The Gorran party was shocked by the swift meetings of the KDP and PUK leadership bodies which subsequently formed a high political committee to meet with other political parties along with Baghdad. It was stunned by the speed at which the decisions made in the bilateral meeting were enforced.
The Gorran party was still considering a meeting to discuss the PUK’s recent roadmap for the party’s vision, with whom Gorran has an alliance agreement, before it was stunned by the PUK’s political maneuverings. Hence, the Gorran party was befuddled initially, and worse than all, the PUK had no explanations for the Gorran party in this regard.
Refusing to meet with the KDP-PUK joint committee and arguing in favor of the reopening of the parliament to settle political matters, was apparently Gorran’s response to the KDP’s earlier rejection to meet with a joint committee formed previously by the Gorran party and the PUK. But the stance taken by the Gorran party in this matter appeared to be somewhat unreflective.
The PUK, KDP and other political parties have somehow been able to separate the question of the independence referendum and the fate of the province of Kirkuk as two national causes from internal political disagreements in the region.
There are legal and political barriers facing the referendum. But the KDP and the PUK have alternatives for legal hurdles and have also taken into account the Gorran party’s reactions in this matter. Gorran’s position shows the party’s disappointment in the bilateral alliance with the PUK, which doesn’t take Gorran’s regional pressures seriously. The PUK looks at the bigger picture, instead.
Instead of reflecting on the question of referendum, the Gorran party is engaged with preparations for an election which is highly likely to be delayed. The party’s current political position might well push the party to boycott the anticipated referendum in the end.
It will be hard for the Gorran party to ask its fans to participate in the referendum with a Yes or No vote. However, it can ask its fans to boycott or leave the choice for them whether to participate in the referendum, under the pretext that holding the referendum was a party decision made outside the parliament.
The result of a referendum which asks the people of southern Kurdistan whether they want to be independent or part of an invading country, is clear. It is also clear that the majority of Kurds want independence despite differences of opinion in other matters. Foes and friends alike know this.
In regard to the referendum on independence, there are two important things which shouldn’t be overlooked. First, the political establishment should enforce the opinion of people once sought to settle a question. In this case, the political establishment should commit to the opinion of people. They should set a time frame for the establishment of an independent state should the majority of people vote for independence.
Currently, there is an argument that the Yes vote might not be necessarily immediately implemented. But this argument could merely be intended to ward off concerns raised by regional countries.
Kurdistan Region’s referendum on independence is and will be different to those held in other places of the world. For example, in Europe, the establishment can decide in a week to hold a referendum on a simple matter, and subsequently enforce the outcome which will have the commitment and compliance of all parties.
If there is going to be a referendum due to which the region’s political and economic problems are sidelined for a while, the people of Kurdistan should understand that the outcome will be used neither to forget internal crises nor will it be used as a pressure card by the establishment.
Second, the question of referendum along with the conviction that coexistence with Baghdad is no longer feasible has now become the core of the political argument in the Kurdistan Region. Has the Kurdish leadership got any plans to deal with Baghdad with a different formula, in the event the referendum doesn’t go ahead for some reason, namely due to opposition from regional countries?
The striking thing about Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's threats was that he had not used this kind of language in dialogues with the Kurdistan Region for nearly eight years. In the past, he was talking about the constitutional rights of the Kurds to extract and sell oil of the Kurdistan Region and Kirkuk. He even allowed the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to directly export Kirkuk’s oil through pipelines to Ceyhan port for sale.
This rhetoric changed recently. He threatened to strain relations (with the KRG), and even said that a heavy price will be paid for raising Kurdistan’s flag in Kirkuk. Erdogan’s recent threats should have pleased parties unhappy about relations between Turkey and the KRG.
But the reality is that there were certain things written to be said by Erdogan which he himself didn’t believe in, probably written by his advisor İlnur Çevik. This kind of language by Erdogan was merely intended to appease the country’s Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) which is in alliance with the president’s ruling party until Turkey’s constitutional referendum is voted on.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
