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An Iraqi soldier walks past a mural bearing the logo of the Islamic State (ISIS) on the outskirts of Mosul, March 1, 2017. File photo: Ahmad Al-Rubaye / AFP
The past couple of weeks have seen several reports of Islamic State (ISIS) resurgence in Iraq and Syria. The jihadis are apparently regrouping, taxing isolated rural communities, mounting a growing number of attacks (including one in which a US soldier was killed in Nineveh last week), and reorganizing for a guerrilla war as they did prior to 2014.
A new report from the Inspector General of the US Department of Defense claims ISIS can still count on 14,000 to 18,000 fighters across Iraq and Syria. The report is scathing towards President Donald Trump’s decision to abruptly scale down the already limited number of US troops in Syria and to withdraw many diplomatic personnel from Iraq – blaming these moves for the resurgence.
When Brett McGurk, the American Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL (the American term for ISIS), resigned in December following Trumps Syria withdrawal announcement, he warned his policies would lead to chaos and “an environment for extremists to thrive”. Other top officials also chose to resign over the move, including then-defense secretary Jim Mattis. All strenuously disagreed with Trump’s “mission accomplished” and “let’s move on” attitude.
Why is countering ISIS in Iraq and Syria proving so difficult?
In places like Afghanistan, with its rugged high mountains, low levels of development, and a population that is seventy percent rural, one can understand the serious challenges of counter-insurgency. Syria and Iraq, however, are comparatively much more developed and seventy percent urban. The areas where ISIS operates are also quite flat, depriving them of the rugged mountainous terrain that is so helpful to insurgents.
Nor does the United States always fail in establishing stability following a war. After World War II and the Korean War, the Americans retained a commitment to building new, functioning governments in Germany, Japan, and South Korea. Although they faced insurgent attacks (mainly in Germany) after these wars, they remained committed to rebuilding these post conflict societies and the resultant pro-American success stories they became.
In Iraq as well, the US decision in 2006 to foster and partner with allied Sunni forces – the Sahwa Awakening Councils or “sons of Iraq” Sunni tribal militia – ended the al Qaeda insurgency there. When the US abruptly withdrew in December 2011, however, the Iraqi government under Nouri al-Maliki quickly abandoned the Awakening Councils (ending their salary payments and failing to incorporate them or their communities into Iraq’s governing system) and even turned on the Sunnis in general. The result came just three and a half years later, with ISIS capturing Mosul and most of Sunni Arab Iraq.
Along with precipitous withdrawals, it is perhaps Washington’s insufficient commitment to supporting good governance, federalism, and power sharing in Iraq (and conceivably Syria) that accounts for a bigger insurgency problem than projected. Iraq in particular has revenue of its own, but without real power sharing that revenue and the ability to rebuild never makes it to the post-conflict areas that need it most.
Nineveh, Kirkuk, Saladin, Anbar, and other war-battered areas still lie in ruins. In Syria, the same is true of Raqqa and other former ISIS strongholds. In Syria, the Kurdish-led administration and its forces remain isolated, embargoed, and without any financial means to effectively administer the liberated areas. In Iraq, Sunni Arab areas still lack the autonomy of Kurdistan or a significant role in Baghdad, meaning they have little say over the institutions that administer them.
Especially in regions with many sectarian divisions, high levels of power sharing, decentralization and the financial means for local administrations to function well remain crucial for post-conflict reconstruction and stability. While not perfect, the Bosnian example shows that this approach remains viable.
Unless Washington commits more to northeastern Syria and pushes Baghdad to respect its own decentralizing and federal constitution, however, the hydra of jihadist insurgency and instability in general will keep haunting the area and calling America back.
The American commitment need not be on the scale of the Marshall Plan that rebuilt Europe or the never-ending placement of troops in South Korea. It just needs to play smart and take its existing efforts a little more seriously.
A new report from the Inspector General of the US Department of Defense claims ISIS can still count on 14,000 to 18,000 fighters across Iraq and Syria. The report is scathing towards President Donald Trump’s decision to abruptly scale down the already limited number of US troops in Syria and to withdraw many diplomatic personnel from Iraq – blaming these moves for the resurgence.
When Brett McGurk, the American Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL (the American term for ISIS), resigned in December following Trumps Syria withdrawal announcement, he warned his policies would lead to chaos and “an environment for extremists to thrive”. Other top officials also chose to resign over the move, including then-defense secretary Jim Mattis. All strenuously disagreed with Trump’s “mission accomplished” and “let’s move on” attitude.
Why is countering ISIS in Iraq and Syria proving so difficult?
In places like Afghanistan, with its rugged high mountains, low levels of development, and a population that is seventy percent rural, one can understand the serious challenges of counter-insurgency. Syria and Iraq, however, are comparatively much more developed and seventy percent urban. The areas where ISIS operates are also quite flat, depriving them of the rugged mountainous terrain that is so helpful to insurgents.
Nor does the United States always fail in establishing stability following a war. After World War II and the Korean War, the Americans retained a commitment to building new, functioning governments in Germany, Japan, and South Korea. Although they faced insurgent attacks (mainly in Germany) after these wars, they remained committed to rebuilding these post conflict societies and the resultant pro-American success stories they became.
In Iraq as well, the US decision in 2006 to foster and partner with allied Sunni forces – the Sahwa Awakening Councils or “sons of Iraq” Sunni tribal militia – ended the al Qaeda insurgency there. When the US abruptly withdrew in December 2011, however, the Iraqi government under Nouri al-Maliki quickly abandoned the Awakening Councils (ending their salary payments and failing to incorporate them or their communities into Iraq’s governing system) and even turned on the Sunnis in general. The result came just three and a half years later, with ISIS capturing Mosul and most of Sunni Arab Iraq.
Along with precipitous withdrawals, it is perhaps Washington’s insufficient commitment to supporting good governance, federalism, and power sharing in Iraq (and conceivably Syria) that accounts for a bigger insurgency problem than projected. Iraq in particular has revenue of its own, but without real power sharing that revenue and the ability to rebuild never makes it to the post-conflict areas that need it most.
Nineveh, Kirkuk, Saladin, Anbar, and other war-battered areas still lie in ruins. In Syria, the same is true of Raqqa and other former ISIS strongholds. In Syria, the Kurdish-led administration and its forces remain isolated, embargoed, and without any financial means to effectively administer the liberated areas. In Iraq, Sunni Arab areas still lack the autonomy of Kurdistan or a significant role in Baghdad, meaning they have little say over the institutions that administer them.
Especially in regions with many sectarian divisions, high levels of power sharing, decentralization and the financial means for local administrations to function well remain crucial for post-conflict reconstruction and stability. While not perfect, the Bosnian example shows that this approach remains viable.
Unless Washington commits more to northeastern Syria and pushes Baghdad to respect its own decentralizing and federal constitution, however, the hydra of jihadist insurgency and instability in general will keep haunting the area and calling America back.
The American commitment need not be on the scale of the Marshall Plan that rebuilt Europe or the never-ending placement of troops in South Korea. It just needs to play smart and take its existing efforts a little more seriously.
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David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East. |
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