Chatter among Iraq’s political pundits has reached fever pitch as Prime Minister-designate Mohammad Tofiq Allawi prepares to announce his new cabinet.
According to insider sources, Allawi is now finalizing his cabinet nominations. However, very little is known about who will be appointed to which ministry or how they were selected.
One thing that appears certain is Allawi’s intention to overhaul the entire cabinet. It is also understood Allawi has been given a free hand to pick his ministers without pressure from Iraq’s powerful political blocs.
This approach has angered some of Iraq’s political leaders, who are already weighing up a move into opposition rather than joining him.
Can he make it work?
Some observers say Allawi is stuck between a rock and hard place.
The rock is the pledges he made to Iraq’s anti-government protesters on the day of his nomination, which some have described as more of a “wish list” than actual deliverable policies.
The hard place is the demands of the political parties for their “electoral right” to be represented in government. After all, Allawi needs the political parties to approve his cabinet in a parliamentary vote.
Some pundits give Allawi a 50-50 chance of getting his cabinet approved, while others are far more generous in their predictions. Either way, the outlook looks promising for Allawi. The rationale behind these odds of success can be understood as follows:
Better the devil you know
Iraq’s big Shiite political blocs have spent almost three months debating, quarrelling, and maneuvering to agree a compromise candidate.
Besides Allawi, the parties proposed intelligence chief Mustafa al-Kadhemi and former minister of planning Ali al-Shukri. The Sadrists of the Sayirun bloc vetoed Shukri while the pro-Iran Fatih bloc vetoed Kadhemi. This allowed Allawi to emerge as the compromise candidate.
Article 76-3 of the Iraqi constitution gives the president a free hand to nominate whom so he desires if Allawi fails to form his cabinet within 30 days. This notion is somewhat scary for some of the Shiite mainstream parties, because they cannot guarantee he will pick the devil they know.
To force the hands of the political parties, outgoing PM Adil Abdul-Mahdi told them he will step down on March 3 no matter what happens, which means President Barham Salih (a Kurd) could assume the role of caretaker prime minister until a new PM is selected. This would not sit well with the Shiite blocs.
Continuation of chaos
According to some observers, Allawi’s bacon might be saved thanks to the immense pressure on the big political blocs to deliver on the promise of reform. The longer they dither, the deeper Iraq could slide into anarchy.
The protest movement is gathering new momentum after the announcement of a truce between supporters of Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and the young anti-government protesters occupying city centers across southern and central Iraq.
The louder the movement shouts, the heavier the weight presses down on Iraq’s political elite.
Inter-Shiite turmoil
To date, the protests have been concentrated in Iraq’s Shiite constituencies of Baghdad, Nasiriya, and Najaf. The vast majority of those killed or wounded in clashes are from the Shiite community. The bloodshed will be difficult to sustain without plunging Iraq’s Shiite areas into a full fledged civil war.
There are numerous armed Shiite groups on both sides, in addition to the tribes of the south. Some even possess heavy weaponry. If matters get out of hand, these forces could declare small fiefdoms and take control, sowing the seeds of further chaos.
Shiite leaders are fully aware of the dangers if they continue down this path and understand they must give way to a more logical alternative. They hope a new government, tasked with preparing for an early election, will help ease the unrest and allow time to regroup and rethink their strategy.
In addition, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s top Shiite religious authority, has consistently demanded the formation of a new government as a vital step towards early elections.
Sistani also made it clear that his office has no say or opinion on the type of cabinet formed or the personalities represented, which indicates his desire for the political parties to get on with it and stop dithering and obstructing.
The Iran factor
Iran has long considered Iraq the crown jewel of its Middle East strategy, its main trading gateway to the world, a base for expanding into the other territories such as Syria and Lebanon, and, more importantly, a platform to counter US sanctions.
Iranian ties with Iraq go beyond economy and politics into faith and religion. Tehran regards the Shiites of Iraq as part of its own nation.
The Iranian regime also believes it has done Iraq’s Shiites several big favors, defending them against the Sunni extremists of the Isalmic State (ISIS). So when Iranian officials hear the Shiite youth in the streets of Najaf and Karbala chanting “Iran out, out”, they must be wondering what went wrong.
Add to this the loss of Qasem Soleimani, the main architect of Iran’s Middle East policy, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the main implementer of these policies in Iraq, in a US drone strike in early January, and Tehran finds itself on the back foot in the immediate term.
Iran has learned a big lesson and has now opted for a different approach. It needs time to regroup and rethink its policy in Iraq, to restore a degree of calm and order, and therefore end the political rollercoaster by supporting the new cabinet – at least for the time being. Tehran is well aware it has more to gain by backing Allawi’s cabinet than opposing it.
The international community
Although public endorsement of Allawi’s nomination among the international community has been mute to say the least, reservations are being expressed privately.
Most foreign observers wish to see Allawi succeed and form his new government and support at least part of his ambitious “wish list”. Few, however, want to come out prematurely, fearing the “kiss of death”.
The support of the international community is crucial to prevent political factions exploiting Allawi’s lack of a strong base to derail his cabinet formation.
Kurdish and Sunni opposition
Some Sunni and Kurdish blocs are demanding solid representation in the new cabinet, or insisting on the right to select their own ministers. Having said that, Allawi is working hard to convince Sunni and Kurdish leaders of his political vision. Those close to him believe he is succeeding.
In addition, if the majority Shiite blocs come out in favor of the new cabinet, then the vote by Sunni and Kurdish blocs would become a mere formality.
If played correctly, there could be enough diversity among the MPs who vote for Allawi’s cabinet for him to legitimately claim plurality and inclusivity.
Possibilities of failure
Taken together, one can only conclude that Allawi should be able to form his government – save for some unforeseen circumstances or ill-conceived decisions, like an unpopular candidate or a major shift in the region’s geopolitics.
It is fair to say that the majority of MPs have low expectations of Allawi’s government delivering on the “wish list”, but still feel they must vote for it. Their main concern is the timetable for new elections.
What will happen next?
Allawi was nominated on February 2 and has until March 3 to present his cabinet to the parliament. Sources close to events in Baghdad suggest the announcement could come at the end of this week. An extraordinary session of parliament would then be called some time next week.
A vote will be held on each and every ministerial candidate, then on the entire cabinet and its program. Allawi will only be successful if more than half of the cabinet is approved and a collective vote is secured for the program.
This parliament has managed to vote down many cabinet nominations in the past and a recurrence cannot be ruled out.
What is certain is that the country cannot tolerate more dithering and procrastination by political elites and there is no room for delay. Otherwise chaos and ruin is the inevitable fate.
Farhad Alaaldin was a political adviser to former Iraqi President Fuad Masum, the former chief of staff to the KRG prime minister from 2009 to 2011, and former senior adviser to the KRG prime minister from 2011 to 2012.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
