul Bremer dissolved Iraq's army as a means of ending its sectarian hegemony. With the atrocities committed by the army against its own people, particularly Kurds and Shiites, in mind, Iraqi political parties saw Bremer’s move as the starting point for a national army that could assure Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites that no one group would unilaterally dominate the army. 

Some basic principles were set in the temporary laws of the transitional government and later concretized in the 2005 constitution, regulating soldier numbers, recruitment methods. and the administration of the army by Iraq’s  main ethnic and religious groups in Iraq based on partnership. This was done to prevent the filling of the army with a particular sect, as Saddam had done with Sunnis, which could have led to army involvement in sectarian conflicts once again.

However, in the early days of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s tenure, these constitutional and legal principles were somehow violated, and most of decision-making positions in the army - at all levels - were dominated by Shiites and Shiite loyalists, despite US presence as a monitor.

Later, Sunnis were marginalized in the army as a result of Shiite resurgence in the wider Sunni-Shiite conflict and the presence of terrorist groups in predominantly Sunni areas of the country. The Kurdish presence also weakened, due to Erbil-Baghdad tensions. The army was so imbalanced that it was on the verge of Shiite domination. Despite objections from Kurds and Sunnis, the conflict and Shiite-ization of the army continued until the emergence of Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq, when Shiites achieved dominance over the army and controlled the country’s security and military institutions.

The situation emerged during ISIS’ first offensives, when the army was unable to resist, fleeing and leaving behind weaponry. They handed all Sunni areas over to ISIS overnight. Soon after, Shiite Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called for the arming of Shiites on the ground to protect Iraq’s holy sites.
 
The threat of ISIS provided the pretext for the activation of a strategy for the Shiite-ization of security and military institutions, to the point where it could control the army. Even if the threat from ISIS had not arisen, an alternative pretext would have been used. It may take decades for people to expose what took place behind the scenes.

Following the establishment of Hashd al-Shaabi (otherwise known as the Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMF), the process of Shiite-ization began to take hold, using war with ISIS and Erbil-Baghdad issue as reasons. The results are clear: we see the heights Shiites have reached in the Kurdistan Region and in Sunni areas.
 
Shiite power now holds all Iraqi administrative and judicial institutions under their control. When war with ISIS neared its end, they (Shiite politicians) passed a special law for Hashd in parliament, guaranteeing fighters’ power and financial rights when Shiite politicians knew that the end of the war meant there would be no excuse for staying in these areas. When ISIS was declared defeated in Iraq, PMF power was cemented when modern, exclusive weapons originally given to the Iraqi Army by the US ended up in their hands.
  

When the US-Iran conflict escalated to a point where Iranian armed forces and their allies were listed as terrorists, the process of concealing the PMF began. Iraqi people heard in the media that Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi dissolved Hashd and annexed them to Iraqi Army - without prior preparation or previously prepared excuses.

Various PMF wings said they that they would comply with the PM’s decision and Shiite political parties supported the move. The prime minister, however, does not have the power to dissolve laws. There is a special amendment in the constitution for PMF. However, neither the judiciary authority nor constitutional courts, nor any other institution opposed the move. Instead, everyone is praising the decision, creating the impression that this move was a universally agreed upon move to strengthen the Iraqi Army.

 

It is clear that this move was not meant to actually dissolve the PMF but had other objectives - above all, the protection of the PMF from US blacklisting and sanctions, and to cement the Shiite composition of the army.

Now that the Shiites are in full control of the army, a number of genocides and massacres await both Kurds and Sunnis.